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Chapter 1
Introduction
An extensive literature generally agrees that early childhood development can
have lasting impacts on adulthood outcomes (Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007;
Santrock, 2004). Because skills are shaped by both genetic factors and choices,
investments in the early years of childhood can be important determinants for
adult outcomes (Helmers and Patnam, 2011; Lam and Duryea, 1999; Rosenzweig
and Stark, 1997; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994). In addition to this, child devel-
opment research also shows that there are sensitive periods in a child’s life when
the development of skills is at its peak (Blau and Currie, 2006; Cunha and Heck-
man, 2007). This implies that gaps in human capital accumulation can occur at
early ages.
In the context of developing countries, Grantham-McGregor et al. (2007) es-
timate that more than 200 million children in those countries failed to achieve
their development potential because of socioeconomic causes, such as poverty
and malnutrition. Thus, this failure in adequate childhood investments has con-
sequences that reach far into the future for those countries, including intergener-
ational transmission of poverty. Given that households in developing countries
are frequently subjected to various market and institutional failures, inadequate
investments in children early in their lives can have more serious consequences for
children in these countries. Therefore, understanding the factors that determine
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early childhood investments in developing countries is essential for improving the
general welfare of the children in these countries. The goal of the essays in this
Ph.D thesis is to contribute to increasing that understanding.
The first essay of this thesis examines the underlying factors that led to the
small impacts of Indonesia’s Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Program on child
health outcomes. In mid-2007, the government of Indonesia launched a CCT
program with the stated goal of improving early childhood investments in child
health and education (World Bank, 2008). Although the program provided large
cash transfers, amounting to 15 to 20 percent of a poor household’s per capita
income, the impact evaluation conducted by the World Bank (2011) shows little
or no impact of the program on child health. Given the scale of the program, the
lack of strong positive impacts raises questions about the efficacy of the program
to influence the health outcomes of the beneficiary children. This study, thus,
develops a theory of change to provide a framework for understanding the poor
performance of the Indonesia’s CCT program. In particular, this study uses the
data collected to evaluate the program to test seven different hypotheses about
the location of the weak link in the theory of change. This first essay thus
differs from most of research on CCT programs, which typically focus on impact
evaluation. This study instead uses the data to understand the process, instead
of just the impacts.
The second essay estimates the impact of the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis
on the cognitive skills of children in Indonesia. The financial crisis had massive
political, economic and social impacts on the Indonesian population. Among
the Southeast Asian countries hit by the crisis, the impacts were most severe
for the Indonesian economy (Furman et al., 1998). Previous research shows that
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the impacts of the crisis on child health outcomes were relatively moot (Block
et al., 2004; Frankenberg et al., 1999; Strauss et al., 2004). However, none of
these studies examines the impact of the crisis on child cognitive development.
This second essay therefore attempts to estimate the impacts of exposure to the
economic crisis during early childhood on children’s cognitive development. This,
to the author’s knowledge has not been done for the case of Indonesia.
The third, and last, essay attempts to estimate the causal impacts of reli-
giosity on female autonomy. This essay is motivated by studies that have shown
positive impacts of female bargaining power within household on child outcomes
(Adato et al., 2000; Beegle et al., 2001; Iyigun and Walsh, 2007). Connecting
this to the first essay, this relationship between women’s autonomy and child out-
comes is one of the reasons why most CCT programs require that the transfers be
collected by mothers. Thus, understanding what determines women’s autonomy
is important not only due to its direct benefit to the women, but also to its indi-
rect benefit through the impacts on their children. Many studies have examined
the determinants of female autonomy, including the relationship between reli-
gion and female autonomy (Chattopadhyay and Goswami, 2007; Heaton et al.,
2005; Lundberg and Pollak, 2003; McElroy, 1990; Obermeyer, 1994). However,
there are few studies that examine the relationship between religiosity, intensity
of religious practice, and female autonomy. This essay will thus try to address
this by employing the rich data from Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) to
estimate the causal impacts of religiosity on female autonomy.
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Chapter 2
Understanding the Linkage between Indonesia’s
Conditional Cash Transfer Program and Child Health
in Indonesia
2.1 Introduction
In the last two decades, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have come to
the forefront of poverty mitigation policy in many developing countries. These
programs grant poor households a specific amount of cash conditional on these
households satisfying certain required health and education behaviors (usually
involving child immunization, health check-ups and school attendance). Several
studies have shown that CCT Programs can improve child health status and edu-
cation outcomes (Parker et al., 2007). Following the apparent success of CCTs in
other countries, in 2007 the Government of Indonesia joined the growing number
of developing countries that have adopted such programs. Surprisingly, the initial
impact assessment of the Indonesian pilot CCT program shows relatively small
impacts on both health and education outcomes (World Bank, 2011). That eval-
uation suggests several possible reasons for these results, such as the low quality
of health facilities and the small amount of the transfers. Nevertheless, despite
these disappointing impacts, the Government of Indonesia continues to expand
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the program throughout the whole country, as seen in Table 2.1
There are several possible reasons why a CCT program could have disappoint-
ingly small impacts on children’s health outcomes. First, the program might be
reinforcing a behavior that was already part of most households’ behavioral de-
cisions. Second, the cash transfer amount may not be enough to induce more
investment in basic health care. Third, the supply of health services in the pro-
gram areas may not be sufficient. Fourth, the required health behaviors imposed
by the programs may by themselves have very little effect on child health. Fifth,
households may allocate the cash transfer or reallocate other expenditures in such
a way that diverts most of the benefit away from the beneficiary children. Sixth,
lack of enforcement of the health behaviors required to receive the cash transfers
may reduce the program’s impact on children’s health outcomes. And seventh,
the child health outcomes maybe less affected by the transfer because it is often
not collected by the mothers.
This study will investigate the plausibility of these seven different hypotheses,
all of which attempt to explain the disappointing results of Indonesia’s CCT
Program on child health. In contrast to the existing extensive literature on
CCTs, most of which is limited to estimating the overall impact of the program,
this study will concentrate in trying to understand the causal chains behind
the disappointing performance of the Indonesian CCT program. This focus can
provide some useful suggestions to improve both the current program as well as
similar future programs. This research is particularly relevant for a country such
as Indonesia, where CCT programs are being implemented as an important tool
to reduce the poverty rate, which is currently at 11.2 percent.1
1The Statistics Indonesia estimates that in 2015 there are more than 28 million Indonesians
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The rest of this study is organized as follows. The next section reviews the
existing literature on both intra-household allocation of child health investments
and CCT programs. This is followed by a brief historical examination of Indone-
sia’s public welfare policy, focusing on health programs, to provide the context
for the implementation of the CCT program. The next section describes the
Indonesian CCT Program, and the results of the initial impact evaluation that
was conducted by The World Bank. This is followed by a description of the
identification strategy used for the empirical estimation. The last two sections
report the findings and summarize the findings of the research.
2.2 Literature Review
Human capital accumulation has been a subject of research in economics since
the early 1960s. The development of health economics as a distinct sub-discipline
within economics is due to the work of Arrow (1963) on the subject of medical
care. This sub-discipline has also benefited from the work of Schultz (1960, 1961)
and Becker (1964) on human capital theory, which has been used for various ap-
plications beyond those studies’ initial focus on education. Since the publication
of these seminal works the study of health issues by economists has progressed
significantly.
However, as in many areas of empirical economics, a persistent theme in
health economics is the difficulty of establishing causality using observational
(e.g. survey) data (Strauss and Thomas, 1998). This is because health outcomes
are frequently interrelated with other types of human capital, such as the intri-
cate relationship between health status and both school performance and labor
who live below the official poverty line.
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productivity (Fuchs, 1996, 2004; Glewwe et al., 2001; Miguel and Kremer, 2004).
Furthermore, human capital is also related to other unobservable factors such as
genetic endowments, parental preferences and the social environment (e.g. tacit
norms and rules). The relationships between these observable and unobservable
factors are oftentimes difficult to tease out to determine the direction of causality.
These difficulties are part of the reason for the flourishing use of the randomized
control trial (RCT) methodology to evaluate the impact of government social
welfare policies. One such policy that is related to child health and education
is the popular CCT programs that were initially started in Mexico and Brazil,
under the names PROGRESA and Bolsa Familia, respectively.
On top of its importance to children’s lifelong well being, child health is par-
ticularly important because currently around 6.3 million children under five die
every year (UNICEF, 2014), 50 percent of whom died due to infectious disease.
The issue of child health is even more critical for developing countries, where
child health problems persist despite improvements in the developing countries’
economies (Black et al., 2008). As a developing country, Indonesia faces sev-
eral problems regarding child health investments and outcomes. Furthermore,
although the maternal and infant mortality rates have continued to fall in In-
donesia, they are still high compared to other East Asia and Pacific (EAP) coun-
tries (World Bank, 2012). Indonesia also faces problems of disparities in the
accessibility of health services between regions and across socioeconomic groups.
Thus, it is no surprise that the Government of Indonesia decided to implement
a CCT program that provides cash transfers and incentives for human capital
investment in both health and education simultaneously.
Another appeal of CCT programs in terms of their health behavior require-
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ments is due to research that has shown that there is a critical and sensitive period
in children’s development that influences their development later in life. This hy-
pothesis has been supported by many research studies. For example, a study by
Knudsen et al. (2006) showed that some skills are more productively acquired
at a certain period of childhood. One example is the ability to learn a second
language, which will be higher if the child started at an early age (Newport,
1990). This implies that inequality of cognitive and non-cognitive skills across
socioeconomic groups starts in early childhood (Blau and Currie, 2006; Cunha
and Heckman, 2007; Heckman and Carneiro, 2003). Thus, another appeal of
CCT programs is that they are targeted to young children in poor households,
which the research on early childhood development suggests is the most effective
approach to increase children’s human capital.
Thus, although the initial endowment (e.g. genetic and family traits) of chil-
dren is an important determinant of their skills, disadvantaged groups in society
may improve these conditions through external support (from either the govern-
ment or their communities) to help them close the gap in child development. In
developing countries, where various market and institutional failures (e.g. credit
constraints and weak infrastructure) are common, the need for external support,
especially from the government, is more pronounced. Without public investment
in child health, households’ investments in child health will be prone to various
arrays of shocks that frequently befall poor households. This might further widen
the gap of child development between poor households and their wealthier coun-
terparts. Given this context, CCT programs may be able to influence households’
decisions on child health investments, both directly through the conditionality
requirements and indirectly through the expansion of households’ budget con-
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straint brought about by the cash transfer.
Ever since they were first launched in Mexico and Brazil in the 1990s, CCTs
have become one of the main policies in many developing countries to reduce
poverty. Such programs are designed to respond to the immediate needs of the
poorest segments of communities by increasing their incomes. Even more ambi-
tiously, the main goal of CCT programs is to break the inter-generational cycle
of poverty by increasing investments in human capital accumulation among the
poor at a very young age.
The evaluations of the CCT program in Mexico, and of its subsequent repli-
cations in other countries, have shown generally promising results on child edu-
cation and health outcomes. For example, a study by Gertler (2004) finds sig-
nificant child health improvements due to Mexico’s PROGRESA CCT program
on three measures of child health: child morbidity, height for age, and anemia.
Evaluations of the same type of programs in other countries have shown similar
results, such as studies by Behrman and Hoddinott (2005); Leroy et al. (2008);
Rivera et al. (2004) for Mexico; Maluccio and Flores (2005) for Nicaragua; and
Attanasio et al. (2005) for Colombia. However, not all CCT programs record
positive impacts on child health outcomes. No impacts on child anthropometry
were found in Honduras (Leroy et al., 2009) or Brazil (Morris et al., 2004). The
results in Honduras was argued to be caused by the small size of cash transfer (4
percent of household expenditure); while the results in Brazil is suspected to be
due to mistaken perception that households would no longer be eligible for the
program if their children’s growth shared no signs of malnutrition.
Aside from the child health outcomes, some of these studies along with several
other studies, also examine the pathways of which the programs can impacts the
9
child health outcomes with mix results. For example, a study by Morris et al.
(2004) shows that the CCT program in Honduras has increased child visits to
health center and getting DPT1 vaccine. The research, however, also shows that
the program has no significant impacts on measles vaccination. Research by
Attanasio et al. (2005) on Colombia also shows strong positive impacts of that
program on children’s health care visits and on younger children’s (less than
24 months) DPT1 vaccination rate, but no significant effects on the vaccination
rates for older children.
Given that the evaluations of the CCT programs in other countries have
shown that such programs often improve child health, the relatively mediocre
health impacts found in the Indonesian PKH Pilot program should raise several
concerns about the quality of the program and its overall efficacy for improv-
ing child health. In addition, CCT programs have been the subject of various
criticisms, such as the high implementation costs, the paternalistic nature of
the program, and unknown mechanisms behind the results (Baird et al., 2011;
De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006). Given these reasons for caution, there is a need
for a formal examination to understand the reasons behind the disappointing re-
sults of the Indonesian CCT program. This is particularly important because the
Government of Indonesia has, since the initial pilot, expanded its CCT program
to the rest of Indonesia.
This study will examine the underlying factors that drive the unexpectedly
small health impacts of Indonesia’s CCT program by testing seven possible hy-
potheses. The first hypothesis proposes that the health behaviors required by
the program were already being practiced by the vast majority of households.
The second hypothesis is that the amount of cash transfer given is not enough
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to induce behavioral change in child health investments. The third hypothesis
posits that the supply of health services in the program’s area may be insuffi-
cient to improve children’s health conditions. The fourth hypothesis proposes
that the health behavior requirements imposed by the program may not have
large impacts on child health. The fifth hypothesis is that parents of benefi-
ciary households may reallocate their expenditure in such a way that the transfer
does not benefit beneficiary children. And the sixth hypothesis posits that weak
enforcement of required health behaviors results in little change in health behav-
iors and thus to small impacts on health. And lastly, the child health outcomes
maybe less impacted by the transfer because it is often not collected by mothers.
Note that these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, as it is possible for two
or more to be correct simultaneously.
This study differs from much of the existing literature because of its focus on
trying to understand the underlying mechanism of the program instead of simply
evaluating the impact of the program. Most past research on CCT programs
focuses on the impacts of the programs on various welfare outcomes, such as
child health, education, mental health and even community participation. This
research instead tries to unpack the causal chains behind the Indonesian CCT
program. Only a few studies have tried to examine the causal chains of CCT
program (Gaarder et al., 2010; Leroy et al., 2009). However, most of these studies
are qualitative in nature. Thus, this study, in addition to examining the reasons
behind the relatively small impacts of the program, is also conducted to demon-
strate how the data that were collected to estimate the impacts of a program
can also be used to understand the mechanism by which the program worked or
failed to work.
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2.3 A Brief History of Indonesia’s Public Health Policies
The origins of the current national health care system in Indonesia started as
early as 1949, just three years after Indonesia obtained independence from more
than three centuries of Dutch colonial rule. In that year, the government imple-
mented a pension program for civil servants. In 1963, the government added to
this benefit by providing health insurance for civil servants. During the 1960s,
this health insurance covered mostly government workers, with only minimally
coverage for other formal sector workers (Aspinall, 2014).
The 1965 coup by General Suharto brought about a regime change that shifted
the focus of Indonesia’s economic policies. In the early years of his presidency,
Suharto was advised by a group of economic advisers (famously called the ”Berke-
ley Mafia”) who urged him to focus more on economic development. In 1968,
the government implemented a new system of community level health centers
(puskesmas) that provided health services at a low price. Within twenty years,
the government managed to achieve full national coverage, with one center for
every 30,000 people. Furthermore, in the 1970s, the government initiated a
wide-reaching effort to broaden the reach of its social welfare policies. Taking
advantage of the oil boom windfalls in the 1970s, the Indonesian government
implemented massive construction of education and health care infrastructure.
One such program was a nation-wide family planning program, which included: a
comprehensive program of targeted advertisements in national and local media;
development of community health centers; and outreach to local and national
religious figures.
Although the infant mortality rate, life expectancy and other health indica-
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tors improved, the quality of health care at community health centers and other
government-run health facilities was frequently poor due to limited funding for
training of staff and for provision of medical equipment. The quality of health
services became so low that financially able government employees often opted to
pay for medical services from private health care facilities, or even from abroad.
This created a two-tiered system in which the rich received the best health care,
while the poor were consigned to the public health care system, which in effect
provided only basic health care. One indicator of this disparity is from a study
conducted in 1995, which concluded that the richest 10 percent of the population
was 10 times more likely to be hospitalized than the poorest 10 percent of the
population (Kristiansen and Santoso, 2006).
In 1992, the government consolidated the existing health insurance systems
spread accross different government agencies into one centralized insurance sys-
tem, called Jamsostek (Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja - Social Security Scheme).
The program provided various insurance schemes, such as occupational injury
insurance, health insurance and life insurance, for workers in the formal sector.
Towards the end of Suharto era, the program experienced rampant noncompli-
ance on the part of many employers, so that only about one third of formal
workers were covered by the system in 2003 (Thabrany, 2011).
In 1998, Suharto resigned from the presidency due to the economic collapse
and social unrest that arose from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The crisis
increased the national poverty rate from 15 percent in mid-1997 to 33 percent by
the end of 1998 (Sumarto et al., 2008). To address this severe economic downturn,
the transitional government launched a major social safety net program, called
JPS (Jaringan Pengaman Sosial - Social Protection Safety Net). Unlike the
13
Jamsostek, JPS was created with a specific aim to protect the chronic poor
from the crisis and to reduce their vulnerability to risk. The program included
various initiatives on education, health, employment and food security. The
health component covered a wide range of health care services, from subsidies
for medical equipment provision to free family planning services (Sumarto et al.,
2010). Although the scale of the program eclipsed any previous social welfare
program (Sumarto et al., 2008), rampant leakages due to inadequate targeting
and corruption led to severe criticisms from the population (World Bank, 2008).
In 2003, under President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s leadership, a free health
care initiative with wider coverage was introduced. The new program was built
directly on the existing JPS program. Unlike the JPS, however, this program was
managed at the district level; which allowed more involvement of local govern-
ments in the national program. Yet, in 2004, the new President, Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, re-centralized the health insurance system under the name Aske-
skin (Asuransi Kesehatan untuk Masyarakat Miskin - Health Insurance for the
Poor) which provides health insurance mainly for the poor. This program was
later called Jamkesmas (Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat - Community Health
Insurance).
Despite the name change, the basis of the protection scheme was still the same.
The program was still targeted towards the poor population, even though it still
retained its initial flavor in that it included insurance for workers in the public
and formal private sectors. The main difference is that the formal workers had
to pay an insurance contribution, while the poor was fully funded by government
fund (Sparrow et al., 2013). Although the new program managed to improve
the targeting and coverage, the low utilization rates among beneficiaries of the
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program still persisted (Sumarto et al., 2010).
On top of the central health insurance system, the decentralization that be-
gan in 1998 has also enabled some local governments to initiate a local health
insurance schemes targeted towards their local constituencies. One such example
was the famous initiative created by the Bupati (head of district) of Jembrana
District in Bali (Rosser et al., 2011), who provided universal health care for the
residents of Jembrana District funded by the district budget.2 Such local health
initiatives have spread to other wealthy districts in various provinces. Unlike
the national program, access to health services required proof of residence and
was usually limited to local public health facilities. As many districts could not
afford to adopt such health care programs, the national health policy remained
important for those districts.
The national social welfare programs, including the health insurance system,
were alleged to have poor targeting by citizens and the media. The media and
public criticism became very severe when the government launched an uncondi-
tional cash transfer program (Bantuan Langsung Tunai -BLT) in 2005, which
was initially intended to compensate poor and near poor citizens from the impact
of the government’s decision to reduce subsidies on gasoline, diesel and kerosene.
The BLT program was accused by the media of having chronic inefficiencies and
leakages in its targeting. Although no rigorous research has provided evidence
corroborating these allegations, the government nevertheless decided to focus
on improving its beneficiary targeting methodology for their subsequent social
welfare programs, which includes the household CCT program (Program Kelu-
2The district budget consists of the district’s own revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah) and
an equality grant (Dana Perimbangan) allocated by the national government.
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arga Harapan - PKH) and community CCT program (PNPM Generasi). Both
programs included major health components and involved intensive efforts to im-
prove their targeting quality and distribution systems. Note that, as of January
2014, the Government of Indonesia decided to implement a universal healthcare
program called Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN). This new program unified
various national insurance programs under a new social security agency, Badan
Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial Kesehatan or BPJS (The Economist, 2015). De-
spite the implementation of the universal healthcare, the Government of Indone-
sia did not abolish its CCT program, which is still running even today. However,
because the pilot for the CCT program, which is the focus of this study, was
implemented before this universal healthcare program started, it needs to be
understood within the context of the previously fragmented public healthcare
system in Indonesia.
2.4 The Indonesian CCT Program and Data
Despite generally robust economic growth in the last four decades,3 the provision,
and outcomes, of health care and education services in Indonesia are still low
compared to its neighboring countries (World Bank, 2011). To address this issue,
and motivated by the reported successes of CCT programs on investments in the
human capital of young children in other developing countries, the Government
of Indonesia decided in 2007 to launch a CCT program in Indonesia.
Indonesia’s CCT program consists of two parallel but independent programs,
the community CCT program (PNPM Generasi) and the household CCT pro-
3Since 2002, Indonesia’s GDP growth per capita has been between 3 to 4 percent annually.
During the height of the economic boom from the 1970s to the first half of 90s, the average
annual per capita growth rate was around 6 percent annually.
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gram (Program Keluarga Harapan - PKH). Although both programs were created
to generate investments in health and education, the programs differ in terms of
design, implementation and executing agency.
The PNPM Generasi program is an extension of the government’s sub-district
infrastructure development program, theKecamatan Development Program (KDP),
which was implemented to improve infrastructure in underdeveloped sub-districts.
Building on the KDP, the PNPM Generasiprogram provides a block grant to
communities conditional on their commitment to health and education invest-
ments. The type of health and education investments are decided communally
and can include investments such as procurement of health equipment for inte-
grated health posts to contracting additional teachers for local schools.
In contrast to the PNPM Generasi program, the PKH program is targeted to
provide cash transfers directly to poor households. The program was designed to
substitute for the heavily criticized Unconditional Cash Transfer program (BLT)
that was launched by the Government of Indonesia in 2005. Similar to other
countries’ CCT programs, the PKH’s cash transfers to poor households are condi-
tional on utilization of health and education services. Thus, the PNPM Generasi
program and the PKH program can be considered to be separate but comple-
mentary programs, where the PNPM Generasi addresses the supply side, and the
PKH addresses the demand side, of health and education services. In addition to
these differences, the government agencies executing the two programs are also
different. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) is responsible for implementing
the PNPM Generasi program, whereas the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) is
responsible for implementing the PKH program.
The pilots for both CCT programs were conducted in the second half of 2007
17
in the same six provinces and in the Special Capital City District of Jakarta
(Daerah Khusus Ibukota (DKI) Jakarta). Initially, the pilots covered five provinces
(West Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo and East Nusa Tenggara
(NTT)), but soon after West Sumatra and DKI Jakarta were added. These
provinces were selected due to their local government’s willingness to partici-
pate in the program and because they represent Indonesia’s diversity. Although
both programs were piloted at the same period and in the same provinces, each
program targets different villages because of differences in implementation fo-
cus.4 Given that this research is concerned with the PKH program, the following
sub-sections will focus on that program.
2.4.1 The PKH Program
Similar to CCT programs in other countries, the cash transfers of the PKH
program were given to the children’s mothers in the treatment communities. The
Indonesian Post Office is responsible for distributing these transfers due to its
wide coverage. There are no specific rules that households are expected to follow
regarding the use of the cash transfers. The amount of the transfer is around
15 to 20 percent of poor households’ per capita consumption and is disbursed
quarterly. The exact amount of the cash transfer differs according to the type
and age of the person it is intended to benefit, as shown in Table 2.2. The table
shows that the amount (per year) for health component beneficiaries, who are
children age 0-5 years old, and pregnant or lactating mothers, does not depend
on the number of individuals eligible for the health component in the household.
4Although conducted simultaneously, the two programs are conducted in different districts,
and the subsequent randomization procedures to select the treatment and control groups were
conducted separately for each program. Thus there was no overlap of implementation area (in
terms of either treatment or control group) between the two programs.
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For example, a household with two children age 0-5 will receive the same amount
per year as a household with one child age 0-5 years old, namely IDR (Indonesian
Rupiah) 800,000.
In contrast, the amount for education component beneficiaries, children age 6-
15 and children age 16-18 who have not finished grade 9, applies individually. For
example, a mother who has three primary aged children (6-12 years) attending
school will receive IDR 1,200,000, that is IDR 400,000 per child per year (plus
the base amount of IDR 200,000 per year for a total of IDR 1,400,000). However,
there is a maximum amount of transfer per household: IDR 2,200,000 per year.
Thus for households, the transfers can range from a value of Rp 600,000 to Rp
2.2 million annually, with the exact amount depending on the age of the children
and on the presence of a pregnant or lactating woman.
Health behaviors are required of pregnant women, lactating women and chil-
dren age 0-5 years old to receive the cash transfers. The required health behaviors
are as follows. Pregnant women must complete four antenatal care visits, take
iron tablets during their pregnancy, and have a professionally assisted birth (by
a doctor, a nurse or a medically trained midwife). Lactating mothers must com-
plete two postnatal care visits. Children aged 0 - 5 years old must complete all
childhood immunizations, take vitamin A capsules twice per year and participate
in growth monitoring: monthly for infants 0 - 11 months old and quarterly for
children aged 1-5 years old.
Education conditionality applies to households with children aged 6 - 15 years
(or children aged 16-18 years who have not yet completed grade 9). The edu-
cation conditionality requirements are: enrollment in school and a minimum 85
percent attendance rate for children age 6-15 years old; or enrollment, though
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no minimum required attendance, in a school or a basic equivalent education
program for children aged 16-18 years old who have not finished grade 9.5
The local administrators of the programs are the PKH administrator and
PKH facilitators, the latter of whom were responsible for daily management of
the program and for providing information to the beneficiaries, in particular on
the importance of conditionality fulfillment and the consequences of failing to
fulfill the conditionality. The enforcement rule is stated as follows. The first
time that conditionality is not met, the beneficiaries households will receive a
warning letter from a PKH facilitator. The second breach results in a 10 percent
reduction of the transfer. After the third breach, the beneficiaries households
are permanently expelled from the program. The verification process relies on
health and education service providers, who are expected to input compliance
verification data online before the initiation of payments.
2.4.2 The Design of the PKH Evaluation
To conduct impact evaluations of both the PNPM Generasi and the PKH pro-
grams during the pilot phase, the Government of Indonesia implemented a Ran-
domized Controlled Trial (RCT). The first step was to exclude from both pro-
grams the richest 20 percent of districts in each of the seven pilot provinces.6
From the remaining 80 percent of districts in each province, only districts that
were not eligible for the PNPM Generasi, i.e. non-KDP districts, in these seven
5The basic equivalency education program (the Equivalent Primary-Paket A and Lower
Secondary Schools-Paket B Program) is a non-formal education system provided by the Gov-
ernment of Indonesia for children older than 15 years old or adults who have not completed
grade 9. The students can then participate in primary and lower secondary school equivalency
exams that will allow them to continue their education further to either lower secondary or
upper secondary school, respectively.
6The criteria used were poverty rates, incidence of malnutrition and the transition rate
from primary to secondary school.
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provinces were considered for the PKH program. This left 49 districts to be
considered for the PKH program.
In the 49 districts where the PKH pilot program was implemented, only some
households were eligible for the program. The selection process for PKH eligible
households in these 49 districts and cities consisted of two steps: (1) selection
of PKH sub-districts; and (2) selection of eligible households in the selected
PKH sub-districts. Within the 49 districts, sub-districts that were considered
”supply side ready”7 were randomly assigned into a treatment group and a control
group. This selection process resulted in a total of 588 supply-side ready sub-
districts, of which 329 randomly assigned to the treatment group and the other
259 were randomly assigned to the control group. Figure 2.1 summarizes the
randomization process of the pilot PKH program.
The selection of CCT eligible households from these 588 PKH-eligible sub-
districts also consisted of several steps. First, an initial roster of potential CCT
beneficiaries was developed by Statistics Indonesia by conducting a survey of the
poor and extremely poor households from the beneficiaries list of the 2005 UCT
program from the list of households that was already collected by Statistics In-
donesia (BPS) in 2005.8 This initial screening excluded around 30-40 percent
7Supply-side readiness was determined by a statistical analysis of the available health and
education facilities in the sub-districts. The threshold for sub-district in non-Java provinces
was set to be lower to ensure greater inclusion of areas outside of Java, despite their relatively
limited supply of health and education facilities. The data used were Village Potential (PODES)
2005 data.
8The 2005 UCT program provided cash transfers, with no conditionality requirements, for
all poor and near poor households to compensate for the reduction in national subsidies for
gasoline. The Government of Indonesia classifies the poor or near poor households based on
survey data that Statistics Indonesia collected specifically for the UCT program. Statistics
Indonesia used 14 criteria based on households’ characteristics and assets, examples are house-
holds whose assets were valued at less than IDR 500,000 (equivalent to USD 38), and household
head’s education was less than lower secondary.
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of the UCT beneficiaries who were classified as near poor. During the survey
process, Statistics Indonesia also expanded the screening process in the PKH
targeted area to identify additional poor households that might have been ex-
cluded from the initial 2005 UCT beneficiaries list. This exercise increased the
number of households on the initial list by around 5 percent. A proxy-means test
(PMT) was then applied to all the households on this augmented UCT benefi-
ciaries list to identify the extremely poor households9 for the preliminary CCT
roster.10
These extremely poor households were then further screened to identify eligi-
ble households based on the program criteria: households with pregnant/lactating
women and/or with children aged 0-15 years or with children aged between 16-18
years who have not yet finished 9 years of compulsory basic education. Statistics
Indonesia then gave this list to the implementing agency, the PKH Implementa-
tion Unit (UPPKH) established at MOSA, for final approval of the beneficiary
list. Originally the program was intended to include only extremely poor house-
holds. However, due to additional funding availability, a small percentage of
households that are poor but not extremely poor from the preliminary CCT
roster were added back into the final household CCT roster. These additional
households were chosen from those poor households that were close to the bottom
end of the consumption distribution based on the criteria used in the proxy mean
test. In the end, around 430,000 eligible households were identified as eligible
9Statistics Indonesia defined households as extremely poor if they used a large portion
of their income for basic staple foods; could afford medical treatment only at public health
facilities; cannot buy clothing once per year; could not afford to send the children to school or
could only afford children’s schooling up to lower secondary school.
10The PMT was based on 29 variables, including housing characteristics, education attain-
ment, fuel sources, type of employment and access to health and education services.
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for the CCT program in these 588 sub-districts of the seven pilot provinces, DKI
Jakarta, West Java, East Java, West Sumatra, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo and
NTT.
2.4.3 PKH Program Survey Design and Data
To conduct an evaluation based on the RCT, a baseline survey was conducted be-
tween June and August of 2007, before the first PKH transfers were distributed.
The survey randomly sampled households in both PKH treatment sub-districts
and control sub-districts. The first stage of the sampling plan for the base-
line survey was to sample eight villages/urban precincts from each of the 588
sub-districts. In the second stage, one ward was randomly selected from each
village/urban precinct in the sample. Lastly, in the third stage, five households
were sampled from each ward.
The baseline survey covered six of the seven PKH provinces (excluding West
Sumatra), and thus covered only 44 of the 49 districts included in the PKH pilot.
From these 44 districts, baseline survey data were collected from 180 randomly
selected PKH treatment sub-districts and 180 randomly selected control sub-
districts, resulting in a sample of 360 sub-districts for the PKH evaluation. This
selection of 180 sub-districts from the treatment sub-districts and control sub-
districts was stratified by the urban/rural classification of the sub-districts.11
Due to concern that random sampling of households would have yielded a
small number of treated households in the sample in the areas where program
coverage was small relative to the population size, the sampling strategy used in
11A sub-district is defined as rural if the share of urban precincts is less than 30 percent of
all precincts and villages in the sub-districts, according to the Village Potential 2005 survey
data.
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the baseline data collection was limited to households that were most likely to be
PKH-eligible. This was done by limiting the sample to UCT eligible households.
In addition, since many participants of UCT program were non-poor due to
leakage of that program, a proxy means test was used to restrict the sample
further to the poorer households on the UCT household list. This implies that
the PKH sample is poorer than the general population in the PKH areas.
Sampling was considered only for villages with at least five UCT eligible
households per ward in PKH sub-districts. Because some sub-districts have less
than 8 villages that fulfill this criterion (five UCT eligible households per ward
per village), additional wards from the remaining villages in these sub-districts
were randomly selected to be added to the sample. This was done to ensure the
same number of sampled wards per sub-district.12
Lastly, within each ward, the UCT eligible households with a sufficiently low
proxy means test were classified into three groups: (1) households with preg-
nant/lactating mothers or married women who were pregnant in the last two
years; (2) households with children age 6-15 years; and (3) remaining house-
holds. Then from each ward, five households were randomly selected from group
(1) and group (2) only: two from group (1) and three from group (2).13 This
sampling method resulted in 14,326 surveyed households (7195 treated and 7131
control). The non-response rate was very low, below one percent, for individual
12The World Bank report points out that ”Only villages with at least 5 UCT eligible
HH/ward were considered for sampling. Thus, it’s possible that less than 8 villages were
sampled for some sub-districts. In this case, additional wards would be randomly selected from
the remaining villages, as to balance the number of sampled wards” (World Bank, 2008).
13The World Bank report does not specify a category for households that have both pregnant
woman and children aged 6-15 years old, as stated in the report: ”Among the UCT eligible
households, five households were randomly selected from groups (i) and (ii) only: two from
group (i) and three from group (ii)” (World Bank, 2008).
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household members. Figure 2.2 describes the PKH baseline sample selection.
In addition to the household survey, Statistics Indonesia also conducted a
village/sub-district level survey of village characteristics and of health and edu-
cation providers.14 For the village questionnaire, in each village a village official
(either village head, secretary or section head) was interviewed to collect informa-
tion on various socioeconomic characteristics of the village. Two different health
providers, community health centers (Puskesmas) and midwives, were surveyed
to collect the data on health services quantity and quality in the PKH program
areas.15 For the Puskesmas survey, from each sub-district in the PKH program
area one Puskesmas was randomly selected from all Puskesmases in each sub-
district. If there was no Puskesmas in the sub-district, the Puskesmas in the
neighboring sub-district whose working area includes the sub-district without a
Puskesmas was selected instead. The midwives sample was drawn based on two
sources in each sub-district: a list of midwives working for Puskesmas who also
had a private practice and a list of private midwives. For each sub-district, two
midwives from the first list and two from the second list were randomly sampled.
These same households, villages and health facilities were re-interviewed in
14The PKH survey has 8 questionnaires in the baseline survey and 9 questionnaires in the
follow-up survey. The first four questionnaires cover individual and household characteristics.
The last four or five questionnaires cover non-household characteristics. In the follow-up sur-
vey, aside from the original two questionnaires on health providers, another questionnaire on
integrated health post (Posyandu)’s cadre/volunteer characteristics was added.
15Indonesia has two important types of government run local health facilities: community
health centers ( Puskesmas) and integrated health posts (Posyandu). The two facilities have the
following differences. First, a Puskesmas’s coverage area is a sub-district (Note: a sub-district
can have more than one Puskesmas), while a Posyandu’s is a village. Second, Puskesmas
usually has a fixed physical office and work hours, while Posyandus do not necessarily have
either. Third, the services provided by Posyandus are more limited than those provided by a
Puskesmas. Despite the differences, the two health providers are closely linked because it is
the local Puskesmas that usually provides the medical staff and supplies for various Posyandus
in the sub-district. Within the context of CCT program, households are considered to have
fulfilled the child health conditionality as long as they use the services from the local Posyandu.
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a follow-up survey conducted in 2009, using respondent lists to locate baseline
households, village officials and health care providers. These follow-up surveys
were administered using a modified version of the baseline questionnaire. The
attrition rate was relatively low, below one percent for individual household mem-
bers and Puskesmas and around 2.8 percent for midwives.
The baseline and follow-up surveys were conducted by the University of Gad-
jah Mada (UGM), which is independent of the program implementation agency.
The baseline survey was conducted between June and August of 2007, and the
follow-up survey was conducted between October and December of 2009. This
means that the follow-up survey was conducted around 26 - 30 months after
the PKH baseline survey. Figure 2.3 provides the timeline of the surveys and
program implementation, and Table 2.3 provides the baseline survey sample size.
Unfortunately, the implementation of the PKH program did not always fol-
low the randomized assignment. Due to delays in transfers and expansion of the
program in the middle of the pilot implementation, some sub-districts did not
comply with their initial randomized assignment. Therefore, in addition to the
two waves of the PKH household survey, this study also uses an additional data
set on PKH program implementation status which provides information about
sub-districts’ initial randomization status and any changes to this status during
the pilot implementation period. This additional data set provides information
only on which treatment and control areas followed their initial randomized as-
signment, which treatment areas experienced delayed transfers, and which control
areas received the treatment during the pilot implementation.16 The data do not
16Aside from the CCT and the implementation status data, the World Bank also used
additional administrative data from the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) that are not publicly
available for their impact evaluation report. This additional data provided a more accurate
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provide information on the timing of the delayed transfer in the treatment area or
the timing of transfers that were provided to some households in the control area
even though they should not have received transfers. It is also unclear whether
all eligible households or only some households received transfers in these control
sub-districts that received transfers in contrary to their initial randomized assign-
ment. Table 2.4 provides information on actual implementation, using baseline
survey, follow-up survey, and administrative data. The table shows that about
3 percent of sub-districts (6 out of 180 sub-districts) in the treatment groups
experienced a delay in the cash transfer and more than one fifth of sub-districts
(39 out of 180 sub-districts) in the control groups received the cash transfers.
To address this issue in the empirical estimation for this study, the control
sub-districts that received treatment during pilot will be assigned their status
at baseline. Furthermore, Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation will be used
to correct for possible bias due to some sub-districts not following their random
assignment. Note that Table 2.4 includes only the sample distribution of children
age 0-3 years old at the baseline. The follow-up survey also includes new house-
holds that were not surveyed at the baseline, these households constitute 2.4
percent of the total households in the sample. Lastly, only panel households will
be used in the estimation for this study. The non-panel households constitute
only around 4.2 percent of all surveyed households, thus excluding them should
have little effect on the estimation.
record of transfers received by the households. Around 560 survey households, about 4 percent
of all survey households, reported that they did not receive any PKH transfers even though
the MOSA’s data showed that they were consistently paid during the pilot period of the PKH
program.
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2.4.4 Quality of PKH Pilot Implementation
During and after the implementation of the PKH pilot, several studies were con-
ducted to assess the quality of the program implementation. Two studies, one
conducted by the Center for Health Research (2010) and the other by the SMERU
Research Institute (Febriany et al., 2011), provide the most comprehensive op-
erational assessment of the program in terms of study coverage and depth. The
Center for Health Research conducted random checks on program implementa-
tion in nine districts across the seven PKH provinces between October, 2009 and
February, 2010, while SMERU provided a qualitative assessment of the programs
performance in two of PKH pilot provinces, West Java and East Nusa Tenggara
between January to August 2010. Thus, these two studies provide a general pic-
ture of the operational challenges faced during the implementation of the PKH
program.
The Center for Health Research study found that PKH program outreach was
directed only to the beneficiary households, so that many village officials and
service providers (who were supposedly responsible for conditionality compliance
verification) were unaware of the existence of the program, although the study
did not specify how often this occurred. Another potential problem was that
many PKH program administrators were found to have a limited understanding
about the program, and thus were unable to provide clear information about the
mechanisms and goals of the program to the beneficiaries and other stakeholders,
such as the village heads or midwives. This has caused many beneficiaries and
these stakeholders to perceive the PKH program as an unconditional cash transfer
program. The study by SMERU also found a lack of awareness and understand-
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ing on the part of local administrators and service providers. For example, all
midwives in the five treatment areas interviewed by the study complained that
they were not involved in or had no knowledge of the PKH program.
Aside from public outreach, the management information system (MIS) to
verify the program’s conditionality compliance was not fully functioning through-
out the whole PKH pilot period (World Bank, 2011). This was due to several
different problems, such as: 1. Unavailability and ambiguity of verification forms;
2. Lack of adequate local human resources at the local post office (which is re-
sponsible for transfer distribution), the service provider facilities (school and
health facilities) and the local UPPKH offices; and 3. Failure to enter infor-
mation from the forms into the MIS. Due to these problems, in the first two
years of program implementation, verification of eligibility for conditional bene-
fits was generally not functioning. Therefore, only a few, if any, households were
subjected to penalties for non-compliance with the conditions stipulated by the
program. The SMERU study shows that compliance with the required health
behaviors by the beneficiaries was strongly affected by the active role of PKH
facilitators in providing public outreach and monitoring. For example, in two
treatment villages in NTT, the facilitators threatened to cut the PKH funding
of the beneficiaries who were not fulfilling the health requirements.
The research by SMERU also notes that the CCT transfers amount may
not be large enough to induce the behaviors required of the households by the
program. For example, the cost of a birth assisted by a midwife ranges from IDR
150,000 to 800,000, which for the most expensive midwives is almost as high as
the minimum annual transfers that can be received by households (around IDR
1,000,000). Table 2.5 describes the actual disbursements made by Government
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of Indonesia over the course of the pilot implementation (2007-2009), including
the average payment per year that a household received. The numbers provided
by the table seem to corroborate the conclusion by SMERU that the average
amount received by a typical household may not be enough to cover the cost
to fulfill the required health and education behaviors. The Table shows that on
average household received around IDR 1.3 million which fit the profiles depicted
by SMERU. Both studies by SMERU and The Center for Health Research also
found that the PKH funds were mostly used for daily consumables, such as food
and school supplies. In addition to this, the SMERU study found that PKH
transfer was rarely used to pay for mother and child health care services.
In addition to the above challenges, the studies also highlight the problem of
health and education services availability to serve the beneficiaries. The Center
for Health Research, for example, found that half of the sampled Puskesmas
in West Java did not have BCG vaccine in stock for the previous 12 months.
Although there were some improvements in the availability of Integrated Health
Post (Posyandu) services to the beneficiaries, the SMERU study found some
challenges for households to obtain these services due to the remoteness of the
area where they live or to the limited number of Posyandu’s cadres or midwives.
2.4.5 The PKH Pilot Impact Evaluation Results
The results of the World Bank’s impact evaluation of the pilot program are sum-
marized in Table 2.6. Note that the World Bank estimated three types of impacts:
placement effect, participation effect and spill-over effect. The placement effect
compares the outcomes of all eligible households in the treatment area (irrespec-
tive of actual PKH receipt) with all eligible households in the control group. The
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participation effect compares the outcomes of households in the treatment area
who had received PKH transfers with the outcomes of similar eligible households
in the control area.17 The spill-over effect (within-sub-districts spillover effect)
compares outcomes of eligible non-beneficiary households in the treatment areas
to similar eligible households in the control area.18 In addition to this, each of
these impacts was estimated using three different regression specifications: (1)
with covariates, baseline values and a dummy for panel observations; (2) with
(only) baseline values and a dummy for panel observations; and (3) with (only)
covariates. To simplify Table 2.6, when the results are statistically significant
for all specifications, only the numbers from the first specification are presented
and it is presented without any superscript. If the results are statistically sig-
nificant for only one specific specification but not for the others, the significant
specification result is shown and the superscript indicates which specification
is significant (see Notes under Table 2.6). If the results are significant for two
specifications, no significant results are shown. Instead, only the superscripts
indicating the two significant specifications are shown. Lastly, the results are de-
noted as not statistically significant only if the results from all specifications are
not significant. All estimations use an instrumental variable (the initial random
assignment) to correct for the contamination during the implementation of the
program (see sub-section 4.3), thus all the estimation results are Local Average
Treatment Effect (LATE) estimates.
Table 2.6 shows a positive impact of the program on household welfare only
for health expenditure and a negative impact only for tobacco expenditure. The
17To find similar households in the control areas, a propensity score matching method was
used.
18Also using a propensity score matching method to find similar households.
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program also has spill-over effects only on food and total expenditure per capita
in the estimation only when using the baseline values and the panel dummy (i.e.
Specification (2)). However, the program has no impacts on any other expendi-
ture, not even for expenditure on protein, which was expected to increase due
to the cash transfers. The World Bank report proposes that these weak results
are due to the long length of time between the PKH transfers and the survey.
Drawing from the experience of the UCT in 2005, the report contends that the
transfers were likely to be spent within one week of being received and thus could
not be captured by the survey due to the design of the questionnaires.19.
For health behaviors, the evaluation found significantly positive impacts for
beneficiaries mainly on health services visits, such as visits for pre-natal care,
post-natal care, and child weighing. The program was also found to significantly
increase the usage of professional medical services for deliveries and public health
facilities for outpatient visits. However, none of the estimates for consumption of
Vitamin A is statistically significant. Furthermore, the estimates for immuniza-
tion are significant only for the participation effect, and only at the 10 percent
level. The program, however, consistently shows positive impacts on outpatient
visits of other family members to both public and private health facilities, sug-
gesting spillovers through fungibility.
Despite some improvements in health behaviors, there is no evidence that
they led to better long-term health outcomes. The World Bank report argues
that: ”Malnutrition and child mortality rates, however, are not expected to im-
prove within the short three-year period of the pilot project” (World Bank, 2008).
19The questionnaires asked food expenditure only for the previous week, and non-food ex-
penditure for both the previous month and previous year from the time of the interview.
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However, studies by Gertler (2004) and Attanasio et al. (2005) on Mexico’s and
Colombia’s CCT programs, respectively, show positive impacts on child health
outcomes after only two or three years of operation for those programs. In ad-
dition to this, and contrary to expectations, reports of infant diarrhea and fever
among 0 to 3 year old children among beneficiary households increased by 3 and
4 percentage points, respectively. The World Bank attributes this increase to
these households’ use of primary health care services, so that it mainly repre-
sents an increase in reporting in the household survey, not an increase in the
incidence of diarrhea and fever among young children. However this argument is
somewhat speculative. Furthermore, the program also found an increase in child
mortality (6-11 months old) for the placement effect (using the first specification)
and participation effect (for all specification).
The report also conducted some additional estimations, only for the place-
ment effect, disaggregated by public service availability, parental education, rel-
ative income levels and gender, as shown at the bottom of Table 2.6. The public
service availability is proxied by Java and off-Java or rural and urban status.
The results show that the impacts are more pronounced if beneficiaries live in
Java or in urban areas. This suggests that larger effects will be found if more or
better health facilities are available for the beneficiary households. The results
by different parental education levels show mixed results between father’s and
mother’s education. Mothers who have formal education seemed to have better
health behaviors, yet fathers with no formal education were more likely to have
their children weighed. The strong positive impacts are also greater for relatively
wealthy households, which is contrary to the program’s goal of improving out-
comes for the poorest of the poor. This may indicate that the program needs
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households to have some initial threshold of income to have greater impacts on
child health. Lastly, households with a female head tend to have stronger health
impacts, although boys were more likely to have their immunizations.
2.5 Methodology
This section is divided into two parts. The first part presents a theoretical foun-
dation for this study using the concept of theory of change to construct the causal
changes of the PKH program. This theoretical construct is then used to propose
several hypotheses to examine the efficacy of the PKH program. The second part
focuses on the empirical strategy to test all the proposed hypotheses.
2.5.1 The Theory of Change
To examine the mechanisms that explain the impact (or lack thereof) of the CCT
program in Indonesia, this subsection develops a theory of change to construct
the causal chain, and the assumptions behind it, that would appear to underly
the design of the program. Because there has been no official report that provides
the theory of change for the Indonesian CCT program, this study develops its
own theory of change based on similar research for other countries by Baird et al.
(2013); Gaarder et al. (2010); Gertler et al. (2011); Imas and Rist (2009). The
assumptions posited by this study’s theory of change are adapted from Gaarder
et al. (2010). Although the World Bank report (2011) does not provide a theory
of change, these assumptions can be derived implicitly from this report and from
studies by Febriany et al. (2011) and Center for Health Research (2010). This
theory of change is then used as a basis for the hypotheses proposed in this study.
Figure 2.4 provides a diagram that schematically represents the proposed theory
34
of change for the PKH program.
Figure 2.4 shows the complexity of the causal chain underlying the CCT
program. It shows the policy inputs (the CCT program) that are targeted to
influence the outcomes, both intermediate (required health behavior and other
factors that improve health) and final (health status) outcomes. By design, the
CCT program is aimed to influence the intermediate outcomes through the de-
mand for health services. The demand should increase due to the behaviors
that are required in order to receive the cash transfers. The program is not
designed to improve the supply and quality of health services. These health ser-
vices are assumed to exist and thus the program does not directly change them.
The demand channel includes both the income effect, brought about because the
transfers increase households’ incomes, and the price effect that occurs through
the conditionality of the transfer.20 One rationale for the conditionality in CCT
programs is the assumption that the income effect from a pure cash transfer
may not be enough to induce a behavioral change that will improve child health.
Hence conditionality on behaviors that should improve child health is expected
to increase investments in child health relative to an unconditional cash transfer
program by creating a price effect that reduces households’ costs of investing in
child health. Besides these two economic factors, the CCT program can also influ-
ence the demand for investments in child health through a change in households’
preferences. For example, by giving money to mothers, their status inside the
household may increase, which then may influence the overall household demand
for children’s health care.
20Note that the unconditional cash transfer program would have an income effect but no
price effect.
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The solid lines represent direct channels through which the program is de-
signed to influence the outcomes, while the dashed lines represent plausible in-
direct channels. This is why the lines connecting to and from the non-economic
factors of the demand are dashed as this channel is only indirectly targeted by
the program. Similarly, the lines connecting to and from the supply of health
services are also dashed, since the supply and quality of health care services are
not directly affected by the program. Note also that the arrows to and from
the supply of health services go in both directions. This is because the supply
of health services not only influences the intermediate and final outcomes, but
can also be affected by changes in demand and outcomes. Thus this can create
a feedback loop within the system. For example, due to an increase in demand
of basic child health care, the price of those services could increase which could
dampen the overall effect of increased demand for child health care.
This causal chain represented in the diagram depends on several implicit
assumptions (Gaarder et al., 2010). First, the program assumes that poor house-
holds did not invest sufficiently in preventive health services, and that the condi-
tional cash transfers will increase the use of those health services. It is a stylized
fact that poor households in developing countries rarely use preventive health
care and also have low health status (Dupas, 2011; O’Donnell, 2007; Wagstaff
et al., 2004; Wagstaff and Claeson, 2004). In general, barriers to the utilization
of preventive health care could come from either the demand side or the sup-
ply side of health care services for poor households. A large enough conditional
cash transfer for poor households can be a powerful incentive to increase their
demand for health care utilization. However, the effect of such transfers on the
intermediate outcomes in Figure 2.4 may be small if those intermediate outcomes
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have an upper bound and many or most households are already close to that up-
per bound, e.g. immunizations have a clear upper bound that the households
are already close to reaching. The World Bank, SMERU and Center for Health
Research reports indicate that the Indonesian CCT program has changed chil-
dren’s health utilization only marginally (see sub-sections 4.4 and 4.5). Thus,
drawing from this first assumption, two hypotheses can be proposed. The first
hypothesis posits that the health behavior expected to be improved by the CCT
program might have already been part of most households’ behavior before the
CCT program began, i.e. close to the upper bound. If this is the case, the pro-
gram impacts might not be as large as initially expected. The second hypothesis
will test whether the amount of cash received is enough to induce households to
invest more in preventive health care for their children. In Figure 2.4, these two
hypotheses are represented by the text symbols H.1 and H.2, the number of which
represents the corresponding hypothesis. The symbols are placed near the corre-
sponding arrows that pertain to each hypothesis. This is why both Hypotheses
1 (H.1) and Hypothesis 2 (H.2) are located between the two lines connecting the
price and income effects to the intermediate outcomes.
The second assumption to be examined is that the increase in the use of
health services will improve the health status of the users. This assumption
rests on several prior assumptions, such as the quality of services provided at
the health facilities, and also the quality of the substitute products and services.
The program essentially assumes that the health centers provide a sufficient
quantity and quality of health care, and that the costs of getting the care do
not threaten the future health of the beneficiaries (e.g. by increasing very high
out of pocket spending). It is further assumed that the use of these services
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will improve the health status, in particular the use of the specific health care
required (conditioned) by the program. Related to this assumption, the reports
for the Indonesian CCT seem to indicate some concerns regarding the quality
and accessibility of health services for the program beneficiaries. These assump-
tions raise two more hypotheses that will be tested. The third hypothesis posits
that the quality of services in the CCT program area may not be sufficient to
induce significant improvement in child health, e.g. vaccines are not available
at health centers. And the fourth hypothesis proposes that the required health
behavior imposed by the programs may by themselves have very little effect on
child health. In a similar manner as the first two hypotheses, the third and fourth
hypotheses are denoted as H.3 and H.4 in Figure 2.4.
A third assumption of the program is that the cash transfer is designed to
influence health status mainly through the use of health care and improved nu-
tritional inputs. Although the CCT program in general does not specify what
the cash can be spent on, it is generally assumed that the program will affect
health outcomes both through conditioning on preventive health care use (price
effect) and through households’ ability to purchase higher quality of food (income
effect). As such, intra-household allocation plays an important role in ensuring
that this channel works to improve children’s health. An intra-household alloca-
tion of household resources that directs the cash transfer away from beneficiary
children may influence the results of the program in an opposite way than ex-
pected. Furthermore, assuming child health is a normal good, there should be
some income effect of the cash transfer. Although this could be very small. This
assumption thus leads to the fifth hypothesis that will be tested, which is whether
households allocate the cash transfer to benefit children’s health or allocate those
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funds in a way that does not benefit the beneficiary children. This hypothesis is
denoted as H.5 in Figure 2.4.
The fourth assumption is that conditionality needs to be enforced to achieve
the desired level of health care consumption. One unique characteristic of CCT
programs is the requirement that households carry out some type of behavior.
Given the design of the program, the enforcement of the conditionality would
appear to be an essential component for the program’s success. The report
by SMERU and The Center for Health Research, however, indicates weak or
even nonexistent enforcement of the Indonesian CCT program’s conditionality
requirements for households. Thus, the sixth hypothesis, to be tested, will there-
fore examine whether lack of enforcement of the required health behaviors may
reduce the program’s impact on children’s health outcomes. This hypothesis is
represented in Figure 2.4 as H.6.
Related to the fourth assumption is the requirement that the transfers be
received by the mother. This assumption is based on many studies (among
such studies are research by Beegle et al. (2001); Maitra (2004); Quisumbing
and Maluccio (2003)) that show the positive impacts of increased females’ status
within the household on prenatal care and child rearing. Thus the CCT program
requires the transfer to be given to mothers to improve their control of household
economics resources and their ability for decision-making. This would hopefully
benefit their children more compared to giving the money to the fathers. In a way,
this requirement is a kind of implicit conditionality. Thus, the last hypothesis to
be examined is whether the child health outcomes vary according to whether the
mothers received the transfer, which is denoted as H.7 in Figure 2.4.
There are two other assumptions of the CCT program that will not be exam-
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ined by this study due to data and methodological limitations, and thus they are
omitted from Figure 2.4. The first assumption is that the staff and beneficiaries
of the program have sufficient and correct information about the program. This
assumption is crucial as misinformation may lead to unintended outcomes, such
as an increase in fertility. The World Bank evaluation of the Indonesian CCT
program implementation indicates that there have been some problems regarding
the way the information about the program was disseminated (see sub-section
4.4). However, the data on this program do not allow for examination of this
assumption quantitatively as the data contain no information on the knowledge
that different stakeholders (households, village heads and health professionals)
have about the program. The second assumption that cannot be tested is that the
program assumes that the outcomes measured by the evaluation are those that
are impacted by the program. This is because the impacts of the program often
depend on what is being measured and when the evaluation is conducted. For
example, there have been mixed results of CCT programs impacts on nutritional-
related indicators, such as anthropometric z-scores. However, it is not entirely
clear whether these results are driven by the uneven success of the programs or
by the limitations of such measures as impact indicators. Given that no reli-
able methodology can be used to test this, this study will use several different
measurements of child health to partly address this issue.
2.5.2 Estimation Strategy
Before discussing the estimation strategy to address the hypotheses proposed in
the previous sub-section, balance check results will first be presented to investi-
gate whether the randomized assignment was correctly implemented. Tables 2.7
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and 2.8 provide a general balance check at baseline between the communities
that were assigned to the treatment group and the communities that were as-
signed to the control group, focusing on health variables for children age 0-3
years old at baseline. Standard errors are clustered at the sub-district level.
None of the baseline differences is statistically significant. In addition to these
child-health variables, Appendix Table A1 provides balance checks for household
characteristics. The results are similarly insignificant except for the ever receive
UCT transfer variable. Given that only one variable out of all 64 examined-
variables is significant (ever received UCT), it is reasonable to conclude that the
program implementation follow the randomized assignment correctly. Balance
check results from the World Bank’s baseline report are also presented in Ap-
pendix Table A2, A3 and A4. Note that there are several differences in these
results and the World Bank study’s balance checks, such as for the weighed at
least twice in last month variable and receiving vitamin A at least twice per year
variable. These differences might be caused by the differences in the treatment
of outliers and missing values.
In addition to balance checks, Table 2.7 also shows that less than 50 per-
cent of children have achieved age appropriate vaccination, with distribution of
vaccination to be highest for very early age immunization (BCG, 1st and 2nd
Polio, 1st and 2nd DPT, and 1st Hepatitis B vaccines). On a more positive note,
only around 25 percent of children were not weighed in the last 2 months and
more than 60 percent of children received Vitamin A at least twice per year as
recommended. On child health outcomes (Table 2.8), only a small percentage
of children were either malnourished or severely malnourished. Nevertheless, the
rate of illness incidence for the the last month is quite high, at around 70 percent.
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To test the seven hypotheses, t-tests and regression methods will be employed,
all of which exploit the Randomized Control Trial (RCT). Given the contami-
nation during the program implementation (see sub-section 4.3), the estimation
methods will be adjusted to address this potential source of bias. In the ideal
scenario of an RCT, where the program was implemented exactly according to
the initial design and all individuals in the treatment group choose to participate
in the program, the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) can measure the average
impact of the program on the population of intended beneficiaries. The ATE is
defined as the average impact of the program for the whole population, i.e:
ATE = E[Y1   Y0] = E[] (2.1)
where Y1 and Y0 represent the values of the outcome variable conditional on being
treated (Y1) and not treated (Y0 ), and  denotes Y1   Y0.
Unfortunately, the implementation of many RCTs is less than ideal, which
creates complications in estimating ATE. One such problem is that some bene-
ficiaries in the treatment group choose not to get treated, and a consequence of
this is that ATE can no longer be estimated. In this case, provided that no one
in control group receives the treatment, only the Average Treatment Effect on
the Treated (ATT) and the Intent to Treat (ITT) effects can be estimated. ATT
is defined as the impact of the program on the program’s participants, instead of
the impact on the whole population as in ATE , i.e.:
ATT = E[Y1   Y0jP = 1] = E[jP = 1] (2.2)
where Y1, Y0 and  are defined as the above, but now it is conditional on P
(participation) which takes the of value 1 if the household is treated (participated
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in the program), and 0 otherwise. On the other hand, ITT is defined as the impact
of the program on those that are offered the treatment, and it is defined as:
ITT = ATT  Pr[P = 1] (2.3)
where ATT and P are the same as above. In contrast to ATT, but similar to ATE,
ITT is defined for the whole population, regardless of their actual participation,
while ATT is defined only for those who participate in the program.
Unfortunately, none of these three indicators of program impact can be es-
timated for the CCT program in Indonesia. This is because the program not
only has some beneficiaries in the treatment group whose offer of treatment was
delayed, but it also has some households in the control group who were able to
get the treatment. Given this situation, only the Local Average Treatment Effect
(LATE) can be estimated. Estimation of LATE uses an Instrumental Variable
(IV) approach to estimate the average impact of the program on the compliers.
LATE is defined as the impact of the program for those whom the IV induces
the impact, or:
LATE = E[Y1   Y0jP0 = 0; P1 = 1] (2.4)
where P0 is the value of P when assigned to the control group and P1 is the value
of P when assigned to the treatment group. People for whom P0 = 0 and P1 = 1
are the population that follows their random assignment; they are also known as
”compliers”.
To estimate LATE, one can use IV regression methods:
Yihst =  + Pihst +Xihst + ihst (2.5)
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Pihst =  + Rs +Xihst + uihst (2.6)
where equation ( 2.6) is the first stage regression and equation ( 2.5) is the main
equation to be estimated. In terms of notation, R is the instrumental variable,
which in this context is the initial random assignment for sub-districts, which
equals 1 for sub-districts randomly assigned to the treatment group or 0 for
sub-districts randomly assigned to the control group. P is defined as program
participation as measured at the follow-up survey. Lastly, Xihst is a vector of
control variables for individual i in household h in sub-district s at time t that
may be included to increase the precision of the estimates.
Returning to the hypotheses, this study will test the following seven hypothe-
ses to understand better the small impacts of Indonesia’s CCT program on child
health:
Hypothesis 1 The program might be reinforcing behaviors that are already
practiced by most households.
Hypothesis 2 The cash transfer amount is too small to induce an increase in
preventive health care investments for children.
Hypothesis 3 The supply of health services in CCT program areas is inade-
quate.
Hypothesis 4 The program’s required health behaviors may by themselves have
very little effect on child health.
Hypothesis 5 Households may allocate the cash transfer or reallocate other
expenditures in a way that will not benefit the beneficiary children.
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Hypothesis 6 Lack of enforcement of the health conditionality may reduce the
program’s impact on children’s health outcomes, due to little change in
health behaviors.
Hypothesis 7 Child health outcomes are less influenced by the transfers be-
cause they are often not collected by the mothers.
To test the first hypothesis, whether the health behaviors at the baseline are
significantly different from the recommended health behaviors, simple t-tests will
be used to see whether households were already carrying out the required levels
of health behaviors for their children at baseline. The tests will focus on the
program’s required behaviors, i.e. growth monitoring, vitamin A consumption,
and complete immunization as appropriate given the child’s age.
To test the second hypothesis, that the amount of transfers was not large
enough to induce behavioral change, the cost of the required health behavior is
calculated to be compared with the average amount of transfer that the house-
hold received. The data for the cost of health services come from two different
data sets, one is from puskesmas level data and another is from household level
data. The cost for vaccines at the household level data is based on the cost of
each vaccination that the household has ever paid. The household level data do
not have specific questions on the cost for weighing and Vitamin A, thus it is ap-
proximated by using the questions on activity on last posyandu visit and amount
paid for that visit. Similarly, for puskesmas level data, the cost for visits can
only be approximated by the cost for new visits and follow-up visits. Note also
that puskesmas level data grouped vaccines into a larger category, for example:
the costs for 1st through 4th polio vaccines is combined into the cost for a polio
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vaccine.
In regards to the third hypothesis, that the CCT program sub-districts may
have inadequate supplies of health services, summary statistics of health services
indicators will be presented. The summary statistics will give a general picture
of whether the health facilities in the vicinity of the households are adequate
to serve the increase in demand induced by the PKH program. The variables
included in the summary statistics span from location of the nearest posyandu to
availability of vaccination in health facilities. In addition to the summary statis-
tics, LATE estimation using health services indicators as interaction variables
will be conducted. To measure availability of health services for the estimation,
an index of a health services will be constructed using all the variables included
in the summary statistics. Thus, IV regression from Equation (5) and (6) will
become:
Yihst =  + Pihst + Is;t 1 + Ps  Is;t 1 +Xihst + ihst (2.7)
Pihst; Pihst  Is;t 1 =  + Rs + Is;t 1 + Rs  Is;t 1 +Xihst + uihst (2.8)
where R, P , and X are defined as the above. Is;t 1 is the health services index
at baseline and Yihst is child health behaviors and outcomes. The health services
index is constructed using principal component analysis. Because this index rep-
resents a more general measure of health services, an estimation using a specific
index on vaccine availability will also be conducted on vaccine-related outcomes
(e.g. completed vaccination). These estimations are conducted to specifically
address the finding by Smeru’s study of inadequate medical supplies in the PKH
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program area. The data on health services is from puskesmas, village and house-
hold level data.
To test the fourth hypothesis, that the imposed health conditionality has small
effects on child health outcomes, a two step estimation of a health behavior index
on health outcomes will be conducted:
Yihst =  + Bihst +Xihst + ihst (2.9)
Bihst =  + Rs +Xihst + uihst (2.10)
where Yihst is one of several possible child health outcomes and Bs is the health
behavior index. Xihst and Rs are defined as above. The Indonesian CCT program
stipulates three health behaviors that the households need to fulfill in order to
receive the transfers: growth monitoring, vitamin A consumption and completion
of immunization. The health behavior index is constructed by taking the average
of the three indicators that have been fulfilled by the households. For example,
the index will equal 0 if households did not fulfill any of the required behaviors and
will equal 1 if households fullfil all of the requirements, with numbers in between
if households only partially fulfill the required behaviors. Thus all possible values
are 0, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3 and 1. Because the health behavior index is endogenous in
equation (9), it will be instrumented by the initial random assignment of the
program. Separate estimations for each required health behavior will also be
conducted to see whether the interaction between the program and the impact
of the program is due to a specific health behavior.
To test the fifth hypothesis, whether households reallocate their expenditures
away from child health expenditure, LATE estimations using the IV method, as
shown in equations ( 2.6) and ( 2.5), are conducted. To test this hypothesis, Y
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is now defined as either child food consumption, consumption of ”adult” goods,
or outpatient visits. The PKH survey includes detailed data on household’ ex-
penditures, including food and non-food consumption. Given that there is no
individual level data on adults’ food and non-food consumption, consumption of
”adult” goods can be approximated only by household consumption of alcohol
and tobacco, which are assumed to be consumed exclusively by adults. The child
food consumption variable is used to examine the child nutritional patterns that
are expected to be changed by the program. Lastly, the household data also pro-
vide outpatient visits for all household members. These estimations are intended
to give a general picture of the program influences on the health seeking behav-
ior of the child and other household members, in particular whether the extra
money from the cash transfer was spent for the benefit of adults members. Thus,
the estimation of outpatient visits will be done separately for child and adult
outpatient visits. For the purpose of this study, adults are defined as household
members whose age is above 18 years old. This cut-off is chosen because the child
health and education component were collected for household members between
0 and 18 years of age.
The sixth hypothesis of lack of compliance with the required behavior will be
tested by conducting estimates of required health behaviors on PKH receipt, as
defined by the following:
REh =  + RBh +Xh + h (2.11)
where X is defined as the above, while RE denotes PKH receipt by beneficiary
households and RB denotes required behavior which will equal 1 if the household
fulfilled all child health related behavior, and 0 otherwise. Had the conditionality
48
been enforced, non-compliance with the required health behavior should have led
to a reduction or an end of the transfers to the households. As a measure of
PKH receipt, three measures will be used. The first is whether the most recent
transfer received was within the past three months; the second is the frequency
of transfer in a year, and the third is the amount of the last transfer. Note that
the estimation results can be interpreted only as a correlation due to possible
endogeneity problem (reverse causality and measurement errors). Furthermore,
the estimation will be conducted only for the program participants.
Lastly, to test the seventh hypothesis, that child health behavior and out-
comes vary according to whether the transfer is collected only by mothers, an
estimation will be conducted to see whether child health behavior and outcomes
are correlated with the lack of compliance on this implicit conditionality. The
estimation equation will be:
Yihs =  + Mihs +Xhs + ihs (2.12)
where Y is defined as either child health behavior or outcomes, M is defined as
whether the transfer was collected by the mother (1 if collected by mothers, 0
otherwise) andX is defined as above. Similar to Hypothesis 6, the estimation will
be conducted only on program participants, and due to endogeneity problems it
can be interpreted only as a correlation.
2.6 Results
The following sub-sections will present the results of this study. The first sub-
section presents the LATE estimation results for child health behaviors and out-
comes, while the second sub-section presents the tests of the seven hypotheses.
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2.6.1 Estimation Results
Table 2.9 provides summary statistics for all of the control variables that are
used in the estimation. Before investigating the seven hypotheses, LATE es-
timates will be presented for several child health behaviors and outcomes of
interest to verify the generally small impacts of the program on these out-
comes. Following the World Bank report, in addition to the required child
health behaviors–growth monitoring, consumption of Vitamin A and completion
of childhood immunization–estimates will also be presented for other important
health behaviors: has ever been breastfed; length of breastfeeding; waiting time
for breastfeeding after birth; and outpatient visits to different health facilities
(traditional, private and public). Growth monitoring will take the value of 1
if children were weighed according to schedule at the health center (monthly
for infants 0-11 months old, or quarterly for children age 1-6 years old), and 0
otherwise. Completion of childhood immunization is constructed using the age
appropriate requirement for childhood immunization.21
Following Gertler (2004) and World Bank (2011), several indicators are used
to measure child health outcomes: morbidity, weight-for-age, height-for-age,
weight-for-height, malnutrition (z-scores  2), and severe malnutrition (z-scores
  3). Morbidity is defined as the parents’ report that their child was ill in the
four weeks prior to the survey. In the case of Indonesia’s CCT household survey,
21Childhood immunization requirements differ by age. In the first month of life, children are
required to get the first Hepatitis vaccine. At one month, they are required to get BCG vaccine
and the first Polio vaccine. At two months, the children are required to get the first DPT in
addition to the second Hepatitis and Polio vaccines. At three months, the third Hepatitis and
Polio vaccines, plus a second DPT vaccine should be given. At four months, the last DPT,
Hepatitis and Polio vaccines should be given. Lastly, at nine months, the children should get
the measles vaccine.
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the following illnesses are considered: diarrhea, fever, cough and acute respira-
tory infection (ARI). The morbidity estimates are conducted separately for each
illness. Because these morbidity measures can be criticized as being subjective,
weight-for-age, height-for-age and weight-for-height z-scores are used to provide
a more objective measure of child health; these are calculated using the World
Health Organization (WHO) growth reference standards. In addition to these
outcomes, estimates are also conducted for mortality during the program pilot
period for different age groups of children. Finally, also following the World
Bank, the estimations are conducted using three different specifications. The
first specification includes covariates and the baseline value of the dependent
variable.22 The second specification includes only baseline values. And lastly,
the third specification includes only covariates. Although the World Bank’s re-
port estimates three different impacts (placement, participation and spill-over
effects), this study estimates only the placement effects (i.e. LATE estimation
of ITT effects using all observations).
Tables 2.10 and 2.11, respectively, show the LATE estimation results for
child health behaviors and health outcomes for this study. The two tables show
some impacts of the program on the health behavior indicators, but no positive
effects on health outcomes. Among the three required behaviors for transfers,
the program has significantly positive impacts on only one, namely an increase in
child health visits that is significant at the 1 percent level. Note that the results
22The covariates are: household per capita expenditure, age of household head, gender of
household head, proportion of household members aged 0-2 years old, proportion of household
members aged 3-6 years old, proportion of household members aged 7-15 years old, household
head worked in agricultural sector, household head education attainment, household’s assets,
social network (e.g. familiarity with village head or his/her spouse), community participation
(e.g. participation in social service group), UCT households, have health insurance for poor
(Askeskin).
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for weighing for child age 0-11 months do not include baseline values because
these children were born after the baseline survey was collected. In addition to
this, the program also increased child and household members’ visits to public
health services. Child visits to public health services are higher than the control
group by 7 or 8 percent, which is significant at the 1 percent level, while all
household members’ visits to public health facilities is higher than the control
group by around 6 or 10 percent at the 1 or 5 percent statistical significant level.
Turning to health outcomes, there are no statistically significant favorable
impacts, and some impacts are unfavorable and marginally significant. The pro-
gram appears to have had a negative impact on height-for-age that is significant
at the 5 percent level for the specification that includes both covariates and base-
line values; and at the 10 percent level for the specification that includes only
baseline values. Similarly, the program appears to have increased the reported
incidence of fevers by more than 8 percentage points at the 1 or 10 percent sta-
tistical significant levels. Aside from these two impacts, none of the estimates on
health outcomes is statistically significant.
Besides the results on child health behavior and outcomes, estimations are
also conducted for household expenditure. The results, presented in Table 2.12,
show that only monthly expenditure per-capita on health increases, and it is
statistically significant only at 10 percent level by around IDR 2000 (around 1
percent of the average per-capita income of the households in the sample). Aside
from this variable, the program has no impacts on any of the other household
expenditures.
These results on child behaviors, child outcomes and household expenditures
hold even when the estimations were conducted only on households with only
52
one child age 0-5 years old in the household, although the statistical significant
levels are not always the same (see Tables 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15. Note that
the marginal positive impact on expenditure on health completely disappear in
the estimation with only one child age 0-5 years old. These results generally also
hold when the estimations are disaggregated by Java/off-Java or urban/rural (see
Appendix Tables A5, A6, A7, A8, and A9).23
Furthermore, when the estimation is limited to households with only one child
age 0-5 years old, none of the estimation on household expenditures is statistically
significant (see Table 2.15).
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2.6.2 Hypotheses Test Results
The results for Hypothesis 1, that the program might be reinforcing behaviors
that are already practiced by most households, are provided in Table 2.16.25
23Only the results from the estimations with covariates only are presented. The results
with baseline values only and both covariates and baseline values are similar, and thus are not
presented here.
24While these results are generally consistent with the World Bank’s results (See Appendix
Table A9 and A10), some of the results are different. For example, this study finds no
significant impact of the program on household members visits to private health facilities.
The World Bank report, however, found positive impacts that are significant at the 1 and 5
percent levels. As with the balance check results, these differences may be due to differences in
the treatment of missing values and outliers. For example, the World Bank imputed missing
baseline values using propensity score methods. This study, however, has opted to exclude
observations with missing values. Furthermore, the World Bank report used data from MOSA
on actual PKH transfers that are not publicly available and hence cannot be used in this study.
Lastly, the World Bank report uses all observations, including split and new households, which
differ from this study, which focuses only on panel households. Nevertheless, these differences
are relatively minor, so this study’s results corroborate the main results of the World Bank’s
impact evaluation in finding little or no impact of the PKH program on child health.
25The results presented are from the estimation using covariates only to allow the results
on variables that have no baseline values, such as child weighing for children age 0-11 months
old, who were not yet born at baseline. The complete results can be provided on request and
the conclusion presented here holds even with the inclusion of these estimations using baseline
values only and both baseline values and covariates
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The table shows that, except for child check-up visits of children age 1-3 years
old, most households have not invested in the required amount of child health
investments related to the PKH program’s conditionality. This results hold even
when the tests were conducted separately for urban/rural and Java/off-Java (see
Tables 2.17 and 2.18). Furthermore, these results also hold for different types
of specific vaccinations and different age groups, e.g. BCG and DPT as shown
in Tables 2.19, 2.20, 2.21 and 2.22. Among the specific vaccinations, the
mean for some of the later required vaccinations were lower than those of the
earlier ones (such as 1st Polio vaccine compared to the 4th Polio vaccine). This
implies transition problems between the earlier and later vaccination that has
the potential to be partly addressed by the PKH program. The mean for BCG
vaccine is especially low for those in age group 0 to 9 months old. Thus, these
results show that the PKH program required behaviors were not already part of
households behavior on child health investment, i.e not close to the upper bound.
This indicates that there is potential for the PKH program to improve on these
behaviors.
The results for the second hypothesis, that the cash transfer amount is too
small to induce an increase in preventive health care investments for children,
are shown in Table 2.23. From the summary statistics, the costs for vaccines are
relatively low compared to the the average yearly transfer to the household (only
around 0.5 percent of the yearly transfer). As can be seen from Table 2.2, the
annual transfer for children age 0-5 years old is around IDR 1,000,000 (including
the fixed cash transfer of IDR 200,000), or IDR 250,000 per quarter. If compared
to the cost of vaccination of around IDR 8876 (from household data) or IDR 5991
(from puskesmas data), the amount given by the program should be much more
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than enough to cover the cost of vaccination. However, these costs do not include
indirect costs, such as transportation costs, which cannot be examined as these
costs are not available from the data. Thus, the actual costs of fulfilling all the
required behaviors may be significantly higher than reflected by this summary
statistics of health services costs. Furthermore, the transfer might be allocated
for bigger expenditure, such as for education and clothes. However LATE es-
timations on households expenditure show no significant effect of the program
on any of types of expenditure, except marginally for health expenditure (see
Table 2.12). In addition to this, as it will be shown in the next section, most
household lives very near to the health facilities, and thus the transport costs
are most likely quite small. Thus, there is no strong evidence that the amount
of cash transfer is not enough to induce health care investments for children.
Tables 2.24 to 2.27 provide information relevant to Hypothesis 3, that the
supply of health services in CCT program areas is inadequate. From Tables 2.24
and 2.25, health services appear to be quite accessible, and the health facilities
generally have all the required health supplies to serve the households in the sur-
rounding area. In terms of distance, most of households did not have to travel
far in order to get the required basic services for child health. For example, the
mean of hours needed to reach the nearest posyandu is just 0.204 (about 12 min-
utes and the mean distance in kilometers to the nearest posyandu is around half
kilometer. Contrary to the finding by SMERU (2011), most of the puskesmas
surveyed had all the necessary vaccines available, with weeks of shortage much
less than 1 week in the previous month. These results hold even when the sum-
mary statistics are calculated separately for Java/off-Java and urban/rural (see
Appendix Tables A11 and A12). Specifically for vaccination availability, the re-
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sults also hold for the provinces where the SMERU’s study was conducted (West
Java and East Nusa Tenggara), as shown in Appendix Table A13 and A14. The
village data also show that although only 13.7 percent of households live in the
village with puskesmas located in it, time needed to reach the nearest puskesmas
is less than 20 minutes.
To provide a more precise analysis, some estimation results using the health
services indicators are presented in Table 2.26 (the first stage estimation is pre-
sented in Appendix Table A15). The two tables show that in general the health
services indicators do not seem to influence the child health behavior and out-
comes much. None of the estimations on child health behavior show any signif-
icant impacts for the health services indicators. Note that only the coefficient
for received CCT variable are significant at the 1 percent statistical level which
is consistent with the impact evaluation results showing the positive impacts of
the program on child health visits. This means that the households did go to the
health facilities, however, these visits do not seem to include receiving Vitamin
A or vaccination for the children. To examine whether this child-health visits
have any impacts on child health outcomes (through other channel not required
by the program, such as receiving food supplement or other types of vitamin),
the same estimations are also conducted for child health outcomes. The results,
presented in Table 2.27, show that the health services indicators are statistically
significant only for four estimations out of 37 estimations conducted. These re-
sults appears to suggest that the increase in child health visits may have very
little to no impacts to children’s health outcomes. Given the results from the
summary statistics and the estimations with interaction variables, there is no
strong evidence to support the notion that there is a lack of health services in
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the PKH areas. These results however raises questions about the efficacy of the
program to increase the demand for child health investments, because despite
the availability of health services and an increase in child health visits, none of
this were translated into stronger impacts on child health outcomes.
The results for Hypothesis 4, that the program’s required health behaviors
may by themselves have had very little effect on child health, are given in Ta-
ble 2.28. Similar to LATE estimation for the impact evaluation, random assign-
ment variable is also used as an instrument for the child health behavior variables
(the first stage result is presented in Appendix Table A16). Given that the es-
timations results are very similar in terms of statistical significance, the results
presented here are only a subset of all the estimations conducted. The results
are statistically significant at the 5 percent level only for reported incidence of
fever. These lack of significant results are maybe caused by the strength of the
IV to explain the instrumented variable (i.e. required health behavior measures).
From the 1st stage of estimation (as seen from Appendix Table A16), the instru-
ment is statistically significant for health behavior index and growth monitoring
measures, but not for Vitamin A consumption and vaccination, with the F-stat
ranging from 3.05 to 5.66. Overall, the results suggest that growth monitoring
alone is not enough to influence child health outcomes.
Because these IV estimates are too imprecise to provide a strong test for this
hypothesis, OLS estimations were conducted to examine the correlation between
these health behaviors variables and child health outcomes. These estimations
were conducted only for PKH beneficiary households to isolate the correlation
only on those that have received the transfer. The results are presented in Ta-
ble 2.29. Similar to the results in Table 2.28, the results presented here is a
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truncated version of all the estimations conducted. As expected, among the
three required behavior variables, growth monitoring shows strong correlation
with almost all child health outcomes. For some variables, the results seem to be
consistent with the impact evaluation results, such as height-for-age variable that
is correlated negatively with the health behavior index, growth monitoring and
vitamin A consumption at the 1 percent statistical significant level. Similarly,
the reported incidence of fever is positively correlated with the health behavior
index and growth monitoring. Among the health outcomes that are significantly
correlated with the health behavior variables, only the weight variable is posi-
tively correlated with all four health behavior variables. Nevertheless, the strong
results for growth monitoring may reflect reverse causality, thus the results need
to be interpreted with caution. Combining the two results (LATE estimation
and OLS), we can cautiously conclude that there is no strong evidence that the
required behaviors dictated by the program have significant positive impacts on
child health outcomes.
Table 2.30 provides the estimation results for Hypothesis 5, that households
may allocate the cash transfer or reallocate other expenditures in a way that will
not benefit the beneficiary children. Among the measures, none of the child food
consumption variables is affected by the program. Given that one channel for the
program’s impacts should be through child nutrition, the program has obviously
did not achieve this goal. Fortunately, the program seems to have no impact
on alcohol and tobacco consumption. The only variables significantly affected
by the program are child and adult outpatient visits to public health services,
which increased by 8 percentage points and 10 percentage points, results that
are statistically significant at 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively. Note that the
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percentage increase for adults is higher (10 percent) than for children (8 percent).
This suggests that much, and perhaps most, of the transfers may not be spent for
child health investments. Surprisingly, when the same estimations are conducted
only on households with only 1 child age 0-5 years old in the household, none of
the estimations are statistically significant. The results appears to suggest child
health visits may be conditional on adult health visits. Aside from public health
visits for children and adults, the results using households with only one child
age 0-5 years old still show that there are no impacts of the program on child
nutrition even when there is only one child who is eligible for the program in
the household. Given the data limitation, we can only conclude that the transfer
does not seem to be allocated specifically for child health investments. However,
it is not clear whether the transfer is used mostly for ”adult” goods as the data
do not differentiate household expenditure for children and adults specifically.
Given the size of the cash transfers (15 to 20 percent of poor households’
per capita expenditure), the lack of impacts on household expenditures, except
on health expenditures, and child consumption found by this study and by the
World Bank impact evaluation report (2011) raise the following question: where
did the money go? Comparing the CCT data with the Indonesia’s National
Socio-Economic Survey (Survey Sosial Ekonomi Nasional - SUSENAS), shows
that the household expenditure patterns is comparable between the two data
sets. The CCT data show lower expenditure values because the sample focuses
on the poorest households, unlike the SUSENAS data which are nationally rep-
resentative. This suggests that the results for the fifth hypothesis are less likely
driven by data issues. Research by Smeru (2011) indicates that most of the cash
transfers were used for immediate expenditure needs.
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The results for Hypothesis 6, that lack of enforcement of the health condition-
ality may reduce the program’s impact on children’s health outcomes because the
program does not change health behaviors, are given in Table 2.32. The results
show that growth monitoring is positively correlated with months since last PKH
transfer, and this is statistically significant at 5 percent level, while age appropri-
ate vaccination is negatively correlated with months since last PKH transfer also
at the 5 percent statistical significant level. However, none of the required behav-
iors is correlated with frequency of PKH transfer and value of last PKH transfer
variables. Given that the results are relatively weak, there is limited evidence of
transfers being denied or reduced in response to non-compliance. This result is
consistent with the study by SMERU (2011), which found almost non-existent
enforcement of the required behaviors.
Lastly, Tables 2.33to 2.36 show the results for Hypothesis 7, that child health
outcomes are influenced by whether the transfer is collected by the mothers.
Table 2.33 shows that a little more than 26 percent of households had someone
other than the mother collect the transfer. As expected, households with higher
decision-making power for mothers have a higher probability of the transfers
being collected by the mothers (see Table 2.34). Distance to the nearest post office
and farming household variables are negatively correlated with the probability of
the transfer being collected by the mother. This indicates that there maybe costs
associated with transfer collection that may need to be considered by the program
to make sure that the money can be collected only by the women. The fact that
more than 25 percent of sample stated that the transfer was not collected by the
mothers appears to corroborate the previous results on the lack of compliance to
the required behavior.
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However, this does not seem to be strongly correlated with the health be-
haviors and outcomes, as shown in Tables 2.35 and 2.36. Among child health
behaviors, only waiting time for breastfeeding after birth and child visits to pub-
lic health facilities variables are significantly correlated to transfer is collected by
mother variable, at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. A relatively similar
result is shown for health outcomes. Again only two variables are statistically
significant, reported incidence of ARI variable (10 percent level) and incidence
of cough and rapid breath (5 percent level). Given the number of estimates in
Table 2.35 (18) and Table 2.36 (21), these lack of statistically significant results is
consistent with the hypothesis that all correlation is equal to zero. In conclusion,
despite evidence that the program’s requirement of the transfers being collected
by mothers, the child behaviors and outcomes appears not to be affected much
by this.
2.6.3 Conclusion
The Government of Indonesia launched the CCT program in late 2007 to address
the low investment in human capital among children of poor households. Between
mid-2007 and late-2009, a pilot CCT program was conducted in 48 districts cov-
ering 430,000 eligible households. The transfer amount provided is around 15
to 20 percent of poor households’ per capita consumption. Given the scale and
coverage of the program, the relatively small impacts found in the World Bank’s
impact evaluation report of the program on any of the child health behaviors
and outcome is quite surprising. This study thus tries to examine the causes
of these disappointing impact evaluation results by proposing seven testable hy-
potheses to explain the results. The proposed hypotheses are: (1) The program
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might be reinforcing behaviors that are already practiced by most households;
(2) The cash transfer amount is too small to induce an increase in preventive
health care investments for children; (3) The supply of health services in CCT
program areas is inadequate; (4) The program’s required health behaviors may
by themselves have very little effect on child health; (5) Households may allocate
the cash transfer or reallocate other expenditures in a way that will not benefit
the beneficiary children; (6) Lack of enforcement of the health conditionality may
reduce the program’s impact on children’s health outcomes, by not changing the
health behaviors; and (7) Child health outcomes is influenced by whether the
transfer is collected by the mothers or not.
In addition to examining the underlying reasons for the small impacts, this
study also examines whether the data that were collected to estimate the impacts
of a program can also be used to understand the underlying mechanisms that
determine whether the program worked and failed to work. This research is
partly motivated by the lack of such examination in studies using the randomized
control trial (RCT) method to conduct impact evaluations. Most studies using
the data from an RCT stop after evaluating of the impact of the program. The
data are rarely used to examine facets of the program determine whether it works
or does not work. Given the high costs associated with the collection of this kind
of data, the lack of comprehensive use of the data for such goal needs to be
addressed. This study attempts to do this by using the Indonesian CCT data.
Starting with Hypothesis 1, that the program might be reinforcing behaviors
that are already practiced by most households, the results show that the required
behaviors were not already part of households behavior on child health invest-
ments. These results hold even when the test were disaggregated by urban/rural
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and java/off-java. The results also indicates a possible transition problem from
early vaccination to the latter ones, as shown by the lower mean of the 4th Polio
vaccine compared to the 1st Polio vaccine. The results thus reject Hypothesis 1
which implies that the small impact of the program is not caused by the possibil-
ity that households have reached the upper-bound of their investments in their
children health.
The second hypothesis to be examined is that the cash transfer amount is too
small to induce an increase in preventive health care investments for children.
Examining the costs associated with the required behaviors, there is no strong
evidence to support this hypothesis. The summary statistics of the costs show
that the costs for vaccination are between IDR 5591 to IDR 8876, which is only
around 0.5 percent of the average yearly transfer received by the households.
Although there is a possibility of indirect costs that may not be reflected by the
data, the results suggest that the amount of transfers does not seem to be the
main hindrance to the program’s success to influence child health investments.
The results for the third hypothesis, that the supply of health services in CCT
program areas is inadequate, indicates that in general the health services in CCT
program areas were adequate as shown by the availability of health facilities and
medical supplies in these facilities. For example, the summary statistics show
that most of the puskesmas have in stock all the required vaccines (BCG, DPT,
Hepatitis B, Polio and Measles). In terms of accessibility, most of the health
facilities are reachable in less than 20 minutes. The LATE estimations using
health services indicators as interaction variables further provide supports for
the results from the summary statistics. The estimation results show that there
is no strong statistically significant impact of health services on child health
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behaviors and outcomes. Combining these two results (summary statistics and
LATE estimations), it can be concluded that the third hypothesis can be rejected.
The fourth hypothesis test examines whether the program’s required health
behaviors may by themselves have very little effect on child health. The results
suggest that there is a possibility that the program’s required behavior may not
have strong positive correlation to child health outcomes. The fact that the
required behavior has positive correlation with only child weight should raise a
question on whether the program needs a more directed behaviors to improve
child health outcomes significantly. Nevertheless given the data are insufficient
to provide a conclusive evidence, these results should be interpreted with caution.
To test the fifth hypothesis that households may allocate the cash transfer or
reallocate other expenditures in a way that will not benefit the beneficiary chil-
dren, LATE estimations were conducted on child and ”adult” goods consumption.
Among the estimations results, the program has positive impacts only on child
and adult health visits. However, these positive impacts are no longer visible
when the estimations are limited to only households with only one child age 0-5
years old. The results also show that the program has no impact on child nutri-
ent which was expected to improve due to cash transfers. Thus, the estimations
results fail to reject the hypothesis. This lack of program’s impacts on child
nutrient may have influence its impacts on child health outcomes. Given that
research has shown the importance of macronutrients on child development, the
program may want to consider adding a specific component on macronutrient to
improve the efficacy of the program to positively influence child health outcomes.
The sixth hypothesis stated that lack of enforcement of the health condi-
tionality may reduce the program’s impact on children’s health outcomes, by
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not changing the health behaviors. To test this hypothesis, the estimations of re-
quired behavior on CCT transfers receipt were conducted. The estimation results
provides no strong evidence to reject this hypothesis. This possible lack of com-
pliance to the program’s required behaviors may have significantly reduced the
impact of the program on child health. Without the conditionality, the program
is essentially implemented as if it was an unconditional cash transfer program.
The results of this study, thus, tentatively conclude that the income effect is not
enough to induce higher investments in child health. Thus, the success of the
CCT program may rely significantly on the enforcement of the required behav-
iors.
The last hypothesis to be tested is that child health outcomes is influenced by
whether the transfer is collected by the mothers or not. Although a little more
than 26 percent of the households had the transfers not collected by mothers
(providing further support on the lack of compliance to required behavior), the
outcomes do not appear to be affected by this. These results, however, only
provide correlation not causation. Thus, the results provide only a tentative
evidence for the rejection of Hypothesis 7.
In closing, the results show that although it is possible to examine the under-
lying mechanisms that explains the success of a program that use an RCT method
for its impact evaluation, the data collected to evaluate the program may provide
only limited information that can be used for this purpose. One example of the
Indonesian data is the lack of questions for health providers on their knowledge
of the program. Given their roles as the enforcers for the program, this kind of
information can be used to infer whether the program was implemented correctly
or to implicitly examine whether the required behaviors were enforced. It needs
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to be noted that the current CCT program has undergone several improvements.
One of those is the enforcement of the required behaviors. Thus, the results in
this study should be interpreted within the context of the pilot of the Indonesian
CCT program.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Expenditure and Coverage of Indonesian CCT Program, 2007-2012
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
No. Households (millions) 0.388 0.621 0.726 0.774 1.052 1.454
Budget (million USD PPP) 79.244 113.065 126.688 146.049 210.181 228.287
Provinces (of 33 total) 7 13 13 20 25 33
Districts (of 497 total in 2010) 48 70 70 88 119 169
Sub-districts 337 637 781 946 1387 2001
Villages 4311 7654 9295 10998 16154 25032
Note: 1 US Dollar was equal to IDR 9138.5 in 2007
Source: Nazara (2013)
Table 2.2: Calculation of Annual Cash Transfer Amounts (IDR/household)
Support scenario
Amount of transfer per
household per year (IDR)
Fixed cash transfer (for all beneficiary households) 200,000
Cash transfer per household with:
a. Children age less than 6 years (per household) 800,000
b. Pregnant or lactating mother (per household) 800,000
c. Children of primary-school age (per child) 400,000
d. Children of secondary school age (per child) 800,000
Maximum transfer per household 2,200,000
Note: 1 US Dollar was equal to IDR 9138.5 in 2007
Source: World Bank, 2011
67
Fi
gu
re
2.
1:
PK
H
Se
lec
tio
n
an
d
Ra
nd
om
iza
tio
n
Pr
oc
ed
ur
e
So
ur
ce
:W
or
ld
Ba
nk
,2
01
0
68
Figure 2.2: Baseline Sample Selection for Pilot PKH
Source: World Bank, 2008
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Figure 2.3: PKH Survey and Program Implementation Timeline
Source: World Bank, 2011
Table 2.3: Baseline Survey Sample
Treatment Control
Sub-district 180 180
Villages 1369 1354
Households 7195 7131
Individuals 36,801 36,762
Children under 3 years 3075 3077
Children age 6-15 9396 9551
Married women age 16-49 7401 7358
Table 2.4: PKH Program Implementation Status
Randomly assigned to treatment
during the pilot
Randomly assigned to control
during the pilot
All Treated
Delayed
Treatment All Not Treated Treated
Sub-district 180 174 6 180 141 39
Villages 1369 1324 45 1352 1066 288
Households 7068 6955 240 7057 5571 1560
Children age 0-3 years 3081 2960 121 3097 2429 668
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Figure 2.4: Theory of Change for CCT Program
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Table 2.24: Hypothesis 3: Summary Statistics of Health Services at Baseline
Treatment Control
Mean St.Dev Obs Mean St.Dev Obs
From household data
Hours needed to reach posyandu 0.201 0.25 1506 0.178 0.21 1378
Distance to posyandu (km) 0.579 1.93 1509 0.449 0.71 1373
Waiting time at posyandu (hour) 0.401 0.63 1499 0.371 0.53 1371
From puskesmas data
Ratio of sub-puskesmas per household 0.005 0.01 177 0.005 0.01 178
Ratio of posyandu per household 0.061 0.06 177 0.059 0.04 179
Ratio of active posyandu per household 0.060 0.06 177 0.057 0.04 179
Current availability of Vitamin A (=1) 0.953 0.21 170 0.936 0.25 171
Current availability of BCG vaccine (=1) 0.954 0.21 173 0.989 0.11 180
Current availability of DPT vaccine (=1) 0.932 0.25 148 0.951 0.22 144
Current availability of DPT
or Hepatitis B combo vaccine (=1)
0.971 0.17 170 0.977 0.15 173
Current availability of Polio vaccine (=1) 0.994 0.08 175 0.983 0.13 180
Current availability of Hepatitis B vaccine (=1) 0.970 0.17 169 0.97 0.17 167
Current availability of measles vaccine (=1) 0.994 0.08 175 0.994 0.07 179
Weeks Vitamin A was not available last month 0.280 1.00 168 0.329 1.04 170
Weeks BCG was not available last month 0.395 1.09 172 0.358 1.11 179
Weeks DPT was not available last month 0.320 1.01 147 0.289 0.94 142
Weeks DPT/Hepatitis B combo vaccine
was not available last month
0.226 0.85 168 0.291 0.97 172
Weeks Polio vaccine was
not available last month
0.168 0.75 173 0.257 0.94 179
Weeks Hepatitis B vaccine
was not available last month
0.263 0.92 167 0.325 0.98 166
Weeks Measles vaccine was
not available last month
0.173 0.78 173 0.197 0.81 178
From village data
Active posyandu per household 0.006 0.02 1368 0.005 0.00 1351
Puskesmas is located in the village (=1) 13.7% 1369 14.1% 1354
Minutes needed to reach the closest puskesmas 17.412 33.38 1356 16.983 25.61 1343
Distance to the closest puskesmas 4.114 5.15 1369 4.015 4.94 1354
98
Table 2.25: Hypothesis 3: Distribution of Distance to Posyandu from Households
Treatment Control
All observations
Posyandu is located in the neighborhood 40.59% 40.24%
Posyandu is located in the ward 44.84% 46.26%
Posyandu is located in the village 13.53% 12.18%
Posyandu is located outside village 1.04% 1.33%
Java
Posyandu is located in the neighborhood 43.62% 43.76%
Posyandu is located in the ward 45.56% 46.81%
Posyandu is located in the village 9.82% 8.23%
Posyandu is located outside village 1.00% 1.20%
Off-Java
Posyandu is located in the neighborhood 33.33% 31.46%
Posyandu is located in the ward 43.11% 44.87%
Posyandu is located in the village 22.44% 22.02%
Posyandu is located outside village 1.12% 1.66%
Urban
Posyandu is located in the neighborhood 39.22% 38.48%
Posyandu is located in the ward 45.73% 46.85%
Posyandu is located in the village 13.91% 13.22%
Posyandu is located outside village 1.13% 1.45%
Rural
Posyandu is located in the neighborhood 45.80% 45.59%
Posyandu is located in the ward 41.72% 44.44%
Posyandu is located in the village 11.79% 9.00%
Posyandu is located outside village 0.68% 0.96%
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Chapter 3
Economic Crisis and Early Childhood Cognitive
Development in Indonesia
3.1 Introduction
After three decades of strong economic growth, Indonesia was hit by a currency
crisis in mid-1997 that escalated into financial, economic and political crisis by
early 1998. Because of the crisis, the economy contracted by 14 percent, while
domestic prices increased by 78 percent (Sumarto and Bazzi, 2011). The impacts
of the crisis were felt mostly through decreases in real wages and a massive
increase of the prices of basic goods (see Figure 3.1) (Sumarto and Bazzi, 2011).
The national poverty rate increased to 33 percent by the end of 1998 from its
initial rate of 15 percent in mid-1997. In the aftermath of the crisis, various
studies were conducted to assess its impacts on the country, including its impacts
on household health behaviors and outcomes. The research noted a significant
decrease in households’ health expenditure and health care utilization (Block
et al., 2004; Strauss et al., 2004; Thomas and Frankenberg, 2007; Waters et al.,
2003). However, most research finds little impact of the crisis on health outcomes
(Block et al., 2004; Frankenberg et al., 1999; Strauss et al., 2004).
This study will examine the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on child
cognitive development in Indonesia using the 2007 and 2014 Indonesian Family
Life Survey data which, to the knowledge of the author, has yet to be examined.
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Most research on the impacts of the crisis on child health focuses on several
common measures of child health, such as weight-for-height, Vitamin A con-
sumption, and reported incidence of illness. Furthermore, most of these studies
focus on short -term impacts or do not focus on young children, who were the
most vulnerable to the impacts of the crisis. This study, thus, differs from the
previous research due to its specific focus on early childhood development (birth
to eight years old; see UNESCO (UNESCO) and Raikes et al. (2014)) and its
attempt to examine whether the economic crisis has a medium term impact on
the development of children’s cognitive skills.
This study is motivated by research showing that there is sensitive periods
in child development that influences children’s development later in life. For
example, a study by Knudsen et al. (2006) showed that some skills are more
productively acquired at a certain period of childhood. Cunha and Heckman
(2007) in particular argue that the productivity of parental investments will be
higher in a child’s early stages of life for cognitive skills, relative to later year
investments. The opposite is argued for non-cognitive skills. Thus, given these
sensitive periods, in addition to the fact that these abilities are influenced by both
genetic and environmental components, a massive crisis like the 1998 financial
crisis in Indonesia may have had long-run deleterious impacts on Indonesian
children’s cognitive development. These impacts may have lasting consequences
on the later life outcomes of these children.
Although the crisis is colloquially called an economic or financial crisis, the
crisis in Indonesia actually consisted of three separate, but interacting, processes
(Block et al., 2004). The origin of the crisis was the currency crisis, which deep-
ened into a full-blown financial crisis with regional and national ramifications.
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As the crisis deepened, a national political crisis occured resulting in the ousting
of the then incumbent president. Amidst this economic and political chaos, most
rural areas in Indonesia also experienced drought due to El Niño-Southern Os-
cillation (ENSO) events that hit Indonesia before and during the financial crisis.
Thus, although this chapter will refer the crisis as an economic or financial crisis,
this term should be understood as including all three phenomena.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. The next section provides a
review of the existing literature on child development. This will be followed by a
brief historical examination of the economic crisis and its impacts in Indonesia.
The next section describes the empirical strategy, which includes both the data
description and the identification strategy for estimation. The last two sections
present the findings and conclusions of the research.
3.2 Literature Review
Grantham-McGregor et al. (2007) made a conservative estimate that more than
200 million children in developing countries faltered in their cognitive develop-
ment due to socioeconomic causes: poverty, disease, malnutrition and inadequate
care. Because human capital, which includes both cognitive and non-cognitive
skills, is a strong determinant of welfare outcomes in adulthood, this fact has
far-reaching consequences into the future for developing countries. Thus, early
childhood parental investments are important to ensure that children reach their
potential.
Child development research has highlighted several important factors influ-
encing the formation of human capital (Cunha and Heckman, 2007). Although
genetic endowments matter, skills are also influenced significantly by environmen-
116
tal conditions. Thus any skill is shaped by both genetic and acquired factors.
Because there are sensitive periods in child development, skill gaps open up at
early ages, for both cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Thus, investment in early
childhood has an important role in breaking the intergenerational transmission
of poverty (Helmers and Patnam, 2011; Lam and Duryea, 1999; Rosenzweig and
Wolpin, 1994).
Different types of ability appear to be malleable at different ages in humans.
For example, IQ scores appears to become stable at age 10 (Hopkins and Bracht,
1975). This implies that the later remedial measures are given to disadvantaged
children, the less effective they will be (Cunha and Heckman, 2007). Research by
Nelson et al. (2007) using a randomized control trial (RCT) method to compare
the cognitive skills between abandoned children reared in institutions with those
who were placed in institutions but then moved to foster care show that those
children who were moved to foster care have higher cognitive skills than those who
remained in an institution. Furthermore, the better cognitive outcomes are most
pronounced among children who were moved to foster care at the youngest ages.
This, again, suggests that there are sensitive periods in cognitive development.
Because there is a sensitive time for ability formation, human capital investments
in early life will be more productive or cost efficient than the same investments
in later life (Bärnighausen et al., 2008; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Horton et al.,
2008). However, early remedial or investments need to be followed up with
later investments to sustain their impacts on the development of children’s skills
(Cunha and Heckman, 2007).
Poverty is considered to be the main hindrance for human capital develop-
ment, and poor children have been observed to have not only lower physical
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health status, but also lower psychosocial and cognitive outcomes (Bradley and
Corwyn, 2002; Sameroff et al., 1993). Walker et al. (2004) argue that there are
three functional domains in early childhood for skill acquisition: cognitive skills,
non-cognitive skills and motor development. Children in developing countries
are subject to various major risks that affect their development in these three do-
mains: stunting; iron-deficiency; iodine deficiency; lack of cognitive stimulation;
intrauterine growth restriction; and maternal depression (Walker et al., 2004).
Within these already less than ideal conditions, an economic crisis can further
hinder childhood skill formation in developing countries through nutritional (e.g.
lower food quality) and environmental (e.g. maternal stress or lower quality of
public health services) pathways.
Despite the possible harmful impacts of a crisis on human capital formation,
the impacts of crises on child health are still not well understood, as the impacts
can be accentuated or dampened by other factors, e.g. the extent of govern-
ment support to help households overcome the crisis. Most research examining
the impacts of crises on child health focus on the role of nutrition. Franken-
berg et al. (1999), Block et al. (2004), and Stillman and Thomas (2008), found
that macroeconomic shocks had a negative impact on nutritional and health out-
comes. Nevertheless, Stillman and Thomas (2008) provide evidence that the
nutritional status of children in Russia is not vulnerable to short-term fluctua-
tions in income. However, it is vulnerable to long-term fluctuations in income.
Comparatively, Frankenberg et al. (1999) and Cameron (2001) found that the
Indonesian economic crisis had little influence on children’s health outcomes. In
contrast, research by Block et al. (2004), focusing on children under 5 years old,
find more pronounced negative impacts on child health outcomes. These differ-
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ences could be attributed in both different data sets used and differences in the
age-group considered.
Similarly, longer term impacts of the crisis are also a subject of current de-
bate. Duncan et al. (1994) and McLoyd (1998) argue that the deleterious impact
of crises on early child development in the U.S. is mostly due to persistent, rather
than transitory, poverty that is caused by a crisis. Because a crisis is usually a
temporary phenomenon, it is unclear whether temporary shocks can have longer-
term impacts in later periods of the children’s life. However, some studies appear
to suggest that this is the case. One of the most recent studies examining the
medium-term impact of crises on child development is that of Hidrobo (2014).
The study estimates the impact of the 1998-2000 Ecuadorian economic crisis
on children who were three years old or younger during that crisis. The study
compares sibling differences in the outcomes of interest (height-for-age and vo-
cabulary test scores) between households exposed to the crisis and those not
exposed to the crisis. Three major pathways for the crisis were also proposed by
the author: real-income reduction, child-care time reduction, and a lower quality
health environment.
Building on the existing literature, this study will examine the impact of the
1997-1998 crisis on children’s cognitive skills in Indonesia. As mentioned above,
there have been many studies examining the impacts of income shocks and child
health in Indonesia, with conflicting results (Bhutta et al., 2009; Block et al.,
2004; Cameron, 2001; Frankenberg et al., 1999; Giles and Satriawan, 2015; Mani,
2012; Strauss et al., 2004; Thomas and Frankenberg, 2007; Waters et al., 2003).
However none of these studies examines the impact of the crisis on Indonesian
children’s cognitive development, and most of these studies focus on the short-
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term impacts of the crisis. There have been very few studies that examine child
cognitive development in Indonesia due to the paucity of cognitive skills data.
One exception is the study of Cheung (2006), who uses zero-inflated binomial
and beta-binomial statistical models to examine the impact of growth status
at infancy and at age 7 years on cognitive function. Although the study uses
Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) data of the period before and after the
crisis (IFLS 1997 and IFLS 2000), it generally ignores the financial crisis in the
analysis. Thus, in contrast to this existing literature on Indonesia, this study will
use IFLS data to examine the impact of the crisis specifically on child cognitive
behaviors, which thus far has not been done for the case of Indonesia.
3.3 The Anatomy of Economic Crisis in Indonesia
The Indonesian economic crisis came as a surprise as, prior to the crisis, most
economic indicators looked promising and stable (Hill, 2000). Furman et al.
(1998) show that among 34 case studies, the Indonesian economic crisis was the
least predictable. The impact of the crisis was felt throughout the country, and
the crisis brought an end to three decades of strong economic growth averaging
to almost 5.5 percent per year from 1990 until the crisis (Ahuja, 1997). The crisis
also brought to a halt massive improvement in the poverty rate (which declined
from 40 percent in 1976 to 18 percent in 1996), the primary school enrollment
rate (which increased from 75 percent in 1970 to universal enrollment by 1995),
the secondary enrollment rate (which increased from 15 percent in 1970 to 55
percent by 1995), and the total fertility rate (which fell from 5.6 in 1971 to 2.8
in 1997) (Strauss et al., 2004).
The chronology of the Indonesian economic crisis started from liquidity flight
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from Thailand and the depreciation of its currency by more than 50 percent (Wa-
ters et al., 2003). As the confidence in the economies of the region plummeted,
Indonesia’s currency, the Rupiah, depreciated by over 500 percent from January
to July 1998 (Ramesh, 2009). The crisis has also caused the inflation to rise to
78 percent with unemployment rate above 6 percent in 1999 (Ramesh, 2009). As
the economic conditions deteriorated, the fiscal austerity imposed on Indonesia
as a condition for a bail-out by the IMF1 created a ripple effect that turned into
a massive political and social unrest (Ramesh, 2009; Sharma, 2010). In May
21st, 1998, the incumbent president, Suharto, resigned from his presidency after
thirty-two years in power. The new government, under the leadership of the pre-
vious vice-president, B.J. Habibie, started several reform measures immediately,
including decentralization of Indonesia’s political and economic power. By the
first quarter of 1999, the Indonesian economy began to recover slowly, and finally
showed a positive growth rate in 2000 of around 4.5 percent (Strauss et al., 2004).
Even though the impacts of the crisis were felt by the majority of the popu-
lation, different groups were affected differently. For most households, much of
the impacts are due to increase in prices of basic goods and reductions in real
wages (Strauss et al., 2004; Sumarto and Bazzi, 2011). With respect to health
outcomes, research shows that the impact of the crisis has been relatively small
(Block et al., 2004; Cameron, 2001; Frankenberg et al., 1999; Strauss et al., 2004;
Thomas and Frankenberg, 2007). Regarding child health impacts, the relatively
small impact is often attributed to household consumption smoothing efforts and
government policy in response to the crisis (Giles and Satriawan, 2015). Table 3.1
1The social protection program was not included in the aid package from IMF and the
World Bank until June 1998, a year after the beginning of the crisis (Ramesh, 2009)
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provides an illustration of the scale of social safety net program in Indonesia dur-
ing the crisis. These programs were generally targeted for the poor (Ramesh,
2009; Sumarto et al., 2008).
Although research generally shows that there have been relatively small im-
pacts of Indonesia’s 1998 crisis on child health outcomes, as discussed above,
most of this research focuses on short term impacts or does not focus on very
young children (Block et al., 2004; Frankenberg et al., 1999; Strauss et al., 2004).
Another common research focus is to examine the role of government policy in
dampening the impacts of the crisis on households. This research thus, differs
from any of the above by its focus on the medium-term impacts of crisis on
children’s cognitive skills.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Data
The data that will be used in this paper come from the 1997, 2007 and 2014
rounds of the longitudinal Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS2, IFLS4 and
IFLS5, respectively). Starting from IFLS3, in the year 2000, specific questions
on child cognitive skills were added. Using a test that was designed by two mem-
bers of the testing division at the Ministry of Education, 17 questions on child
cognitive skills were added (Frankenberg and Thomas, 2000). These questions
were given only to children age 7 to 14 years old. The 17 questions consist of
12 questions on basic cognitive skills (for example: matching pictures) and 5
questions on basic math skills. Some children refused to answer some questions,
in particular the math questions. To address this missing values problem, the
following rule is applied. First, if the child answered none of the 17 questions,
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the test scores values for that child will be missing for all 17 questions. However,
if the child answer some but missing for the rest, the questions that have missing
values will be scored as zero. Less than 10 percent of children in the sample has
missing values, thus this treatment of missing values is unlikely to create bias in
the results.
The timing of the crisis and the structure of the data are critical for the
identification of the impact of the crisis on child cognitive skills. First, because
the test scores are available only for children age 7-14 years old in any of IFLS
rounds except for the most recent one (IFLS5), the sample can include only
children of that age. Second, due to the focus of this study on early childhood
development, it will focus on children who were between 0 to 5 years old during
the crisis year (1997). These children were thus between 10 to 15 years old in
2007. Considering the two available data and the focus of the study, the sample
will thus include only children age 7 to 14 years old in both IFLS (2007 and 2014)
rounds.2 The panel nature of the data will be exploited for identification using
mother fixed effects as explained in detail in the next sub-section. This results
in 6676 children age 7 to 14 years in 2007 and 8159 children of that age in 2014.
Thus, the comparison will be made between of siblings within this age range of
7 to 14 years old.
The main variable of interest is the number of months a child was exposed to
the crisis. In order to determine this exposure length, the start and end of the
crisis needs to be defined. The crisis period is defined using two sources: the data
2Although the focus is on children most affected by the crisis, who were 10 to 14 years
old in 2007, additional children who are somewhat younger are also included to increase the
sample size. These additional children were not directly affected by the crisis, but they provide
valuable ”counterfactual” information precisely because they were not affected
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and the literature. Figure 3.2 shows that real GDP started its massive decline in
the third quarter of 1997. Although real GDP started to increase in 1999, it was
not until the first quarter of 2000 that the growth was consistently above zero.
The literature also generally agrees that the crisis period was between the third
quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 2000 (Hill, 2000; Ramesh, 2009; Sharma,
2010). This study will thus use the period from August 1997 to December 1999 as
the crisis period. The crisis exposure period will include the time exposed while in
utero. The IFLS data includes questions to mothers on weeks of pregnancy that
each child has before birth. Thus children in the data may be born after different
months in utero. On average children were born after 9 months of pregnancy.
Using this information, a child born in December 1999 would have been exposed
to the crisis for 10 months if the child was in utero for 9 months (one month
after birth and 9 months in utero); but the child would have been exposed to
the crisis only for 7 months if he/she was born after only 6 months of pregnancy.
Similarly, a child born in March 1998 would have been exposed to the full 29
months of the crisis if he/she was born after 9 months of pregnancy (20 months
after birth and 9 months in utero), but the child would have been exposed to the
crisis for around 27 months if he/she was born after only 7 months of pregnancy.
The next section will discuss the identification strategy that will use this variable
in the estimations.
3.4.2 Identification Strategy
Following Hidrobo (2014), the variable of interest in the main specification is
months exposed to the crisis. The longer the child is exposed to the crisis, the
larger impact on child cognitive outcomes should be. Specifically, the estimating
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equation is:
Yimta = 0+ 1Lt+0t+1t
2+
21X
p=1
pt  provp+ Ximta+ m+ a+ imta (3.1)
where Yimta denotes the outcome variable (cognitive skills) for child i with mother
m born at time t whose current age is a. The main variable of interest is Lt:
the length of time that a child born at time t is exposed to the crisis. Note
that Lt includes months in utero a child is exposed to the crisis. The other
variables in equation (1) are: Ximta is vector of child characteristics, t is the
date when the child was born (in months) to capture general trends in child
development overtime, which is also interacted with the province variable, prov,
to allow the time trend to vary by provinces, m is a mother fixed-effect, a is
the current age (in months) fixed effect, and lastly imta is the error term. The
inclusion of the mother fixed effect limits the sample to include only children
with siblings who were within the early childhood range (0 to 3 years old) when
they were exposed to the crisis. The mother fixed effect is included to account for
unobserved time-invariant community level characteristics and unobserved time-
variant household characteristics that affect child development. This implies
that the error terms represent unobserved individual child characteristics and
time-variying households and community characteristics. The estimates of crisis
impacts, 1, will be unbiased only if the error term, imta, is uncorrelated with
the length of exposure to the crisis, Lt. The error term will be clustered at the
birth-month cohort, to account for correlation within cohorts.
The challenge in identification for the above specification is to separate the
crisis impacts from secular time trends. In particular, improvements in medicine
and technology over time benefit younger children more than older ones. Thus,
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an apparent worse outcomes in older children may not necessarily be caused by
the crisis. This is why the estimation specification in equation (1) includes a
general quadratic time trend for the child’s date of birth (in months), t, and
province-level linear time trends of the child’s date of birth, t  provp. The effect
of the age of the child on cognitive skills is specified very flexibly using age in
months fixed effects. Table 3.2 shows how the data of both birth month and
exposure variables. Note that birth month was labeled such that the oldest child
birth month (those that were born in January 1993) will be assigned a value of 1,
and the youngest child’s birth month (those that were born in July 2008) is 187.
Similarly, because households most affected by the crisis may react differently,
the estimations also include a mother fixed effect to control for unobservable
time-invariant household characteristics, such as preferences.
The impact of the crisis is identified through comparisons of siblings with
the same gap in ages across different households. In order to do this, data from
two different survey rounds are needed that include children with the same age
gap. If estimates were based on a single cross-section data set, it would not be
possible to distinguish between date of birth and current age. But this is possible
because all estimates include data from both 2007 and 2014. The inclusion of
mother fixed effects restricts the comparison to be made to within-household
sibling differences across different households.
Table 3.3, adapted from Hidrobo (2014), illustrates the identification chan-
nels. The estimates can be identified through two channels. The first channel is
through comparison of sibling pairs in household 1 and household 2 in the first
four rows of Table 3.3. More specifically, the two households’ sibling differences
are compared, i.e. the sibling differences of household 1 for the survey month
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January 2007 are compared with the siblings differences in household 2 in survey
month January 2014. Both households have siblings with the same age gap, but
they differ in exposure (in months) to the crisis because they were surveyed in
different years, specifically the 97 month old child in 2007 in household 1 had
been exposed to the crisis for around 12 months, while a child of the same age
(97 months) in 2014 was never exposed to the crisis. In the absence of the crisis,
and assuming that a relatively linear date of birth time trend of early childhood
development, the cognitive skills differences of siblings in household 1 should be
the same with the cognitive skills differences of siblings in household 2. Thus the
estimates are identified because, although both households have siblings with the
same age gap, the older child in household 1 was exposed to the crisis while the
older child in household 2 was not.
The second channel compares households 3 and 4. The sibling differences
this time are identified through two different survey dates. The sibling differ-
ences within both household 3 and 4 are calculated by using data collected in
two different years. Consider household 3, the siblings are of the same age in two
different years (2007 and 2014). The first child was exposed to the crisis when
he/she was between 0 to 97 months. However, the second child never experienced
any crisis when he/she was between 0 to 97 months old. For household 4 both
children never experienced the crisis when they were both between age 0 to 73
months old. The age gap of the siblings is the same (84 months) for both house-
holds. Without the crisis, the gap in cognitive skills between siblings of these
two households should be the same. The crisis, however, may increase/decrease
the sibling differences in household 3. Thus the crisis impact can be identified
by comparing the differences in cognitive achievement of the siblings of the same
127
age (but of different points in time) in household 3 with the same differences of
siblings’ cognitive achievement in household 4.
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, this identification strategy requires
that the differences in siblings of the same age be the same across households in
the absence of economic crisis, i.e. in the absence of a crisis, the differences in
cognitive skills of siblings in household i whose age gap is 5 years should be the
same as the differences in cognitive skills of siblings in household j whose age gap
is also 5 years. This assumption will hold if the time trend of early childhood
development is generally linear. Given that infant mortality and weight-for-age
time trends in Indonesia are relatively linear, this assumption is likely hold (see
Figures 3.3 and 3.4). Another threat to the identification is that if there is a
deviation from the trend that is caused by other shocks not related to the crisis,
such as unconditional and conditional cash transfer programs (UCT and CCT
programs), which started in 2005 and mid 2007 in Indonesia, respectively. Unfor-
tunately, the IFLS data have no information regarding whether a household has
ever received CCT transfers. Thus, only a variable denoting whether a household
received UCT transfers is included.
Equation (1) assumes that the impact of the crisis is the same at every period
in a young child’s life. To account for the possibility that some periods in early
childhood are particularly sensitive for children’s cognitive development, a more
flexible specification is also used:
Yimta = 0 + 1L
prenatal
t + 2L
0to11
t + 3L
12to23
t + 4L
24to35
t + 5L
above35
t
+0t+ 1t
2 +
21X
p=1
pt  provp + Ximta + m + a + imta
(3.2)
where Lprenatalt is the length of time (in months) a child is exposed to the crisis
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while in utero; L0to11t length of time that a child is exposed to the crisis between
ages of 0 to 11 months; L12to23t is the length of time that a child is exposed to
the crisis between the ages of 12 to 23 months; L12to23t is the length of time that
a child is exposed to the crisis between the ages of 24 to 35 months; and lastly
Labove35t is length of time that a child is exposed to the crisis when 24-months of
age and above.
Table 3.4 provides the summary statistics of variables that are used in the
estimations. To provide a general picture of the data structure, the table is
presented with three columns. The first column show the total number of children
ages 7 to 14 years from both IFLS rounds (2007 and 2014). From more than
14,000 children, around 5,000 of them have no siblings in the IFLS 2014 round
and around 9,000 children have siblings between 7 to 14 years of age in that
round. Focusing on children in column (3), of Table 3.4, in general, exposure
to the crisis is around 9 months. However, conditional on being exposed to the
crisis, the exposure length is around 23 months. More than 50 percent of the
children are male, and most children have their father living in the household
(more than 90 percent). Around 95 percent of the mothers are married. The
average age of a mother when a child is born is around 27 years. Slightly more
than 40 percent of the sample are from farming households, and slightly more
than one fourth of the sample received UCT transfers. Most of children also live
in urban areas. Note that the test score variables are standardized using the
mean and standard deviation of the 2014 children’s test scores.
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3.5 Results
This section is divided into two parts. The first part presents the main estimates
of the impact of the length of exposure to the crisis on child cognitive skills. The
second part presents the robustness checks to assess the credibility of the results.
3.5.1 Main Estimation Results
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 provide the estimation results for the specification in equa-
tion (1). The results in Table 3.5 show small but often statistically significant
negative impacts of exposure to the crisis length on total scores and math scores.
An increase in exposure to the crisis by one month reduces the standardized to-
tal test scores by 0.010 standard deviation (at the 5 percent level) and reduces
math scores by 0.015 standard deviation (at the 1 percent level). Thus, for a
child exposed to the whole crisis (about 38 months), he or she would have a
lower test score of about 0.38 standard deviation for total test scores and 0.57
standard deviation for math scores, which are quite large effects. The estimated
impacts on cognitive scores is somewhat smaller (0.006 standard deviation) and
not statistically significant.
The results differ for the urban and rural populations, as shown in Table 3.6.
The impacts are larger when the sample is limited to urban population; an addi-
tional one-month of exposure to the crisis reduces total scores by 0.015 standard
deviation at the 5 percent statistical level and reduces math scores by 0.018 stan-
dard deviation at the 1 percent statistical level. Again, these negative effects in
urban areas imply quite large effects for 38 months exposure to the crisis, 0.57
standard deviation for total scores and 0.684 for cognitive scores. As in Table 3.5,
the estimated impacts is on cognitive scores is smaller (0.010 standard deviation),
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although it is marginally significant (at the 10 percent level) in the estimation
using only urban population. These generally negative effects are completely
absent in rural areas; none of the estimates using rural sample is statistically
significant.
If the length of exposure variable is limited to exposure to the crisis after
birth, the results change. These results are presented in Tables 3.19 and 3.20.
Comparing Tables 3.5 and 3.19, the estimated impact of exposure to the crisis
variable in Table 3.19 is no longer statistically significant for any of the estima-
tions. Similarly, when the sample is disaggregated into urban and rural areas in
Table 3.20, there are no longer statistically significant impacts for urban areas.
This suggests that the negative impacts of the crisis may be most severe for the
children who were exposed to the crisis while they were still in utero.
To examine the validity of this conjecture, Tables 3.7 and 3.8 provide the
results of the estimations using a more flexible specification that allows for dif-
ferential impacts of exposure to the crisis for different ages. The results clearly
support this conjecture. Table 3.7 shows that longer exposure to the crisis in
utero significantly reduces children’s cognitive skills. The negative impact of
0.047 standard deviation per month (for total scores) implies that exposure to
the crisis for all 9 months of gestation reduces a child’s cognitive skills by 0.42
standard deviation, which is a very large effect. Note also that, in contrast to
Table 3.5, the estimates of the impact of crisis exposure variable on cognitive
scores is now statistically significant at 5 percent level. In particular, an increase
of exposure to the crisis in utero by one month reduces the standardized cognitive
score by 0.033 standard deviation, which is also a very large effect. Turning to
post-natal time period, for all three test score variables, the estimated impacts
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are smaller in size and statistically insignificant. Overall, the crisis appears to
have no impacts on the children who experienced it after they were born.
Table 3.8 repeats the analysis Table 3.5, but does so separately for rural and
urban areas. The results show that virtually all of the burden of the negative
impacts of the crisis were borne by children living in urban areas. An increase
of crisis exposure by one month while in utero reduces total scores, basic cog-
nitive scores and math scores by 0.061, 0.032 and 0.093 standard deviations,
respectively. These estimated impacts imply that exposure for all nine months
of gestation reduce urban children’s test scores later in life by 0.55 to 0.84 stan-
dard deviations of the distribution of test scores, which is a huge effect. Two of
these estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level (total score and
math score), while estimate on cognitive score is statistically significant at the 5
percent level. Although some post natal period show some statistical significant
impacts, they are marginal at best at only the 10 percent level.
Turning to rural children, none of the point estimates are statistically sig-
nificant. One interpretation of this result is that rural farming households may
be able to insulate themselves from the impacts of rising food prices during the
crisis because they produce many or most of their basic food goods.
Among the control variables, boys appear to perform worse in math questions
in all estimations. Children from wealthier households, as measured by the asset
index variable, also have higher test scores. Surprisingly, the children in house-
holds in rural areas who received UCT transfers have much lower test scores.
One possible reason for this is a reverse causality between test scores and UCT
transfers receipt; i.e. households who have children with lower performance are
more likely to receive UCT transfers. Overall, the main results appear to indi-
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cate that exposure to crisis may have negative impacts on test scores depending
on the length of exposure to the crisis while the child is in utero. The negative
impacts are found only in urban areas, which suggest that rural household were
able to insulate their children from the worst impacts of the crisis.
3.5.2 Robustness Check
The robustness check, to assess the validity of main estimation results, are con-
ducted as the following. The first robustness check will re-estimate equation (1)
and (2) using different cluster, 1997 village level clusters. This check is conducted
to examine whether the results are robust to the usage of different clusters. The
second check is conducted by limiting the sample to children age 0-3 years old
in 1997 (the beginning of crisis year). This is because the sample that uses only
youngest impacted children may behave differently to the one that includes the
full sample. Thus, the children to be considered for the sample has age range
between 7 to 13 years old instead of 7 to 14 years old in 2007. Around 12 per-
cent of the sample is lost when the sample is limited to only children between
7 to 13 years old in 2007. Lastly, because the negative impacts of the crisis is
only robust for urban areas, the last robustness check is conducted by estimating
the same specification using only rural sample but disaggregated by farming and
non-farming households. This is to examine whether the lack of negative impact
in rural areas is due to access to farming land.
The results for the estimation using village level cluster are given in Tables 3.9,
3.10 ,3.11 and 3.12. Compared to the main estimations results (Tables 3.5 to
3.8), the estimates using village level cluster appear to have less power in terms
of statistical significance level. For example, the estimates of length of crisis
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exposure on math score is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in Ta-
ble 3.5. However, the same coefficient is statistically significant at only the 5
percent level in Table 3.9. When estimations are conducted only on rural house-
holds sample, length of crisis exposure has marginal or statistically insignificant
impact on total score and cognitive score. These differences also hold for children
in urban households when the estimations include a more flexible form of length
of exposure to the crisis.
Tables 3.13, 3.14 ,3.15 and 3.16 present the estimated impacts of the crisis
on children age 7 to 13 years old in 2007 and 2014. Table 3.13 shows that,
unlike the results in Table 3.5, the crisis exposure coefficients are only marginally
significant at the 10 percent level for the estimates on total score and basic
cognitive score. Furthermore, the estimated impact on math score is no longer
significant for urban population, although the estimated impact on total score
and basic cognitive score is still statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
The estimated impact of in-utero crisis exposure is still highly significant at the
1 percent level in all estimations. This further support the main estimation
results showing the importance of in-utero development for children later in life.
Lastly, Tables 3.17, 3.18 present estimation results using only children in
rural household sample disaggregated by farming and non-farming households.
Table 3.17 shows identical results to the main estimation results using only the
sample of children in rural areas. There is no statistically significant negative
impact of the crisis to the children in either farming or non-farming households.
Table 3.18, however, shows some negative impacts of the crisis on non-farming
households. Specifically, an additional one-month of exposure to the crisis while
in utero reduces total scores for children in rural non-farming households by
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0.073 standard deviation. This impact is, again, very huge for children who were
exposed to the crisis for their full gestation period. The result suggests that
access to farming land may be important for households in rural areas to avoid
the negative impacts of the crisis on child health.
3.6 Conclusion
This study attempts to estimate the causal impacts of the 1997 Asian Financial
crisis on Indonesian children’s cognitive skills. In order to identify the estimates,
the study exploits the longitudinal nature of the Indonesian Family Life Survey
(IFLS) data, by using sample children from the 2007 and 2014 IFLS. The es-
timates are identified by comparing cognitive skill differences between siblings
in the same households with cognitive skill differences of siblings in different
households that have the same sibling age gap.
The main variable of interest is the length of exposure to the crisis (in months)
that a child experienced. To account for the possibility of sensitive periods in
early child development, flexible specifications that differentiate between different
phases of early childhood development were also estimated. The crisis period
is determined by referring to the GDP data and to the literature focusing on
Indonesia’s financial crisis. As such, the crisis period is defined to be between
August 1997 to December 1999. Thus, children born in December 1999 would
have been exposed to the crisis by around one month after birth. To account for
the deleterious impacts of the crisis to fetal development, the length of exposure
to the crisis variable includes months exposed to the crisis while in utero. Thus
a child born in December 1999 and was born after 9 months of pregnancy is
classified as being exposed to the crisis by around 10 months (1 month after
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birth and 9 months in utero).
The results show that the negative impacts of the crisis mostly are felt by
children in urban areas. In rural areas, possibly due to the abilities of parents to
shield their children from the most negative impacts of the crisis by self producing
basic needs, the impacts of the crisis on rural children is generally not significant.
This ability to insulate the children from the crisis appears to apply mostly to
farming households in rural areas as the results show some negative impacts of
the crisis on non-farming households in rural areas. If we differentiate between
the stages of early childhood development, the impacts of the crisis appear to
be most detrimental when the children are exposed to the crisis in utero. This
finding seems to be consistent with the findings by Glewwe and King (2001) on
children in the Phillipines. In contrast, although Hidrobo (2014) finds negative
impacts of crisis exposure in utero for cognitive skills of children in Ecuador,
she also finds that length of exposure to the crisis between ages 0 to 11 months
and between ages 12 to 23 months have also negative impacts on child cognitive
scores.
Several policy implications can be drawn from the estimation results. First,
because the impact of the crisis is most severe when children are exposed to it
while in utero, in time of economic shocks social safety nets focusing on pregnant
women may be important to reduce the impact of crisis on children’s cognitive
skills. Second, the negative impacts of the crisis on rural non-farming households
suggest that the negative impacts of the crisis may be distributed mostly through
reduction in quality and quantity of nutrition. Thus, policies that protect nutri-
tional status of pregnant women and their children are important. Lastly, the
impacts of macroeconomic shocks appear to mostly affect children in urban areas.
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This implies that during crisis, some policies targeted specifically for children in
the urban areas might be needed.
In conclusion, the results provide evidence that the impacts of the crisis on
children were negative for children in urban or non-farming rural households.
Nevertheless, the interpretation of the results need to account for the possibility
that the underlying assumptions for the identification may be violated which may
cause some bias in the estimates.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1: Indonesian GDP percapita growth, inflation and food price index (annual %)
Source: World Development Indicators
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Figure 3.3: Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)
Source: World Development Indicators
Figure 3.4: Prevalence of underweight, weight for age (% of children under 5)
Source: World Development Indicators
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Table 3.2: Birth Month and Months of Crisis Exposure
Month of birth Months in utero Birth-month (labeled) Months of crisis exposure
July 2008 7 months 187 0
June 2008 9 months 186 0
January 2007 9 months 169 0
August 2000 8 months 92 0
August 2000 9 months 92 1
December 1999 9 months 84 10
September 1998 7 months 66 23
September 1998 9 months 66 25
August 1997 9 months 70 29
December 1996 9 months 67 29
May 1994 9 months 17 29
January 1993 9 months 1 29
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Table 3.5: Fixed Effect Estimation of Crisis Exposures on Test Scores
Total score
Basic cognitive
score Math score
Months exposed to crisis
(including while in utero)
-0.010 -0.006 -0.015
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Birth month -0.016 -0.004 -0.034
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012)
Birth month sq 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.041 0.028 -0.164
(0.036) (0.035) (0.041)
Father lived in household -0.255 -0.238 -0.180
(0.144) (0.152) (0.139)
Mother’s age 0.032 0.056 -0.029
(0.101) (0.107) (0.083)
Mother is married 0.132 0.009 0.325
(0.231) (0.239) (0.279)
Mother’s age on birth of child i -0.112 -0.129 -0.032
(0.104) (0.110) (0.088)
UCT household -0.284 -0.263 -0.206
(0.087) (0.092) (0.080)
Farming household -0.028 0.052 -0.180
(0.093) (0.088) (0.099)
Asset index 0.192 0.197 0.102
(0.031) (0.033) (0.029)
Urban 0.023 -0.003 0.066
(0.122) (0.121) (0.145)
Observations 11781 11781 11781
Adjusted R2 0.191 0.154 0.137
Standard errors, clustered at birth month cohorts, in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
All test scores are standardized using variable means and standard deviation
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Table 3.7: Fixed Effect Estimation of Crisis Exposures by Ages on Test Scores
Total score Basic cognitive score Math score
Months exposed to
crisis while in utero
-0.047 -0.033 -0.055
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Months exposed to crisis
between 0-11 months of age
0.010 0.002 0.023
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Months exposed to crisis
between 12-23 months of age
-0.028 -0.022 -0.027
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Months exposed to crisis
between 24-35 months of age
-0.011 -0.012 -0.005
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Months exposed to crisis
above 35 months of age
-0.018 -0.022 -0.001
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
Birth month -0.015 -0.010 -0.018
(0.017) (0.016) (0.019)
Birth month sq -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.040 0.029 -0.163
(0.036) (0.036) (0.041)
Father lived in household -0.255 -0.240 -0.178
(0.145) (0.152) (0.140)
Mother’s age 0.027 0.053 -0.037
(0.103) (0.108) (0.084)
Mother is married 0.125 0.004 0.318
(0.232) (0.239) (0.279)
Mother’s age on birth of child i -0.107 -0.126 -0.023
(0.106) (0.111) (0.090)
UCT household -0.290 -0.267 -0.212
(0.087) (0.092) (0.079)
Farming household -0.027 0.053 -0.178
(0.092) (0.088) (0.099)
Asset index 0.193 0.197 0.102
(0.031) (0.033) (0.029)
Urban 0.033 0.005 0.076
(0.121) (0.121) (0.144)
Observations 11781 11781 11781
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.154 0.139
Standard errors, clustered at birth month cohorts, in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
All test scores are standardized using variable means and standard deviation
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Table 3.9: Fixed Effect Estimation of Crisis Exposures on Test Scores
Total score Basic cognitive score Math score
Months exposed to crisis
(including while in utero)
-0.008 -0.005 -0.012
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Birth month -0.021 -0.010 -0.036
(0.009) (0.007) (0.015)
Birth month sq 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.074 -0.002 -0.189
(0.047) (0.049) (0.051)
Father lived in household -0.220 -0.255 -0.054
(0.205) (0.219) (0.183)
Mother’s age 0.074 0.074 0.044
(0.101) (0.104) (0.085)
Mother is married 0.117 0.031 0.241
(0.304) (0.313) (0.278)
Mother’s age on birth of child i -0.153 -0.153 -0.088
(0.100) (0.105) (0.090)
UCT household -0.269 -0.251 -0.192
(0.101) (0.104) (0.112)
Farming household -0.015 0.068 -0.177
(0.118) (0.111) (0.129)
Asset index 0.191 0.186 0.120
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Urban 0.063 0.029 0.105
(0.191) (0.207) (0.155)
Observations 10486 10486 10486
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.155 0.133
Standard errors, clustered at village level in 2007, in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
All test scores are standardized using variable means and standard deviation
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Table 3.11: Fixed Effect Estimation of Crisis Exposures by Ages on Test Scores
Total score Basic cognitive score Math score
Months exposed to crisis
while in utero
-0.033 -0.019 -0.048
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
Months exposed to crisis
between 0-11 months of age
0.010 -0.000 0.026
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Months exposed to crisis
between 12-23 months of age
-0.015 -0.008 -0.023
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025)
Months exposed to crisis
between 24-35 months of age
-0.000 -0.003 0.005
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Months exposed to crisis
above 35 months of age
0.000 -0.004 0.009
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Birth month -0.012 -0.007 -0.017
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023)
Birth month sq -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.072 -0.001 -0.187
(0.047) (0.049) (0.051)
Father lived in household -0.221 -0.257 -0.054
(0.206) (0.219) (0.185)
Mother’s age 0.070 0.072 0.038
(0.102) (0.105) (0.086)
Mother is married 0.114 0.029 0.237
(0.304) (0.313) (0.278)
Mother’s age on birth of child i -0.149 -0.151 -0.081
(0.101) (0.105) (0.091)
UCT household -0.272 -0.252 -0.197
(0.102) (0.104) (0.111)
Farming household -0.013 0.070 -0.175
(0.118) (0.112) (0.129)
Asset index 0.191 0.186 0.121
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Urban 0.069 0.032 0.114
(0.190) (0.208) (0.154)
Observations 10486 10486 10486
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.154 0.134
Standard errors, clustered at village level in 2007, in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
All test scores are standardized using variable means and standard deviation
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Table 3.13: Fixed Effect Estimation of Crisis Exposures on Test Scores (Children
7-13 years old in 2007 and 2014)
Total score Basic cognitive score Math score
Months exposed to crisis
(including while in utero)
-0.009 -0.006 -0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Birth month -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Birth month sq -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.027 0.041 -0.153
(0.037) (0.035) (0.044)
Father lived in household -0.259 -0.223 -0.223
(0.160) (0.166) (0.150)
Mother’s age -0.079 -0.045 -0.116
(0.128) (0.140) (0.104)
Mother is married 0.099 -0.019 0.296
(0.227) (0.232) (0.253)
Mother’s age on birth of child i -0.002 -0.017 0.030
(0.128) (0.140) (0.106)
UCT household -0.354 -0.347 -0.218
(0.077) (0.081) (0.078)
Farming household -0.023 0.063 -0.188
(0.090) (0.088) (0.100)
Asset index 0.195 0.194 0.114
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
Urban 0.016 0.005 0.031
(0.130) (0.128) (0.148)
Observations 10454 10454 10454
Adjusted R2 0.195 0.157 0.138
Standard errors, clustered at birth month cohorts, in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:010
All test scores are standardized using variable means and standard deviation
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Table 3.15: Fixed Effect Estimation of Crisis Exposures by Ages on Test Scores (for
Children 7 to 13 years old in 2007 and 2014)
Total score Basic cognitive score Math score
Months exposed to
crisis while in utero
-0.053 -0.043 -0.051
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Months exposed to crisis
between 0-11 months of age
0.017 0.005 0.033
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Months exposed to crisis
between 12-23 months of age
-0.033 -0.029 -0.028
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Months exposed to crisis
between 24-35 months of age
-0.007 -0.014 0.010
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Months exposed to crisis
above 35 months of age
-0.017 -0.026 0.008
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
Birth month -0.005 -0.012 0.012
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Birth month sq -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.027 0.041 -0.153
(0.037) (0.036) (0.044)
Father lived in household -0.260 -0.225 -0.223
(0.161) (0.166) (0.150)
Mother’s age -0.089 -0.051 -0.129
(0.130) (0.141) (0.105)
Mother is married 0.094 -0.025 0.295
(0.227) (0.232) (0.254)
Mother’s age on birth of child i 0.012 -0.008 0.048
(0.130) (0.141) (0.107)
UCT household -0.362 -0.353 -0.225
(0.077) (0.081) (0.078)
Farming household -0.022 0.064 -0.188
(0.090) (0.088) (0.100)
Asset index 0.195 0.194 0.114
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
Urban 0.025 0.013 0.038
(0.130) (0.128) (0.148)
Observations 10454 10454 10454
Adjusted R2 0.196 0.158 0.140
Standard errors, clustered at birth month cohorts, in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:010
All test scores are standardized using variable means and standard deviation
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Table 3.19: Fixed Effect Estimation of Crisis Exposures on Test Scores (excluding in
Utero period)
Total score Basic cognitive score Math score
Months exposed to crisis -0.009 -0.005 -0.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Birth month -0.014 -0.003 -0.030
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Birth month sq 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.042 0.028 -0.166
(0.036) (0.035) (0.041)
Father lived in household -0.253 -0.237 -0.178
(0.144) (0.152) (0.139)
Mother’s age 0.036 0.058 -0.023
(0.102) (0.107) (0.085)
Mother is married 0.130 0.007 0.323
(0.231) (0.238) (0.279)
Mother’s age on birth of child i -0.117 -0.131 -0.038
(0.105) (0.110) (0.090)
UCT household -0.284 -0.263 -0.205
(0.088) (0.092) (0.080)
Farming household -0.029 0.052 -0.181
(0.093) (0.088) (0.099)
Asset index 0.192 0.197 0.102
(0.031) (0.033) (0.029)
Urban 0.023 -0.003 0.066
(0.121) (0.121) (0.145)
Observations 11781 11781 11781
Adjusted R2 0.191 0.154 0.137
Standard errors, clustered at birth month cohorts, in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:010
All test scores are standardized using variable means and standard deviation
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Chapter 4
Religion and Female Autonomy in Indonesia
4.1 Introduction
Greater female autonomy has been argued to improve demographic and socioe-
conomic indicators and it has been associated particularly with improvements in
the outcomes of children. Research by Adato et al. (2000), Beegle et al. (2001),
Binder (1999), Iyigun and Walsh (2007), Maitra (2004), and Thomas (1994) has
shown that mothers’ control of resources leads to improvements in children’s
health and education outcomes. Nevertheless, despite the increase in women’s
status in the past 100 years, gender disparities still prominently persist in many
societies, particularly so in developing countries. The substantial gap in sta-
tus between the men and women has created an imbalance of power not only
outside of households but also inside the households that the women are a part
of. However, these imbalances in status differ across countries due to differences
in political systems, economic conditions, and cultural and religious practices.
There have been many studies examining the determinants of female autonomy,
including the role of religion in shaping this autonomy (Borooah and Iyer, 2005;
Chattopadhyay and Goswami, 2007; Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001). This study will
contribute to the existing literature by examining the role of religion, specifically
religiosity, on women’s status in Indonesia.
Given the above-mentioned positive benefit of female autonomy, understand-
161
ing the underlying causes that influence intra-household female bargaining power
has become an important research topic. Kinship norms (Fricke et al., 1986;
Rammohan and Johar, 2009), relatively low return for female labor (Bardhan,
1988), and women’s economic status (Browning and Chiappori, 1998) are among
the factors that are thought to influence female autonomy within the household.
Some studies have also tried to link religion to female autonomy (Karim, 1992;
Mason and Smith, 2000). Nevertheless, these studies use only religion as their
variable of interest. In contrast, this study examines the link between religiosity,
which measures the intensity of of religious behaviors and beliefs, and married
women’s autonomy within households in Indonesia.
Furthermore, this study will try to establish causality between religiosity and
women’s status. Guiso et al. (2006) recommend three steps to establish the link
between religion and economic outcomes. The first is the need to understand
how religiosity affects cultural outlooks and preferences. This is followed by
examination of how these preferences influence economic outcomes. And the
third is to identify the direction of causality between the two. Thus, the goal of
this study is to estimate the causal impacts by using instrumental variable (IV)
methods to avoid bias due to the endogeneity of religiosity. Five instrumental
variables will be used. They are: co-religion education, non-co-religion education,
community self-assessment measures of religiosity, community praying behaviors,
and share of village population of one’s own religion.
Indonesia also provides an interesting case study for this topic as the country
has experienced dynamic changes in the role and capacity of women inside and
outside of the household over several decades of economic development, while at
the same time the country has experienced an increase in religious intensity in
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the two decades since the 1997 Asian Financial crisis (Chen, 2010; Mazumdaru,
2017).
The rest of this chapter will be structured as follows. The next section will
explore the current literature on intra-household bargaining power and religiosity.
This will be followed by an explanation of the empirical strategy, which includes
a description of the data that will be used in the study. The last two sections
will present the findings and conclusions of the study.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Determinants and Consequences of Female Autonomy
The traditional view of household behavior was established by Becker (1965),
who developed a unitary household model to examine household decision-making
processes. Under this assumption, a household’s behavior can be represented by
an individual household member’s behavior, who makes decisions for the en-
tire household (Haddad et al., 1997; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1997). However,
subsequent empirical research in both developed and developing countries on
intra-household bargaining has challenged this unitary household model. These
empirical studies have instead pointed out the possibility that a bargaining pro-
cess determines household decision-making. The research in this area has been
mostly examined how women’s status and preferences relative to their partners’
has influenced households’ socioeconomic behaviors and outcomes.
Why is understanding the distribution of power within the household im-
portant? An improvement in women’s bargaining power has been attributed to
improvements in the education, health and general welfare of children. Maitra
(2004) shows that control of resources in the hands of women increases health
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care usage in India. Beegle et al. (2001) show that differences in prenatal and
delivery care for children in Indonesia are influenced by the relative autonomy of
the mother in the household. Female autonomy has also been shown to influence
households’ expenditure patterns (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003). This is why
programs such as Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs require that the
cash payments be delivered specifically to mothers.
Despite a general agreement on the positive linkage between women’s sta-
tus and households’ demographic and welfare outcomes, part of the challenge
in these studies is to understand the mechanisms and identify the factors that
have shaped this bargaining power. Many empirical and theoretical studies have
tried to better understand what determines intra-household bargaining power.
Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy (1990), and Lundberg and Pollak (2003)
have examined how a bargaining process between individuals in some households
resulted in household decisions. Chiappori (1988, 1992) shows how households
achieve efficiency in resource allocation through a series of repeated interactions
between individuals within the household. McElroy (1990) recommends using
what she calls extra-household environmental parameters (EEPs), describing an
individual’s socioeconomic endowments in the case of household disbandment, as
useful candidates for intra-household bargaining power measures, while Kabeer
(1999) provides a philosophical exposition on the conceptualization of women’s
rights and empowerment.
For empirical research, another challenge is in converting the theoretical no-
tions into measurable indicators of power within households. This is because the
concept of power is a multidimensional one. Some studies have used education,
employment status and age differences between spouses as proxies for female’s
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autonomy (Dharmalingam and Philip Morgan, 1996; Dyson and Moore, 1983;
Heaton et al., 2005). This study will follow Basu and Amin (2000) in defin-
ing women’s status as exposure to the outside world, physical mobility in the
community and decision-making power within the household.
4.2.2 Religion, Religiosity and Female Autonomy
Religion influences many aspects of the daily lives of a large fraction of world’s
population. In contrast to the popularity of religion as a topic of interest in
sociology, psychology and medicine, relatively few studies have attempted to link
religiosity to economic outcomes or vice versa. The few economic studies that do
exist have found that religious people engage in less risky health behavior and
less criminal behavior, have better self-reported measures of well-being, and have
more marital stability. One major concern regarding the research in this area is
in establishing the causal impact of religiosity on these economic behaviors due
to the systematic difficulties in disentangling religiosity effect with other factors
which might also influence the economic variable of interest. Iannaccone (1998)
implicitly points out that this observed relationship might stem from the overlap
of preferences for religiosity and these economic outcomes instead of direct causal
impact of religious participation on these outcomes.
Iannaccone (1992) provides one of the most frequently employed models of
religious adherence. This model was used by Hungerman (2014) to examine
the importance of religious adherence in influencing the economic behavior of
the highly religious. Another paper by Gruber (2005) provides an interesting
method to create a useful instrumental variable to overcome the endogeneity
problem of using religiosity as a control variable. Using US General Social Sur-
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vey (GSS), Gruber created a religious market density that is formed based on
ancestral mix. The market density is constructed using the religious preference
of a person ancestral heritage (e.g. Irish ancestry and Catholicism) with respect
to the religious preference of other heritages that live in the same neighborhood
(e.g. Germanic ancestry and Protestantism).
Only a few studies on Indonesia have linked religiosity to economic outcomes.
Among these is a study by Chen (2010), who uses data from the Hundred Villages
Survey. He finds that the 1997 Asian Financial crisis that hit Indonesia has
increased religious intensity in that country. He further notes that the increased
religious fervor in Indonesia due to the economic crisis persisted even after the
economy has reached its relative normalcy in the early 2000s.
Related to female autonomy, there exists an extensive literature examining the
link between religion and women’s autonomy. Obermeyer (1994) compares the
impact of religion (Islam) on female fertility decisions (a common proxy for female
autonomy) between Tunisia and Iran. He concludes that the fertility decisions
are largely determined by the political situation instead of adherence to religious
rules. In a similar vein, Cain et al. (1979) argue that patriarchy in any society is
influenced jointly by kinship, political and religious factors. However, studies by
Bhat and Rajan (1990), Drèze and Murthi (2001), Dharmalingam et al. (2005),
Kulkarni and Alagarajan (2005), and Chattopadhyay and Goswami (2007) show
differences in fertility decisions (and hence women’s status) between different
religions, which implies a more definitive role of religion on influencing fertility
decisions. Most of these studies, however, focused on South Asia.
A few studies connecting religion and female autonomy have also been con-
ducted in Southeast Asia. Mason and Smith (2000), in their study of Malaysia,
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find that Malaysian women have the highest level of freedom among five Asian
countries. A study by Rammohan and Johar (2009) that examines the determi-
nants of female autonomy in Indonesia includes religion as one of its explanatory
variables. However, all of these studies have used only differences in religion
as their variable of interest, instead of religiosity. In the context of Indonesia,
where affiliation to a certain religion is almost enforced (most documents require
statement of religious affiliation and hence have legal ramifications, such as for
marriage and inheritance), statements of religious affiliation do not necessarily
imply religious adherence. Thus, in contrast to the above studies, this study will
use religious adherence variables to examine the relationship between religiosity
and female autonomy.
There are not many studies that have examined the role of religiosity and
women’s status within the household. One such study is by Agadjanian and
Yabiku (2015) who examine the role of religious participation (e.g. frequency of
church attendance) in women’s autonomy in Mozambique. However, there has
been no such study conducted for Indonesia. Furthermore, most of these studies
do not address the endogeneity problem and provide only correlations between
religion or religiosity and women’s status. Thus this study differs from the above
research by focusing specifically on religiosity and trying to establish causality
between religiosity and female autonomy by using IV methods.
There is good reason for thinking that religiosity might be related to women’s
status in the household. Although the interpretation and the implementation are
often disputed and varied by the different religions or religious denominations,
almost all major religious groups have a set of defined rules dictating the relative
roles of husband and wife within a household. One example is from Quran ”Men
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are overseers over women because God has given the one more strength than the
other, and because men are required to spend their wealth for the maintenance
of women...”(Quran, 4:34). Another example is from the Bible which states ”And
I do not permit a woman to teach or to have authority over a man, but to be in
silence. For Adam was formed first, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but
the woman being deceived, fell into transgression...”(I Timothy 2:12-14). Given
these sets of rules, and how much religiosity plays an important role in many
people’s lives, understanding how adherence to these rules is linked to women’s
autonomy within the household could provide new insights into this issue. In
particular, since some religious practices have often been cited as preserving
patriarchy in society by many in the popular media (e.g an article by Barber
(2012)).
4.3 Empirical Framework
The data that will be used in this paper come from the 2007 and 2014 rounds
of the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS4 and IFLS5, respectively). The IFLS
data are longitudinal. This survey has been conducted by the RAND Corpo-
ration since 1993, with the cooperation of a private or university affiliated local
survey agency. Currently, there are six waves of the data (1993, 1997, 1998, 2000,
2007, and 2014), however only five waves are available publicly (1993, 1997, 2000,
2007, and 2014). The IFLS contains rich data on economic and non-economic
indicators, including information on consumption, income, assets, education, mi-
gration, labor market outcomes, fertility, household decision making processes,
income transfers and community participation. The survey sample represents
around 83 percent of the population of Indonesia. When first implemented in
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1993, it collected data from 13 of the country’s 26 provinces.1 The survey con-
tinues to be expanded; the most recent IFLS includes some provinces in Eastern
Indonesia which were previously not surveyed. Another major advantage of the
IFLS is that it also contains extensive community level data. These community
level data record various types of information on the community, from economic
conditions to traditional law and customs of the community. For these data,
various community leaders (religious, political and social) were interviewed to
provide the general picture of the community.
This study will thus use both the household and community level data of the
IFLS4 and IFLS5. In particular, this study will exploit new questions that were
added to IFLS4 and IFLS5 which ask about household religiosity, including a
set of specific questions on religious adherence for various religions in Indonesia.
This study will thus use specific questions on adherence to a specific religion to
construct the religiosity variables. Indonesia officially acknowledges five major
religions (Islam, Christian, Catholic, Buddhism, Hindu) and Confucianism. Due
to the small number of individuals in the sample identifying with Buddhism and
Confucianism (less than 0.5 percent of the sample), this paper will exclude these
two groups from the analysis.
4.3.1 Measures of Married Women’s Autonomy
Following Rammohan and Johar (2009) and Majlesi (2016), the dependent vari-
able measuring women’s autonomy will focus on the responses of married women.
Women’s autonomy is defined as the extent to which women participate in var-
1After the 1998 economic and government reformation brought about by the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis, as part of the decentralization process, the number of provinces in Indonesia,
as of 2017, has increased to 34.
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ious decisions in their households. Starting with the 1997 round, the IFLS has
included several questions, which were expanded in subsequent surveys, regard-
ing decision-making in the household. These questions in IFLS4 and IFLS5
include decisions regarding: (1) expenditure on food; (2) choice of food; (3) rou-
tine household purchases; (4) individual’s own clothing; (5) spouse’s clothing; (6)
children’s clothing; (7) children’s education; (8) children’s health; (9) expendi-
tures for large purchases of durable goods (such as a TV); (10) money transfers
to parents; (11) money transfers to parents-in-law; (12) expenses for wedding or
party gifts; (13) money for arisan2 (informal saving lottery); (14) saving; (15)
spouse’s time allocated for socializing; (16) own time allocated for socializing;
(17) own or spouse’s work; and (18) the use of birth control. The direct measure
of women’s status within their households will thus be constructed using these
questions on decision-making.
The literature on women’s autonomy has used different methods to transform
these questions on decision-making power into measures of female bargaining
power. This study will follow Majlesi (2016), who defines female bargaining
power within household as the number of household decisions that the woman
has power on minus those that the husband has power on. To create a dependent
variable from the decision-making questions, a dummy variable is created first
by assigning value of 1 if the woman participated, either alone or jointly with her
husband or other family members, in the decision of a particular category (e.g.
2Arisan is a women’s saving lottery group. Many women in Indonesia join these groups
for socializing purposes. During the meetings, each member will have to contribute a certain
agreed amount of money to the money pool. Then, a lottery was drawn to determine the
recipient of the money pool for that particular meeting. The winner is expected to be the host
for the next meeting. A woman can join as many arisan groups as she wants. For each arisan,
the frequency of meeting per year will vary, from as frequent as biweekly to as rare as once per
year.
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expenditure on food from Question 1), and 0 otherwise. Then, these numbers
from all 18 questions will be added to provide the total decision-making spheres
that the woman has power on. Thus, if she has power on all spheres, the total
value should be equal to 18. A similar method is conducted for the husbands.
The final measure is derived by subtracting the husband’s total value from wife’s
total value. Thus, this measure ranges between  18 to +18, i.e. from wife
having no power at all to wife having all of the full power. Note that value of zero
denotes equal relative power between husband and wife. Because changes in total
decisions that the wife has purview on may not necessarily imply an increase in
bargaining power, as some decision spheres may be more important than the rest,
five categories are created to provide a comparison between different decisions’
aspects. The five categories are: routine household decisions (Questions 1 to
5), child related decisions (Questions 6 to 8), non-routine economic decisions
(Questions 8 to 14), time use decisions (Questions 15 to 17) and fertility decisions
(Question 18).
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the summary statistics for the decision-making vari-
ables for full cross-section samples in 2007 and 2014 and for the panel sample, re-
spectively. The tables show that, in general, the women in the sample have quite
high decision-making power, especially on routine household decisions, which is
expected due to the perceived traditional role of women in the household. Around
36 or 37 percent of women in 2007 state that they do not have to discuss their
own time for socializing with their husband. This number increased to around 53
percent for the full sample and 55 percent for panel sample in 2014. This implies
that many women have significant power to decide on how best to use their own
time without any interference from either their husband or other household mem-
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bers. Note that, in 2007, most decisions on non-routine household expenses were
decided jointly with the husband. Only a small percentage of women in 2007
stated that they can decide on non-routine household decisions on their own
without having to discuss it with other family members. However, this number
increased dramatically in 2014. For example, only around 8 percent of women in
2007 stated that they have ”sole-decider” power to decide on money transfer to
their own parents. By 2014, this number had increased to more than 20 percent.
A similar trend can be seen in different decision sub-categories. There are two
possible reasons for this increase. The first is that changes in socioeconomic and
political conditions may influence female bargaining power (e.g. an increase of
women’s participation in political parties). The second is that older women have
higher power in household decisions.
One issue, however, arises from using the questions on decision-making power
from the IFLS. It is not clear whether the women were interviewed separately
from the their husband. Only around 19 percent of women in 2007, 21 percent
in 2014, had the interview without the presence of other household members.
Therefore, in addition to the above measure, women’s status will also be measured
by the share of household assets owned by the wife (all assets and non-liquid
assets), current use of contraception, having job, and number of arisan groups
joined in the previous year. These indirect measures will thus act as supporting
evidence in the empirical estimations.
In regards to share of household assets, Table 4.3 shows that most women
own between 40 percent to more than 74 percent of household assets in 2007.
Of all the assets, ownership of jewelry is dominated by women. It needs to be
noted that the husbands still hold a higher share of non-liquid assets, such as
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houses and land. In 2007, women held around 48 percent of house ownership,
and this decreased to 45 percent in 2014. Similarly for non-farm land, women
held around 47 percent of ownership in 2007 that, again, decreased to 43 percent
in 2014. Unlike the decision-making variables that show general positive trends
in decision-making power, asset variables show a more mixed result, with some
higher in 2014 (such as for jewelry and receivables), while others are lower (such
as vehicle ownership). For estimation purposes, an average of wife’s ownership
of all household assets and non-liquid households assets will be used. The assets
that are considered as non-liquid are: house, other house, and land.
Lastly, Table 4.4 shows the summary statistics for the rest of the indirect
measures of female autonomy. Almost 60 percent of women used birth control in
both periods. Most women were also employed, almost 60 percent in 2007 and
more than 60 percent in 2014. Many women did not join any arisan in 2007, as
shown by the mean of number of arisan groups participated in during last year
(0.573 for the full sample and 0.576 for the panel sample). This number however
increases in 2014, where women in general joined at least one arisan group.
4.3.2 Measures of Religiosity
Starting in 2007 (IFLS4), new questions were added to the IFLS regarding re-
ligious adherence for all the acknowledged religions or philosophical systems in
Indonesia. Each respondent was asked to choose between Islam, Catholicism,
Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism as their religious affilia-
tion.
For the religiosity measures, each respondent was asked to give a self-assessment
of their degree of religiosity. The degree is a four point scale measure: 1. not
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religious; 2. somewhat religious; 3. religious; and 4. very religious. In addi-
tion to this self-assessment measure, the surveys also have additional questions
on respondents’ religious adherences according to their respective religion. For
example, the questions for Christians include whether they go to church or read
the Bible, while the questions for Muslims include whether they eat Halal food
(food that is prepared according to Islamic law) or how many times they pray
every day. These assessment questions provide relatively more objective mea-
sures of religious piety and thus will be used as another measure of religiosity.
Because the questions on religious adherence have different scales across different
religion, the variable denoting religiosity is standardized for each religion to allow
comparison of religiosity across these different religion.
Table 4.5 provides summary statistics for religiosity, including summary statis-
tics separately for each religion. The table shows that, in general, the women
in the sample are quite religious, as shown by the standard deviation of self-
assessed religiosity at 0.110 in 2007 and 0.091 in 2014. Similarly, for the more
objective religiosity measure (religious practice variable), the standard deviation
is at 0.047 in 2007 and 0.075 in 2015. Note that the two measures of religiosity
show different trend of religiosity between the two IFLS rounds. By self-assessed
religiosity measure, religiosity has decreased between 2007 to 2014. However, us-
ing religious practice variable, religiosity appears to have increased between the
two rounds. This provides an interesting comparison between the two measures
in the estimations.
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4.3.3 Identification Strategy
The main variables of interest for this study are religiosity, religion, and married
women’s autonomy. The general equation to be estimated is:
Aiht =  + Riht + Xiht + iht (4.1)
where Aih denotes the relative measure of woman i’s autonomy within household
h at time t, while R and X respectively represent religiosity and control variables.
OLS estimates of Equation (1) are unbiased if iht is uncorrelated with Riht and
Xiht, which is unlikely to hold.
To exploit the panel nature of the data and to correct for unobserved time-
invariant household characteristics, which can lead to bias in OLS estimates,
fixed-effect estimation will also be conducted. The equation to be estimated is:
Ait = i + Rit + Xit + it (4.2)
where A, R, andX are defined as the above, and i is an individual-specific fixed
effect. Fixed-effect estimation thus controls for unobserved differences between
households, such as parental education or family norms.
As stated before, simple OLS estimates of equation (1) are unlikely to pro-
vide unbiased estimates of the causal effect of religiosity on women’s autonomy
due to correlation between the error term and the observed variables in Equa-
tion (1). Although the fixed-effect estimation in Equation (2) avoids bias due to
unobserved differences between households that do not change over time, it does
not avoid bias due to unobserved factors that change over time and are corre-
lated with the observed variables. For example some time-varying unobservable
variables can influence both religiosity and women’s autonomy simultaneously,
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such as an improvement in local economic conditions that may influence both
religiosity and female autonomy.
One approach to avoid this type of bias is to use instrumental variable esti-
mation. The estimating equation using instrumental variable(s) is:
Aiht =  + Riht + Xiht + iht (4.3)
Riht =  + Ziht + Xiht + !iht (4.4)
where A, R, and X are defined as the above, and Z is an instrumental variable
for the religiosity variable, R.
For an instrumental variable (IV) to produce consistent estimates, it must
satisfy two conditions. First, the instrument must be uncorrelated with the error
term of the structural equation of interest (the exclusion restriction). That is,
the instrument must influence the dependent variable only through the variable
that is instrumented. Second, the instrument needs to satisfy the partial cor-
relation requirement, that is the instrument must have explanatory power for
the instrumented variable after conditioning on the other variables in the struc-
tural equation. Considering these two requirements, this study proposes three
variables for instruments.3
The three proposed IVs represent community-level religiosity. People who live
in a generally religious community tend to be more religious, either because of
3Initially, nine variables were considered for the IVs. The three variables that have the
strongest results in terms of their statistical significance level were retained. Note that given
the number of estimations conducted, there is no combination of IV that passes the overi-
dentification test for all estimations. Thus, what is being presented here are the best results
among all of the estimations. The other six instrumental variables that failed the IV tests
are: co-religion education, non-coreligion education, routine religious activities in the village,
religious leaders can resolve land conflicts, and religious leaders can solve community conflicts,
and share of own religion in the village.
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higher exposure to religiosity or because of social pressure to be more religious.
The first two IVs are created by taking the community level average of individual
religiosity from household-level data. Because religiosity tends not to change for
the older population, the average is constructed using only the religiosity of the
population 50 years and older. Because this study uses two different measures
of religiosity at the individual level (self-assessment and praying behavior, or
praying frequency if Muslims), community-level religiosity will be constructed
separately for both types of individual-level religiosity. Because these community-
level variables are derived from the individual-level religiosity data, they have
the same scale as the individual-level variables. For example, the scale for the
community-level self-assessment of religiosity is still from 1 to 4, the same as
individual-level religiosity variable. In addition to this two IVs, the last IV to
be used is a dummy variable denoting whether more than 75 percent of village
population participated in religious activities. This variable is constructed using
community level data that provides information on community participation in
various activities in the village.4 Table 4.6 shows summary statistics for all IVs.
The table shows that most community members age 50 years or older are quite
religious. Around 50 percent of the sample also live in villages where more than
75 percent of the population participates in religious activities.
Some notes regarding the estimations. The estimation will be conducted only
4The original question on the proportion of the village population who participate in re-
ligious activities was coded for three possible responses: 1. less than 25 percent; 2. between
25 to 75 percent; and 3. more than 75 percent. Because the category 1 is the least common,
this question was then used to create a dummy variable with value of 1 if more than 75 per-
cent of village population participated in religious activities, and 0 otherwise. Estimations,
not presented here but available from the author upon request, were also conducted using
the categorical variable, and they give similar results to the estimations that use the dummy
variable.
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for married women whose husbands are still alive and who live in the same house-
hold as the woman. This restriction is important to allow for the construction of
the relative measures of autonomy, as it compares the power between wife and
husband. Given the small number of husbands living outside of the household (2.2
percent of the 2007 sample and also 2.2 percent for the 2014 sample), dropping
these observations is unlikely to lead to selection bias. Second, because almost
90 percent of the sample is Muslim, the same estimations will also be conducted
using only the Muslim population. In addition, all estimations will be clustered
at the village level. Given that some households moved out of their 2007 village
between 2007 and 2014, fixed effect estimations will be clustered using the 2007
village code to allow for clustering in the estimation.5 Third, because the IVs are
constructed using above 50 years old population, the estimations are conducted
only for women below 50 years old. Estimations using the complete female sam-
ple were also conducted for comparisons. Lastly, all estimations are conducted
with control variables that will be discussed in the next sub-section.
4.3.4 Control Variables
Table 4.6 also shows the summary statistics for the control variables used in
the regression analysis. The control variables include various individual and
household characteristics, such as age, education, employment status, religion
and household size. The household characteristic variables show that, in general,
both wives and husbands have at minimum primary education (6 years), as shown
by the mean for years of education of more than 8 years. For the full sample, the
5Fixed-effect estimations are also conducted using the 2014 village code for clustering to
check the robustness of the results. Because the results are almost identical, only the results
using the 2007 village code are presented.
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average age for the wives is almost 38 years old in 2007 and more than 38 years
in 2014; while for the panel sample, the average age for the wives is around 36
in 2007 and almost 43 in 2014. The mean age of the husbands is slightly higher
in both years, almost 43 years old in 2007 and more than 43 years old in 2014
using the full sample; or almost 41 years old in 2007 and almost 48 years old in
2014 using only the panel sample. In terms of family size, most households in
the sample have around six members. Most of the husbands were also employed,
more than 92 percent in both years.
Reflecting Indonesian culture, families tend to include extended family mem-
bers, so variables denoting whether the women live with their own parents or
parents in-law are included as control variables. Table 4.6 also shows that most
women live with neither their parents nor their parents-in-law, almost 76 percent
in 2007 and 2014 using the full sample, and 76 percent in 2007 and 85 percent in
2014 using only the panel sample. Given the average age of these women, many
of their parents are no longer alive. Interestingly, if the couple decided to live
with either parents or parents-in-law, most lived with the wife’s parents instead
of the husband’s parents. Most households also have one or two children who are
less than 15 years old. In terms of community characteristics, around 50 percent
of sample lived in urban areas in 2007, which increases to 57 percent in 2014.
More than 55 percent of the sample lives in Java.
Because the Indonesian population consists of many different ethnicities with
various kinship norms, variables on kinship norms will also be included. These
variables are also included to account for the fact that Indonesia has the ”world’s
largest matrilineal society” which mostly comes from Minangkabau ethnicities
(Lam, 2016). The kinship norms variable is constructed using a specific question
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from the community level data in the 2007 IFLS. This survey round includes a
specific module on local customs and norms. One of the questions posed is the
local custom regarding of residence after marriage.
Following Rammohan and Johar (2009), this variable will be used to construct
three kinship norm variables: uxorilocal, patrilocal and ambilocal kinship norms.
Under uxorilocal kinship norms, couples will generally reside with or near the
parents of the wife. The daughter essentially brings male labor into the family
through marriage. Conversely, in patrilocal kinship norms, couples will reside
with or near the parents of the husband. In ambilocal kinship norms, couples can
live near either set of parents. In the estimation, the uxorilocal kinship norms will
act as the base to allow for its comparison with patrilocal and ambilocal kinship
norms. From Table 4.6, it can be seen that more than 50 percent of women live in
areas with uxorilocal kinship norms. Note that these kinship norms variables are
available only for the 2007 IFLS. Because customs are usually slow to change, the
same module will also be used to create kinship norm variables for the estimations
using the 2014 IFLS. Therefore, these variables will be omitted for fixed-effect
estimations of religiosity on female autonomy.
4.4 Empirical Results
The results will be presented in two parts. The first part will present the main
estimation results of the impact of religiosity on married women’s autonomy
within their households. The second part will provide some robustness checks of
the main results.
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4.4.1 Main Estimation Results
Tables 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 provide the estimation results on decision-making power
measure of women’s autonomy using the two different measures of religiosity,
self-assessment and religious practice (note that the estimated effects of the con-
trol variables are presented in Appendix Tables B1 to B10). The OLS estimation
results in Table 4.7 indicate that religiosity generally has a relatively weak sta-
tistical relationship with the decision-making variables in 2007. The estimated
impact of religiosity (self-assessment) on women’s autonomy is marginally signifi-
cant in only in one of the six regressions. It is negatively correlated with the time-
use decisions variable at only the 10 percent statistical significance level. The
estimated impact of religious practice, however, show stronger negative impacts
in two out of six regressions (non-routine household decisions at the 1 percent
level and time-use decisions at the 5 percent level). Neither of the religiosity vari-
ables (self-assessment and religious practice) has a significant estimated impact
on the aggregated autonomy measure.
In contrast, the estimations using the 2014 IFLS are noticeably stronger, espe-
cially for self-assessed religiosity; the estimated negative impacts are statistically
significant for four of the six regressions, including the aggregated autonomy vari-
able. Yet, the estimated impact of the religious practice variable is negative and
statistically significant for only three of the six variables: child-related decisions
(with a coefficient of -0.054 that is significant at the 5 percent level), time-use
decisions (with a coefficient of -0.023 that is significant at only the 10 percent
level) and fertility decisions (with a coefficient of -0.024 that is significant at the
5 percent level).
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As noted in the previous section, the OLS estimates are likely to be biased due
to unobserved heterogeneity, so fixed-effects and instrumental variable estimates,
which are two methods to reduce this bias, merit serious consideration. Table 4.8
reports the estimated impacts of religiosity on female autonomy for the fixed-
effect specification in equation (2). Only one of the 12 estimated impacts is
statistically significant, and only at the 10 percent level. More specifically, the
estimated impact of religious practice variable is negative on time-use decisions.
Given these results, one can conclude that these fixed-effect estimation results
do not support the hypothesis that religiosity has a negative impact on female
autonomy in Indonesia.
As explained above, fixed-effects estimates could be biased if unobserved het-
erogeneity varies over time. Moreover, fixed-effect estimates may be particularly
susceptible to bias toward zero if the explanatory variable is measured with er-
rors. Thus, the final set of estimates, shown in Table 4.9, attempt to overcome
this limitation by using instrumental variables. Before turning to the estima-
tion results, consider first the first-stage estimation results, which are provided
in Appendix Table B1 and B10. The first-stage estimation results (presented in
Appendix Table B21 and B22) show that, in general, the instrumental variables
are correlated with the religiosity variables. Although the three IVs are not al-
ways statistically significant in all estimations, the F-statistics, which are shown
in Table 4.9 are all above 10 in both the 2007 and 2014 estimates. This suggests
that there are no serious problems of weak instruments. In addition to this, the
instruments fail the overidentification test in 3 out of 12 cases for the estimations
that use the 2007 IFLS; and 1 out of 12 cases for the estimations that use the
2014 IFLS (see Table 4.9). This suggests that the IV estimates perform quite
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well in both years. Thus, the IV results merit some discussions.
The estimation results of the impact of self-assessed religiosity on female au-
tonomy for the 2007 data show no statistically significant results of self-assessed
religiosity on female autonomy. It shows negative and statistically significant
results for the estimates on the aggregated autonomy measure (at the 5 per-
cent level), routine household decisions (at the 10 percent level) and non-routine
household decisions (at the 1 percent level). All three of these IV estimates
also passed the overidentification test, and their F-statistics are greater than 10.
These estimates show that one standard deviation increase in self-assessment re-
ligiosity variable will reduce the aggregate autonomy variable by 0.863 points.
Given the standard deviation of the aggregate autonomy variable (4.1), this co-
efficient value of 0.863 is quite significant (a ”size effect” of about 0.2).
The IV estimates using the 2014 show that religiosity (self-assessed) has neg-
ative impacts on aggregate measure, child-related decisions, and routine house-
hold decisions. All are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The results
show that an increase in religiosity by one standard deviation reduces aggregate
measure by 1.821 points, reduces child-related decisions by 0.488 points, and re-
duces routine household decisions by 1.030 points. These estimates quite large
considering the standard deviation of the three variables are 2.8 for aggregate
measure, 0.7 for child-related decisions, and 1.9 for routine household decisions.
Self-assessed religiosity also has negative impact on fertility decision by 0.087,
but it is only marginally statistical significant at the 10 percent level. The esti-
mates for religious practice are also statistically significant for aggregate measure,
child-related decisions, routine household decisions, and fertility decisions. How-
ever, IV estimate for routine household decision fail the overidentification test.
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The IV estimated impacts show that religious practice has negative impacts on
aggregate measure by 1.315 points (at the 1 percent level), on routine household
decisions by 0.346 points (at the 1 percent level), and on fertility decisions by
0.087 points (at the 5 percent level).
Recall that most women were interviewed in the presence of other household
members. Because of this, there is a potential problem of inaccuracy in the an-
swers to these questions. Thus, estimations of religiosity on indirect proxies of
female autonomy are also conducted to provide the supporting evidence for the
decision-making power estimates. The estimation results of religiosity on the in-
direct proxies of female autonomy (current use of birth control, number of arisan
groups joined, number of arisan meetings attended, wife’s shares of all household
assets, wife’s share of non-liquid household assets and currently employed) are
presented in Tables 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 (the results for control variables are in
Appendix Table B11 and B20). The OLS estimation results in Table4.10 show
that the self-assessed religiosity estimates are highly statistically significant only
for the number of arisan groups variable in 2007 (at the 1 percent level). Con-
trary to expectations, the self-assessed religiosity has a positive estimated impact
on the this arisan variable. The self-assessed religiosity also has estimated neg-
ative impacts on wife’s shares of all and non-liquid household assets, but only
marginally at the 10 percent level. None of the religious practice estimates are
statistically significant. Using the 2014 data, self-assessed religiosity estimate
is only marginally significant at the 10 percent level for the fertility decisions
variable. Again, none of religious practice estimates are statistically significant
in 2014. Overall, the 22 OLS estimates in Table4.10 show almost no impact of
religiosity on these proxy variables, with the possible exception of arisan meet-
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ings attended. Since this estimates are likely to be biased, it is best to focus on
the fixed-effect and instrumental variable estimates.
The fixed effect estimation results (Table 4.11) of religiosity on indirect proxies
of female autonomy are relatively consistent with the fixed effects estimations
of religiosity on decision-making variables. Out of 10 estimates, the estimated
impact of self-assessed religiosity on current use of birth control variable and of
religious practice on wife’s shares of all household asset variable are marginally
significant, at the 10 percent level. Given that there are 10 estimates in this
table, this statistically significant results could be due to random chance. Thus,
the fixed effects estimates provide little or no support to the hypothesis that
women’s religiosity has a negative effect on their autonomy.
Turning to the IV estimation results in Table 4.12, the F-statistics in all
regressions are above 10 (again, the first stage estimation results are presented
in Appendix Table B21 and B22). Thus, there do not seem to be any problems
of weak IVs in the estimations. In terms of the overidentification test, 9 of the 12
estimates passed the test for the 2007 IFLS data; and 8 of the 10 estimates passed
the test for the 2014 IFLS data. Thus, consistent with the estimation results in
Table 4.9, the IV estimates in Table 4.12 also merits further examination.
Comparing the two years of IFLS data (2007 and 2014), self-assessed religios-
ity has negative impact on wife’s shares of non-liquid assets that is significant
at the 5 percent for the 2007 IFLS data and at the 1 percent level for the 2014
IFLS data. The magnitude of these impacts is quite high, at 8 percentage points
in 2007 and 16 percentage points in 2014 for one standard deviation increase in
religiosity. The estimated impact of religious practice on non-liquid asset vari-
able is also consistent with negative impact by 7 percentage points in 2007 and
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10 percentage points in 2014.
Similar to the OLS estimation results, self-assessed religiosity has unexpected
positive impact on the arisan groups variable for the estimation using the 2014
data. One possible reason for the positive relationship between religiosity and
arisan participation is that a religious person may be involved in many religious
activities, including a religious-based arisan. Unfortunately, the data do not
distinguish between the religious-based and other types of arisans. Thus, arisan
variables may not be a good indicator of female autonomy for these estimations.
The estimation in Table 4.12 show contradictory impacts of religiosity on cur-
rent use of birth control. In 2007, religious practice variable has negative impact
on current use of birth control variable at the 5 percent level. However, in 2014,
religiosity variable (self-assessed) has positive impacts on current use of birth
control, also at the 5 percent level. One possible explanation for the 2014 re-
sult is that the distribution of birth control maybe include intensive involvement
of religious leaders in that year. Indonesia has had history of religious leaders
taking an important role in the success of the national family planning program
(Warwick, 1986). However, given that religious practice variable is a more ob-
jective measure of religiosity, the positive impact of religiosity using self-assessed
measure is maybe due to the highly subjective nature of this variable.
Aside from the religiosity variables, the estimations also include control vari-
ables. These results are shown in Appendix Table B1 and B20. Among the
control variables, a higher educated wife, compared to her husband, has gen-
erally positive impacts on the wife’s decision-making power, in particular on
child-related decisions. Older women seem to consistently enjoy greater power
over many household decisions ( for example in Appendix Table B9, women’s
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age positively influence aggregated autonomy measure, child related decisions,
routine household decisions, non-routine household decisions and time-use de-
cisions). However, women who are older than their husbands seem to have
less decision-making power. A husband’s employment status appears to reduce
women’s decision-making power. The results also show that living with parents-
in-law negatively affects women’s decision-making power, while the number of
children influences the decision-making power positively. Among the kinship
norm variables, as expected, patrilocal kinship norms consistently have a neg-
ative impact on most decision-making power variables. Also, women who live
in Java generally enjoy greater autonomy, which is expected because of the ten-
dency for social and economic infrastructure to be concentrated in Java due to
the capital being located there.
Because almost 90 percent of the sample (and of the population of Indonesia)
are Muslims, similar estimations were also conducted using only the Muslim
population. Tables 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 provide the estimation results on decision-
making power using only the Muslim population.6
Compared to the results using all observations in Table 4.7, the OLS esti-
mation results using the Muslim only population in Table 4.13 are very similar,
especially for the religious practice variable in 2007 and self-assessed religiosity
variable in 2014. For example, the OLS estimation results in 4.13 indicate that
self-assessed religiosity negatively influenced aggregate measure of fertility deci-
sions at the 1 percent statistical significance level in 2014 in both estimations
using the full sample and using Muslims sample only. There are however several
6The complete results for Muslims only and robustness check will not be presented here.
They are available on request from the author.
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differences between results in Table 4.7 and 4.13. For example in 2007, self-
assessed religiosity has no statistical significant impact on fertility decisions in
Table 4.7, but it has negative marginal impact (at the 1 percent level) in Ta-
ble 4.13. Nevertheless, given the likelihood of endogeneity, these results may be
biased and hence the fixed-effect and IV estimation results are more likely to be
reliable.
The significant OLS estimation results in Table 4.13 do not extend to the
fixed-effect estimation results in Table 4.14. Similar to results in Table 4.8,
almost none of the estimates using panel data statistically significant, the only
exception being the estimation of religious practice on time-use decisions, which
is significant only at the 10 percent level. Thus, again, because only one out 12
estimates is statistically significant, this may simply reflect random chance and
should not be interpreted as a causal effect.
The IV estimates for the Muslim-only population are shown in Table 4.15.
The results again show that all F-statistics are greater than 10. Regarding the
validity of the exclusion resstrictions, for the 2007 IFLS, 9 out of 12 estimates
in Table 4.15 pass the overidentification tests, which is identical to the results
in Table 4.9. Furthermore, using the 2014 IFLS, all the estimates passed the
overidentification test in addition to having first-stage F-statistics that are much
larger than 10.
The IV results using the 2007 IFLS data in Table 4.15 provide evidence of neg-
ative impact of religiosity (religious practice) on the decision-making variables.
The only two estimates that are statistically significant are estimated impacts on
the aggregate measure of female autonomy (at only the 10 percent level) and on
the non-routine household decisions variable (at the 5 percent level). Thus, the
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estimated impacts using the 2007 data show some negative impacts of religiosity
on decision-making power variables.
In contrast, similar to those in Table 4.9, the results using the 2014 IFLS
in Table 4.15 show a stronger impact compared to the estimates using the 2007
IFLS. The results using the 2014 IFLS show negative impacts of both measures
of religiosity (self-assessment and religious practice) on child-related decisions,
routine household decisions, fertility decisions and aggregate measure of female
autonomy. Except for the estimates on fertility decisions (statistically significant
at the 5 percent level), all estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. The results show that a one standard deviation increase in religious practice
reduces the aggregate measure of female autonomy by 1.4 points, while a one
unit increase in self-assessed religiosity reduces the same variable by 1.6 points.
Recall that the standard deviation for the aggregate measure variable is 2.8,
which indicates that the impacts to be quite significant.
The final set of results use the indirect proxy variables of women’s autonomy,
again, limiting the sample to Muslim women only. These results are shown in
Table 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18. The OLS estimations in Tables 4.16 are quite similar
to those in Table 4.13, except that the both measures of religiosity are more
likely to be statistically significant in 2007 (but not in 2014). In particular, they
suggest that an increase in religious practice increases participation in attendance
at arisan meetings, and reduces women’s shares of all and non-liquid household
assets.
Fixed-effect estimations in Table 4.17 show no statistically significant results,
as in Table 4.8. Turning to the IV estimation results in Table 4.17, the results
are practically identical to those in Table 4.9.
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4.4.2 Robustness Check
To assess the credibility of the main results, this section provides three robustness
checks. The first check repeats all of the estimations using only women the full
sample (note: women’s below 50 years old constitute around 80 percent of the
sample in 2007 and 79 percent of the sample in 2014).
The estimation results are presented in Appendix Table B23 and B28. The
results are almost identical to the main results. Religiosity generally has negative
impacts on the aggregate measure of autonomy and routine household decisions
in the IV estimations using either the 2007 or the 2014 data. Arisan-related
variables are also positively correlated with religiosity in the IV estimation results.
There are, however, a few differences between the IV estimation using the full
sample and using only the sample of women below 50 years of age. For example,
using the 2014 IFLS, religious practice has no significant impact on child-related
decisions assets using sample of women below 50 years old. However, using the
full sample leads to significant negative impacts of around 0.115 points, although
only marginally significant at the 1 percent level. The consistent results also
apply to the OLS and fixed-effect estimation results. These consistent results to
the main estimations also hold when the estimations are conducted on Muslims
only population (see Appendix Table B30 and B34).
The second robustness check repeats the estimations using the weighted mea-
sures of female decision-making power. The estimation measures of decision-
making power up to this point use no weights in the construction of the the
variables using the 18 questions in the IFLS. Thus, it is implicitly assumed that
only wives and husbands have decision-making power in the household. Because
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the data provide details on other household members who have decision-making
power on various decision spheres, this can be used to create a weight for the
decision-making power variables. To illustrate the construction of this variable,
consider the decision-making power on food (Question 1 of the 18 questions). If
only the wife has decision making power on food, and no other family members
have this power, then value of 1 will be assigned to the wife, and vice versa.
However, if two people in the household have decision-making power over food,
one of which is the wife, then the value assigned to the wives will be 0.5. If
the decision on food is decided by 5 members of the household, including the
wife, a value of 0.2 will be assigned to the wife. The same is done for the rest
of the decision-making spheres (e.g. child cloth, expensive purchase and fertility
decisions). A similar method is also applied to the women’s husbands. The final
measure is then created by taking the difference between the sum of decisions for
which the wives have power on minus those that husbands have power on. The
key difference is that now weight is put on how dominant her voice within the
household, account is be taken of household members other than the women’s
spouses.
The results are presented in Appendix Table B35 and B40. The results are
again quite consistent with the main estimation results, if not almost identical,
whether for OLS, fixed-effect or IV estimations, and whether using either the
2007 or 2009 IFLS data. The IV estimation results again show a negative impact
of religiosity (for both measures of religiosity) on female autonomy. For example
in 2007, religious practice impacted the aggregate measure negatively by 0.863
points in the IV main results. The results for the same year using the weighted
measures show a similar negative impact of religious practice on the aggregate
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measure by 0.834 points. Furthermore, both are statistically significant at the
same 5 percent level.
Lastly, consider estimates that use each of the candidate IVs separately (re-
call there were 9 candidates of IV: co-religion education, non-coreligion education,
community-level self-assessed religiosity, community level religious practice, rou-
tine religious activities in the village, more than 75 percent village population
participate in religious activities, religious leaders can resolve land conflicts, re-
ligious leaders can solve community conflicts, and share of own religion in the
village). The results using the IV’s that have F-statistics around 8 and above,
show almost identical results to the main estimation results. Appendix Table B41
and B44 presents the estimates using community-level religious practice as the
instrument.7 Similar to the main estimation results, the IV estimates also show
generally negative impacts on the aggregate measure and on routine household
decisions using either the 2007 and 2014 data. The IV estimates also show gen-
erally negative impacts of religiosity on wives’ shares of non-liquid assets.
4.5 Conclusion
The goal of this study is to estimate the causal impact of religiosity on married
women’s autonomy within their households. It is challenging to establish causal-
ity due to the difficulties in separating the effect of religious adherence from the
effects of unobserved factors which might influence both religious adherence and
female autonomy. This study tries to overcome this challenge in two ways by: 1.
7The first stage estimates have F-statistics around 8 or higher for four IVs: non-coreligion
education, more than 75 percent of village population participated in religious activities,
community-level self-assessed religiosity, and community-level religious practice. Only the re-
sults using the community-level religious practice is presented. The results using the other IVs
show very similar results and hence are not presented, but can be requested from the author.
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Using panel data to incorporate individual fixed-effects in the estimates; and 2.
Using three different instrumental variables in the estimation, which are commu-
nity religiosity measured by self-assessments, community religiosity measured by
religious practice, and whether more than 75 percent of the village population
participated in community religious activities. For comparison, the study also
presents OLS estimates.
The measures of religiosity are constructed using questions on individuals’
perceptions of their own religiosity and individuals’ self-reported religious prac-
tice (standardized to be comparable across religion). The first measure is a
subjective measure, while the second measure is a self-report of a relatively ob-
jective measure. Because around 90 percent of the sample (and the population
of Indonesia) are Muslims, estimations were also conducted using Muslims only.
The measures of married women’s women autonomy are constructed using 18
questions on decision-making power within household, which are used to create
five measures of female autonomy, all of which measure the decision-making power
of the wife relative to that of her husband. However, because most of these women
were interviewed in the presence of other family members, there is a potential
problem of inaccuracy in these measures of female autonomy. Thus, additional
measures were used to measure female autonomy indirectly: current use of birth
control, number of arisan groups joined, number of arisan meetings attended in
the past year, wife’s share of all household assets, wife’s share of all non-liquid
household assets, and wife’s current employment status.
Among the three estimation methods (OLS, fixed-effect, and IV), the IV
estimates show some evidence of religiosity effects on female autonomy. However,
the fixed-effect estimates show almost no significant impacts of religiosity on
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women’s autonomy. Although the OLS estimates also provide some evidence of
negative impact of religiosity on female autonomy, these results are likely bias
due to endogeneity.
One possible reason to favor the IV estimates over the fixed-effect estimates is
that measurement errors may lead the fixed-effect estimates to be biased towards
zero (Deaton, 1997). Given the religiosity measures are likely to be measured
with error, this might have led to the lack of statistical significant results from
the fixed-effect estimations. The IV method not only resolves problems of en-
dogeneity, but also removes bias due to measurement errors. This may be the
reason for more statistically significant results in the IV estimates. However, the
results for the IV method are influenced by the quality of the IVs used. Thus the
IV estimates may also be biased. In particular, there is a risk of not satisfying the
exclusion restriction required for the instruments. However, given that most of
the IV estimates show almost identical results across different specifications (in-
cluding using only one IV), at the very least we can probably conclude that there
may be some significant correlation between religiosity and female autonomy.
Considering the strength and weaknesses of both the fixed-effect and IV es-
timates, this study can only conclude that if there is an impact of religiosity on
female autonomy, the impact is likely to be negative. However, this study cannot
rule out with 100 percent certainty the possibility that religiosity may have negli-
gible impacts on female autonomy. Thus, the results provide only weak evidence
that religiosity reduces female autonomy. With the current global increase in ex-
treme interpretation of religious tenets, increased religiosity may lead to reduced
female autonomy. As female autonomy is closely related to child development,
the issue will remain relevant for human capital development research.
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If these results are correct that increased religiosity reduces female autonomy,
the results on the control variables, while not estimated as carefully as the results
for religiosity, may provide useful policy advice. For example, they suggest that
education may be one of the most important factor to increase the women’s
status. This is consistent with some studies on female autonomy connecting
education and female autonomy (Beegle et al., 2001; Jeffery and Basu, 1996;
Jejeebhoy et al., 1995). Thus, an increase in women’s education could increase
female autonomy that lead to improvements in child development.
Besides education, local kinship norms seem to also hold an important key
to women’s status. This may indicate that there is a need for community-level
work to slowly dismantle structural patriarchy that exists in many communities.
Indonesia can learn from its own history of the success of its family planning pro-
gram during 1980s (Warwick, 1986). In order to break the resistance of family
planning through birth control, the government conducted an intensive outreach
for many years to various religious leaders across different religions. The religious
leaders, thus, played pivotal roles in making this program a success. The govern-
ment and civil society in Indonesia can learn from this program on how to change
the cultural or religious perceptions that reduces female autonomy through social
outreach and education.
In closing, the above interpretation of the results should be treated with
caution because the measures of religiosity and female autonomy available from
the IFLS have some limitations. Two examples are that the data combine both
spouse’s work when asking about the wife’s decision-making power on work-
related decisions, and most of the women were interviewed in the presence of
other household members. Furthermore, although this study has provided evi-
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dence that the impacts of religiosity on female autonomy may be negative, this
evidence is not definitive. Thus, the results of this study should be interpreted
as providing a tentative support for the hypothesis that increased religiosity has
the negative impacts on female autonomy. Future research using more precise
data on religiosity and better methodology may provide a more conclusive test
to the veracity of this study’s results.
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for Indirect Proxy of Women’s Autonomy
Mean (sd) Observation
IFLS 2007
Use birth control (=1) 56.9% 8714
Number of saving lottery groups participated last year 0.557(0.86) 10506
Number of saving lottery meetings attended last year 8.025(16.74) 10500
Employed (=1) 58.4% 10515
IFLS 2014
Use birth control (=1) 57.3% 10255
Number of saving lottery groups participated last year 1.612(1.0) 6126
Number of saving lottery meetings attended last year N/A N/A
Employed (=1) 61.9% 12685
Panel Sample
IFLS 2007
Use birth control (=1) 58.6% 8714
Number of saving lottery groups participated last year 0.576(0.87) 10506
Number of saving lottery meetings attended last year 8.374(17.12) 10500
Employed (=1) 59.2% 10515
IFLS 2014
Use birth control (=1) 60.4% 10255
Number of saving lottery groups participated last year 1.661(1.03) 6126
Number of saving lottery meetings attended last year N/A N/A
Employed (=1) 66.1% 12685
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics of Religiosity
IFLS 2007 IFLS 2014
Mean Std. dev Obs Mean Std. dev Obs
Religiosity (self-assessment) 0.110 0.90 10495 0.091 0.94 12220
by religion:
Islam 0.080 0.91 9454 0.055 0.94 11076
Christian 0.213 0.85 381 0.188 0.89 429
Catholic 0.213 0.85 172 0.140 0.84 140
Hindu 0.581 0.75 488 0.694 0.81 575
Religiosity (religious practice) 0.047 0.81 9946 0.075 0.87 11712
by religion:
Islam 0.027 0.80 8904 0.065 0.86 10569
Christian 0.236 0.88 381 0.157 0.91 429
Catholic 0.168 0.82 172 0.249 0.84 140
Hindu 0.221 0.91 489 0.158 0.98 574
All religiosity variables are standardized
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Table 4.7: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-making
Power
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.023 0.005 -0.014 -0.004 -0.017 0.011
(0.050) (0.012) (0.032) (0.016) (0.010) (0.006)
Observations 4417 4141 4417 4417 4417 3788
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.009 0.022 0.016 0.026 0.009
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.064 -0.009 0.012 -0.053 -0.024 0.011
(0.055) (0.013) (0.041) (0.017) (0.011) (0.009)
Observations 4170 3919 4170 4170 4170 3582
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.008 0.021 0.017 0.028 0.009
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.192 -0.049 -0.099 -0.041 0.002 -0.007
(0.059) (0.017) (0.028) (0.024) (0.013) (0.008)
Observations 5239 4881 5239 5239 5239 4872
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.028 0.040 0.028 0.027 0.011
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.095 -0.043 -0.038 0.027 -0.023 -0.024
(0.069) (0.019) (0.035) (0.027) (0.013) (0.009)
Observations 4996 4659 4996 4996 4996 4646
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.028 0.037 0.028 0.030 0.013
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam, ratio
of wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live
with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship
norms, urban, and Java
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Table 4.9: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-making
Power
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.205 -0.046 -0.050 -0.056 -0.066 0.028
(0.381) (0.102) (0.268) (0.105) (0.075) (0.066)
Observations 4284 4018 4284 4284 4284 3673
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.002 0.023 0.011 0.019 0.008
First stage F-stat 16.65 13.19 16.65 16.65 16.65 13.45
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.024 0.468 0.025 0.039 0.781 0.569
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.863 -0.107 -0.441 -0.257 -0.013 -0.045
(0.356) (0.089) (0.227) (0.090) (0.054) (0.050)
Observations 4046 3805 4046 4046 4046 3474
Adjusted R2 -0.030 -0.007 -0.016 -0.020 0.029 -0.004
First stage F-stat 17.25 16.71 17.25 17.25 17.25 18.54
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.103 0.755 0.114 0.178 0.589 0.466
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-1.821 -0.488 -1.030 -0.151 -0.115 -0.095
(0.513) (0.134) (0.279) (0.161) (0.088) (0.051)
Observations 4042 3811 4042 4042 4042 3781
Adjusted R2 -0.115 -0.134 -0.176 0.021 0.006 -0.020
First stage F-stat 19.79 18.73 19.79 19.79 19.79 20.05
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.579 0.447 0.987 0.463 0.580 0.070
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-1.315 -0.346 -0.665 -0.200 -0.056 -0.087
(0.377) (0.100) (0.200) (0.125) (0.065) (0.043)
Observations 3874 3660 3874 3874 3874 3623
Adjusted R2 -0.018 -0.031 -0.031 0.012 0.026 0.001
First stage F-stat 22.86 23.76 22.86 22.86 22.86 21.96
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.131 0.109 0.016 0.639 0.357 0.882
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam, ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed, household
size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live with wife’s parents,
live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
205
Table 4.10: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Indirect Proxy of Women’s
Autonomy
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number
of arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.010 0.023 0.830 -0.498 -1.094 0.010
(0.008) (0.015) (0.301) (0.281) (0.590) (0.009)
Observations 4413 4418 4418 4367 3039 4418
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.147 0.078 0.033 0.054 0.082
Religiosity
(praying behavior)
-0.001 0.023 0.494 -0.401 0.790 -0.006
(0.010) (0.020) (0.351) (0.304) (0.600) (0.012)
Observations 4166 4171 4171 4127 2910 4171
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.149 0.077 0.036 0.056 0.081
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.003 -0.014 N/A -0.263 -0.970 0.013
(0.007) (0.019) (0.346) (0.704) (0.008)
Observations 5233 2697 5216 3572 5239
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.059 0.057 0.075 0.081
Religiosity
(praying behavior)
-0.011 0.021 N/A -0.136 0.605 0.005
(0.009) (0.028) (0.368) (0.734) (0.012)
Observations 4990 2597 4975 3452 4996
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.057 0.058 0.076 0.074
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:010
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam, ratio
of wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live
with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship
norms, urban, and Java
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Table 4.12: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Indirect Proxy of Women’s
Autonomy
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number
of arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.041 0.240 4.804 -1.387 -8.800 0.122
(0.061) (0.157) (3.370) (1.799) (3.557) (0.072)
Observations 4281 4285 4285 4237 2949 4285
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.100 0.041 0.030 -0.012 0.040
First stage F-stat 16.67 16.67 16.67 16.93 10.30 16.67
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.013 0.946 0.637 0.762 0.581 0.064
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.131 0.131 0.890 -1.682 -7.570 0.087
(0.052) (0.130) (2.462) (1.637) (3.394) (0.061)
Observations 4043 4047 4047 4006 2822 4047
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.143 0.077 0.033 -0.003 0.061
First stage F-stat 17.16 17.23 17.23 17.69 18.36 17.23
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.215 0.754 0.369 0.989 0.651 0.038
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.119 0.366 N/A -9.004 -16.446 0.054
(0.051) (0.172) (2.870) (4.738) (0.075)
Observations 4038 2128 4027 2879 4042
Adjusted R2 0.019 -0.049 -0.083 -0.082 0.065
First stage F-stat 19.87 15.82 20.53 18.53 19.79
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.104 0.107 0.189 0.800 0.412
Religiosity
(religious practice)
0.055 -0.031 N/A -6.566 -10.218 0.017
(0.039) (0.129) (2.256) (3.805) (0.063)
Observations 3870 2056 3861 2794 3874
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.064 0.005 0.019 0.063
First stage F-stat 22.91 14.86 22.84 18.57 22.86
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.028 0.040 0.104 0.167 0.378
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam, ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed, household
size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live with wife’s parents,
live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table 4.13: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-
making Power (only for Muslims)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.015 0.008 -0.007 -0.002 -0.022 0.011
(0.053) (0.013) (0.033) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007)
Observations 4005 3746 4005 4005 4005 3441
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.006 0.017 0.015 0.025 0.008
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.034 -0.008 0.035 -0.046 -0.027 0.015
(0.055) (0.013) (0.043) (0.018) (0.013) (0.010)
Observations 3752 3518 3752 3752 3752 3229
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.005 0.015 0.015 0.027 0.008
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.171 -0.049 -0.086 -0.033 0.004 -0.009
(0.061) (0.018) (0.029) (0.025) (0.014) (0.008)
Observations 4755 4429 4755 4755 4755 4452
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.028 0.035 0.028 0.025 0.011
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.161 -0.063 -0.065 0.019 -0.028 -0.029
(0.075) (0.021) (0.037) (0.030) (0.015) (0.010)
Observations 4510 4205 4510 4510 4510 4224
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.029 0.033 0.028 0.028 0.013
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, ratio
of wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live
with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship
norms, urban, and Java
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Table 4.15: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-making
Power (only for Muslims)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.190 -0.039 -0.075 -0.050 -0.041 0.036
(0.391) (0.109) (0.280) (0.105) (0.079) (0.068)
Observations 3889 3640 3889 3889 3889 3338
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.000 0.017 0.012 0.025 0.005
First stage F-stat 16.17 12.58 16.17 16.17 16.17 13.60
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.022 0.293 0.055 0.019 0.743 0.141
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.617 -0.066 -0.343 -0.189 0.028 -0.039
(0.342) (0.089) (0.241) (0.086) (0.060) (0.050)
Observations 3646 3422 3646 3646 3646 3134
Adjusted R2 -0.004 -0.001 -0.009 -0.002 0.022 -0.004
First stage F-stat 15.08 14.73 15.08 15.08 15.08 16.58
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.211 0.639 0.197 0.227 0.453 0.211
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-1.621 -0.466 -0.894 -0.110 -0.068 -0.123
(0.502) (0.136) (0.273) (0.157) (0.085) (0.051)
Observations 3655 3445 3655 3655 3655 3443
Adjusted R2 -0.087 -0.121 -0.135 0.021 0.016 -0.042
First stage F-stat 19.47 18.38 19.47 19.47 19.47 19.87
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.508 0.442 0.919 0.418 0.587 0.386
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-1.367 -0.366 -0.693 -0.183 -0.055 -0.094
(0.399) (0.106) (0.208) (0.133) (0.072) (0.046)
Observations 3486 3293 3486 3486 3486 3284
Adjusted R2 -0.018 -0.031 -0.039 0.013 0.025 -0.000
First stage F-stat 23.00 23.55 23.00 23.00 23.00 22.05
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.585 0.429 0.182 0.680 0.704 0.891
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam, ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed, household
size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live with wife’s parents,
live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table 4.16: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Indirect Proxy of Women’s
Autonomy (only for Muslims)
Currently
use
birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number of
arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.008 0.027 0.944 -0.319 -0.940 0.010
(0.008) (0.015) (0.318) (0.272) (0.627) (0.009)
Observations 4004 4006 4006 3959 2774 4006
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.142 0.072 0.033 0.045 0.072
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.006 0.026 0.552 -0.079 1.454 -0.006
(0.010) (0.022) (0.407) (0.318) (0.646) (0.012)
Observations 3751 3753 3753 3714 2642 3753
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.143 0.070 0.037 0.050 0.070
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.001 -0.016 N/A -0.140 -0.589 0.013
(0.007) (0.019) (0.359) (0.749) (0.008)
Observations 4749 2504 4736 3248 4755
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.065 0.053 0.070 0.071
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.013 0.024 N/A -0.322 0.407 -0.003
(0.010) (0.028) (0.401) (0.761) (0.010)
Observations 4504 2403 4493 3127 4510
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.062 0.054 0.072 0.064
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, ratio
of wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live
with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship
norms, urban, and Java
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Table 4.18: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Indirect Proxy of Women’s
Autonomy (only for Muslims)
Currently
use
birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number
of arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.099 0.259 4.257 -1.724 -9.183 0.097
(0.062) (0.168) (3.513) (1.973) (3.918) (0.076)
Observations 3889 3890 3890 3845 2698 3890
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.090 0.049 0.026 -0.033 0.047
First stage F-stat 16.19 16.19 16.19 16.73 10.38
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.037 0.886 0.564 0.823 0.836 0.154
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.162 0.137 0.384 -1.902 -8.492 0.070
(0.055) (0.141) (2.747) (1.833) (3.681) (0.067)
Observations 3646 3647 3647 3609 2568 3647
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.139 0.072 0.030 -0.032 0.059
First stage F-stat 14.51 11.34 14.51 9.94 14.51
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.381 0.686 0.347 0.918 0.484 0.116
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.045 0.358 N/A -7.673 -13.978 0.043
(0.047) (0.162) (2.817) (4.662) (0.075)
Observations 3651 1969 3642 2610 3655
Adjusted R2 0.065 -0.037 -0.055 -0.052 0.060
First stage F-stat 19.51 16.62 20.09 18.11 19.47
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.680 0.100 0.181 0.651 0.071
Religiosity
(religious practice)
0.034 0.102 N/A -6.802 -10.991 0.002
(0.041) (0.130) (2.463) (4.186) (0.062)
Observations 3482 1896 3475 2525 3486
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.068 0.000 0.005 0.054
First stage F-stat 23.04 18.92 23.04 19.60 23.00
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.629 0.023 0.160 0.433 0.070
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed, household
size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live with wife’s parents,
live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The first chapter of this essay examines the underlying causes of the poor per-
formance of the Indonesia’s CCT program on child health outcomes. A theory
of change was constructed to provide a framework that generated seven testable
hypotheses to explain that poor performance. The empirical estimates indicate
that there is no evidence that compliance with the required behaviors was en-
forced during the implementation of the CCT program. This appears to have
influenced the efficacy of the program to improve child health outcomes. Fur-
thermore, there is a suggestive evidence that the required behaviors may not
necessarily have significant positive influences on child health outcomes. The es-
timates also reject these two hypotheses: that the program might be reinforcing
a behavior that was already part of households’ behavioral decisions and that
the supply of health services in the program areas may not be sufficient. The
empirical estimation also highlights the difficulties in examining the underlying
mechanism of the program using the data that were designed mostly to estimate
the impact of the program. Future RCT-based impact evaluations of a program
should consider building a theory of change in order to collect data that can be
used to examine the underlying mechanism of the program.
The second essay estimates the impact of macroeconomic shocks on child
cognitive outcomes. In particular, the essay examines the impact of the 1997
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East Asian Financial Crisis on Indonesia’s children’s accumulation of cognitive
skills. Using sibling-fixed effects, the results show negative impacts of exposure
to the crisis on math and aggregate cognitive scores. Exposure to the crisis when
the children were still in utero appears to be most damaging for the cognitive
skills development. The burden of negative impacts, however, is borne mostly
by the children in urban areas. Children in rural areas seem to be protected
from the harmful impact of the crisis. However, this appears to apply only
for children in rural areas whose households have access to farmland. Those
children in rural areas whose families have no access to farmland appear to have
been less protected from the impact of the crisis. The results also indicate that
during the economic crisis, social safety nets focusing on pregnant mothers may
be important to mitigate the deleterious impacts of the crisis due to significant
pre-natal effects. Specific policies in urban areas may also be needed as most of
the impacts of the crisis fell on children in those areas.
The third and last essay attempts to estimate the causal impacts of religiosity
on married women’s autonomy within their households using the 2007 and 2014
IFLS data. The empirical estimations use three estimation methods in order to
do this: OLS, wife fixed-effect, and instrumental variables (IV). The results from
the fixed-effect estimates contradict the results from the IV method. The fixed
effect estimates provide no evidence of any impacts (negative or otherwise) on
female autonomy variables. The results using the IV method, however, show
some negative impacts of religiosity on female autonomy, in particular those
estimates show consistent negative impacts on non-routine household decisions.
Given the data and methodological limitations, this study can provide only weak
evidence of a negative impact of religiosity on female autonomy. In other words,
217
if there is a significant impact of religiosity on female autonomy, it will likely be
negative. However, it is also possible that there is no impact of religiosity on
female autonomy, shown by the fixed-effect results.
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Table A5: Impact of the Program on Child Health Behaviors (LATE) - Java/Off-Java
Java Off-Java
Coef(Std. Err) Obs Coef(Std. Err) Obs
Ever breastfed (=1) 0.0019 4231 0.0345
 1877
(0.014) (0.017)
Waiting time for
breastfed after birth (hours)
-1.6580 4380 -1.7960 1924
(8.335) (3.333)
Length of breastfeeding (months) -0.7700 4094 0.2140 1830(1.225) (1.270)
Weighed once last month
for age 0-11 months (=1)
0.2530 558 0.0995 357
(0.142) (0.115)
Weighed once last month
for age 1-3 years (=1)
0.2610 2667 0.1810 1054
(0.062) (0.091)
Weighed once last month
for age 0-5 years (=1)
0.2960 4205 0.1780 1870
(0.056) (0.070)
Age appropriate vaccination (=1) 0.0344 3396 -0.0102 1585(0.070) (0.087)
Completed vaccination (=1) 0.0206 3404 0.0032 1586(0.069) (0.087)
Number of Vitamin A consumed 0.3410
 3511 -0.0763 1576
(0.184) (0.223)
Received Vitamin A twice last year (=1) 0.0311 3511 0.0219 1576(0.049) (0.051)
Child visits to traditional
health facilities (frequency)
0.0044 4464 -0.0064 1957
(0.0065) (0.0036)
All household visits to traditional
health facilities (frequency)
-0.0086 43452 0.0212 14629
(0.021) (0.018)
All household visits to traditional
health facilities (=1)
-0.0051 43452 0.0144 14629
(0.012) (0.014)
Child visits to public
health facilities (frequency)
0.0752 4464 0.0910 1957
(0.030) (0.039)
All visits to public
health facilities (frequency)
0.1720 43452 0.4120 14629
(0.107) (0.181)
All household visits to public
health facilities (=1)
0.0801 43452 0.1680 14629
(0.049) (0.068)
Child visits to private
health facilities (frequency)
0.0081 4464 0.0112 1957
(0.021) (0.020)
All household visits to private
health facilities (frequency)
0.0531 43452 0.0451 14629
(0.050) (0.070)
All household visits to private
health facilities (=1)
0.0225 43452 -0.0030 14629
(0.030) (0.045)
Standard errors, clustered at sub-district level, in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:010
Instrument: random assignment; all estimations include control variables
244
Table A6: Impact of the Program on Child Health Outcomes (LATE) - Java/Off-Java
Java Off-Java
Coef(Std. Err) Obs Coef(Std. Err) Obs
Weight (kg) 0.0411 3794 -0.0435 1633(0.243) (0.370)
Weight-for-age 0.1720 3794 -0.2410 1633(0.121) (0.186)
Malnutrition (Weight-for-age  -2) -0.0864
 3794 0.0907 1633
(0.041) (0.064)
Severe malnutrition (Weight-for-age  -3) -0.0347 3794 0.0337 1633(0.025) (0.037)
Height-for-age 0.1250 3484 -0.6660
 1524
(0.206) (0.240)
Weight-for-height -0.0169 3437 0.1740 1499(0.184) (0.233)
Reported incidence of diarrhea (=1) 0.0050 4230 0.1100
 1875
(0.043) (0.052)
Treated Diarrhea (=1) 0.0079 884 0.3250
 342
(0.089) (0.126)
Frequency of diarrhea last month 0.0151 4201 0.0150 1859(0.119) (0.100)
Length of last incidence of diarrhea (days) 0.0435 4202 0.4230
 1858
(0.198) (0.212)
Reported incidence of ARI (=1) 0.0142 4153 0.0582 1851(0.036) (0.038)
Treated ARI (=1) -0.0260 550 0.0521 162(0.108) (0.177)
Reported incidence of fever (=1) 0.1060
 4229 0.0944 1875
(0.054) (0.061)
Reported incidence of cough (=1) -0.0032 4231 0.1040 1876(0.060) (0.072)
Incidence of cough & rapid breath (=1) 0.0018 4096 0.0437 1835(0.041) (0.046)
Reported incidence of illness (=1) 0.0448 4231 0.1250 1874(0.060) (0.081)
Number of mortality for age 0-28 days (=1) -0.0039 8273 -0.0001 2518(0.003) (0.004)
Number of mortality for age 1-2 months (=1) -0.0013 8273 0.0006 2518(0.001) (0.003)
Number of mortality for age 3-5 months (=1) -0.0012 8273 -0.0003 2518(0.001) (0.002)
Number of mortality for age 6-11 months (=1) 0.0018 8273 0.0001 2518(0.002) (0.004)
Number of mortality for age 0-11 months (=1) -0.0044 8273 0.0003 2518(0.004) (0.007)
Standard errors, clustered at sub-district level, in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:010
Instrument: random assignment, all estimations include control variables
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Table A7: Impact of the Program on Child Health Behaviors (LATE) - Urban/Rural
Urban Rural
Coef(Std. Err) Obs Coef(Std. Err) Obs
Ever breastfed (=1) 0.0185 4728 -0.00252 1380
(0.0124) (0.0240)
Waiting time for
breastfed after birth (hours) 2.186 4886 -18.70 1418
(6.546) (9.726)
Length of breastfeeding (months) -0.927 4594 0.502 1330
(1.068) (1.745)
Weighed once last month (=1) 0.170 719 0.201 196
(0.110) (0.169)
Weighed once last month (=1) 0.221 2849 0.306 872
(0.0632) (0.0831)
Weighed once last month (=1) 0.244 4703 0.332 1372
(0.0536) (0.0742)
Age appropriate vaccination (=1) 0.0330 3833 0.0223 1148
(0.0682) (0.103)
Completed vaccination (=1) 0.0292 3841 0.0187 1149
(0.0671) (0.104)
Number of Vitamin A consumed 0.203 3913 0.267 1174
(0.163) (0.266)
Received Vitamin A twice last year (=1) 0.0174 3913 0.0623 1174
(0.0395) (0.0770)
Child visits to traditional
health facilities (freq) 0.00333 5991 0.000335 4918
(0.00371) (0.00482)
All household visits to traditional
health facilities (freq) 0.00386 43931 -0.0286 14150
(0.0191) (0.0304)
All household visits to traditional
health facilities (=1) -0.0000684 43931 -0.00677 14150
(0.0117) (0.0192)
Child visits to public
health facilities (frequency) 0.0728 5991 0.0912 4918
(0.0253) (0.0261)
All visits to public
health facilities (frequency) 0.286 43931 0.138 14150
(0.110) (0.176)
All household visits to public
health facilities (=1) 0.123 43931 0.0724 14150
(0.0472) (0.0769)
Child visits to private
health facilities (frequency) 0.0106 5991 0.00267 4918
(0.0158) (0.0165)
All household visits to private
health facilities (frequency) 0.0560 43931 0.0238 14150
(0.0491) (0.0717)
All household visits to private
health facilities (=1) 0.0102 43931 0.0235 14150
(0.0307) (0.0448)
Standard errors, clustered at sub-district level, in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:010
Instrument: random assignment, all estimations include control variables
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Table A8: Impact of the Program on Child Health Outcomes (LATE) - Urban/Rural
Urban Rural
Coef(Std. Err) Obs Coef(Std. Err) Obs
Weight (kg) -0.1260 4188 0.1770 1239(0.249) (0.356)
Weight-for-age -0.0405 4188 0.1480 1239(0.124) (0.182)
Malnutrition (Weight-for-age  -2) -0.0090 4188 -0.0280 1239(0.042) (0.062)
Severe malnutrition (Weight-for-age  -3) -0.0025 4188 -0.0318 1239(0.025) (0.033)
Height-for-age -0.3300
 3875 0.4560 1133
(0.190) (0.291)
Weight-for-height 0.1880 3807 -0.5590
 1129
(0.166) (0.304)
Reported incidence of diarrhea (=1) 0.0346 4726 0.0751 1379(0.038) (0.071)
Treated Diarrhea (=1) 0.1080 930 0.1090 296(0.089) (0.143)
Frequency of diarrhea last month -0.0261 4692 0.2130 1368(0.081) (0.230)
Length of last incidence of diarrhea (days) 0.1760 4693 0.1930 1367(0.165) (0.303)
Reported incidence of ARI (=1) 0.0455 4644 -0.0163 1360(0.032) (0.045)
Treated ARI (=1) -0.0297 541 -0.0168 171(0.109) (0.148)
Reported incidence of fever (=1) 0.0979
 4725 0.1380 1379
(0.046) (0.088)
Reported incidence of cough (=1) 0.0595 4727 -0.0562 1380(0.054) (0.088)
Incidence of cough & rapid breath (=1) 0.0334 4593 -0.0449 1338(0.037) (0.051)
Reported incidence of illness (=1) 0.0826 4725 0.0515 1380(0.056) (0.096)
Number of mortality for age 0-28 days (=1) -0.0045 8152 0.0030 2639(0.003) (0.004)
Number of mortality for age 1-2 months (=1) -0.0012 8152 -0.0005 2639(0.001) (0.003)
Number of mortality for age 3-5 months (=1) -0.0013 8152 0.0007 2639(0.001) (0.002)
Number of mortality for age 6-11 months (=1) 0.0005 8152 0.0045 2639(0.002) (0.003)
Number of mortality for age 0-11 months (=1) -0.0058 8152 0.0057 2639(0.004) (0.006)
Standard errors, clustered at sub-district level, in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:010
Instrument: random assignment, all estimations include control variables
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Table B1: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Self-Assessment) on Women’s
Decision-making Power (IFLS 2007)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Time-use
decisions
Fertility
decisions
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.023 0.005 -0.014 -0.004 -0.017 0.011
(0.050) (0.012) (0.032) (0.016) (0.010) (0.006)
Wife’s age 0.114 0.013 0.058 0.020 0.020 -0.004
(0.042) (0.011) (0.027) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Religion
is Islam (=1)
-0.005 -0.098 0.188 -0.018 -0.094 0.016
(0.213) (0.048) (0.143) (0.061) (0.028) (0.024)
Wife’s years
of education
-0.029 -0.007 -0.020 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.011) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
0.114 0.040 0.056 0.015 0.007 -0.001
(0.056) (0.014) (0.036) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007)
Husband is
employed (=1)
-0.531 -0.026 -0.208 -0.182 -0.082 -0.048
(0.240) (0.058) (0.161) (0.073) (0.052) (0.040)
Log per-capita
expenditure
0.058 0.030 -0.061 0.073 0.042 -0.024
(0.070) (0.018) (0.049) (0.023) (0.015) (0.012)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
0.242 0.004 0.180 0.085 0.006 -0.031
(0.121) (0.036) (0.083) (0.039) (0.027) (0.019)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.374 -0.048 -0.177 -0.134 0.005 -0.015
(0.126) (0.033) (0.088) (0.039) (0.029) (0.023)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.074 -0.038 0.066 0.008 0.051 -0.024
(0.129) (0.028) (0.099) (0.036) (0.024) (0.022)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.197 -0.106 -0.088 -0.053 0.047 -0.003
(0.152) (0.034) (0.108) (0.041) (0.030) (0.022)
Java 0.336 -0.012 0.250 0.010 0.031 0.062
(0.122) (0.027) (0.091) (0.032) (0.023) (0.018)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variable estimates that are not statistically significant are not presented.
These control variables are:
ratio of wife’s age to husband’s, household size, number of children in household and urban.
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Table B2: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Religious Practice) on
Women’s Decision-making Power (IFLS 2007)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.064 -0.009 0.012 -0.053 -0.024 0.011
(0.055) (0.013) (0.041) (0.017) (0.011) (0.009)
Wife’s age 0.110 0.016 0.050 0.019 0.027 -0.011
(0.042) (0.012) (0.028) (0.014) (0.009) (0.006)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Religion
is Islam (=1)
-0.005 -0.102 0.200 -0.028 -0.092 0.016
(0.214) (0.048) (0.146) (0.061) (0.028) (0.025)
Wife’s years
of education
-0.026 -0.006 -0.017 -0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.012) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
0.102 0.035 0.050 0.013 0.010 -0.005
(0.057) (0.014) (0.038) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008)
Husband is
employed (=1)
-0.449 -0.005 -0.196 -0.154 -0.059 -0.050
(0.239) (0.058) (0.170) (0.064) (0.055) (0.042)
Log per-capita
expenditure
0.085 0.034 -0.047 0.081 0.043 -0.026
(0.073) (0.019) (0.051) (0.023) (0.015) (0.012)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
0.235 0.002 0.201 0.068 -0.001 -0.034
(0.129) (0.038) (0.088) (0.041) (0.029) (0.020)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.359 -0.049 -0.178 -0.125 0.018 -0.019
(0.128) (0.034) (0.090) (0.041) (0.028) (0.023)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.101 -0.033 0.088 0.011 0.047 -0.023
(0.132) (0.028) (0.102) (0.037) (0.025) (0.022)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.142 -0.095 -0.056 -0.041 0.045 -0.000
(0.154) (0.035) (0.110) (0.042) (0.029) (0.023)
Java 0.359 -0.001 0.248 0.026 0.030 0.062
(0.125) (0.028) (0.093) (0.033) (0.024) (0.018)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variable estimates that are not statistically significant are not presented.
These control variables are:
ratio of wife’s age to husband’s, household size, number of children in household and urban.
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Table B3: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Self-Assessment) on Women’s
Decision-making Power (IFLS 2014)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.192 -0.049 -0.099 -0.041 0.002 -0.007
(0.059) (0.017) (0.028) (0.024) (0.013) (0.008)
Wife’s age 0.254 0.025 0.141 0.051 0.027 0.004
(0.053) (0.015) (0.026) (0.022) (0.011) (0.008)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wife’s years
of education
-0.017 -0.017 -0.013 0.016 0.003 -0.006
(0.017) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
Ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s
-0.780 0.137 -0.653 -0.209 0.181 -0.145
(0.509) (0.155) (0.255) (0.207) (0.102) (0.071)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
0.099 0.068 0.032 0.008 -0.005 0.004
(0.079) (0.026) (0.033) (0.029) (0.014) (0.009)
Husband is
employed (=1)
-0.982 -0.348 0.028 -0.346 -0.300 -0.048
(0.495) (0.125) (0.188) (0.220) (0.085) (0.051)
Number of children
in household
0.189 0.045 0.069 0.025 -0.005 0.008
(0.064) (0.019) (0.031) (0.028) (0.014) (0.009)
Log per-capita
expenditure
0.114 -0.039 -0.018 0.096 0.059 0.024
(0.103) (0.031) (0.049) (0.041) (0.021) (0.013)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
0.300 -0.083 0.252 0.197 -0.033 -0.022
(0.177) (0.050) (0.080) (0.085) (0.035) (0.021)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.933 -0.161 -0.370 -0.249 -0.103 -0.044
(0.192) (0.054) (0.095) (0.089) (0.036) (0.029)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.319 0.033 0.223 0.026 0.015 0.027
(0.166) (0.044) (0.088) (0.065) (0.031) (0.022)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.473 -0.181 -0.032 -0.207 -0.036 -0.029
(0.198) (0.053) (0.102) (0.065) (0.032) (0.023)
Urban (=1) -0.149 0.022 -0.142 0.034 -0.050 0.001
(0.149) (0.041) (0.075) (0.054) (0.025) (0.018)
Java 0.210 0.046 0.161 -0.008 -0.033 0.059
(0.153) (0.042) (0.078) (0.059) (0.028) (0.019)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variable estimates that are not statistically significant are not presented (household size).
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Table B4: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Religious Practice) on
Women’s Decision-making Power (IFLS 2014)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.095 -0.043 -0.038 0.027 -0.023 -0.024
(0.069) (0.019) (0.035) (0.027) (0.013) (0.009)
Wife’s age 0.262 0.024 0.147 0.043 0.037 0.004
(0.056) (0.016) (0.028) (0.023) (0.012) (0.008)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wife’s years
of education
-0.014 -0.015 -0.012 0.016 0.004 -0.006
(0.018) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
Ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s
-0.923 0.099 -0.725 -0.176 0.120 -0.160
(0.528) (0.161) (0.265) (0.212) (0.107) (0.073)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
0.090 0.067 0.022 0.012 -0.007 0.004
(0.083) (0.027) (0.034) (0.030) (0.015) (0.009)
Husband is
employed (=1)
-1.010 -0.362 0.002 -0.319 -0.307 -0.053
(0.526) (0.133) (0.197) (0.234) (0.089) (0.052)
Number of children
in household
0.195 0.055 0.069 0.025 -0.008 0.009
(0.065) (0.019) (0.033) (0.029) (0.014) (0.009)
Log per-capita
expenditure
0.144 -0.033 -0.004 0.094 0.065 0.030
(0.105) (0.032) (0.050) (0.041) (0.022) (0.014)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
0.265 -0.093 0.217 0.192 -0.030 -0.011
(0.176) (0.050) (0.082) (0.084) (0.036) (0.022)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.980 -0.171 -0.401 -0.273 -0.093 -0.039
(0.197) (0.056) (0.097) (0.092) (0.037) (0.029)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.298 0.031 0.195 0.023 0.023 0.032
(0.169) (0.044) (0.090) (0.068) (0.031) (0.022)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.456 -0.173 -0.038 -0.197 -0.031 -0.027
(0.202) (0.053) (0.106) (0.067) (0.033) (0.023)
Urban (=1) -0.132 0.029 -0.131 0.037 -0.055 0.002
(0.150) (0.041) (0.077) (0.054) (0.025) (0.018)
Java 0.246 0.064 0.189 -0.012 -0.035 0.056
(0.155) (0.042) (0.080) (0.059) (0.029) (0.020)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variable estimates that are not statistically significant are not presented (household size).
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Table B5: Fixed-effect Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Self-Assessment) on
Women’s Decision-making Power
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-routine
household
decisions
Time use
decisions
Fertility
decisions
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.049 -0.014 -0.019 -0.005 -0.013 0.003
(0.057) (0.017) (0.032) (0.023) (0.013) (0.009)
Wife’s age 0.261 0.092 0.164 0.019 -0.030 0.021
(0.061) (0.020) (0.035) (0.025) (0.013) (0.011)
Religion is
Islam (=1)
0.726 0.022 0.549 -0.204 0.448 -0.114
(1.177) (0.309) (0.650) (0.386) (0.242) (0.221)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
-0.029 0.024 0.038 -0.075 -0.005 -0.009
(0.112) (0.033) (0.059) (0.039) (0.021) (0.015)
Husband is
employed (=1)
-0.411 -0.240 0.076 -0.099 -0.159 -0.033
(0.378) (0.120) (0.183) (0.174) (0.079) (0.062)
Household size -0.039 0.000 -0.004 -0.015 -0.005 -0.011
(0.041) (0.011) (0.024) (0.017) (0.009) (0.006)
Number of children
in household
-0.043 -0.015 -0.001 -0.013 -0.023 -0.011
(0.069) (0.021) (0.041) (0.030) (0.014) (0.010)
Log per-capita
expenditure
-0.324 -0.060 -0.119 -0.088 0.004 -0.063
(0.104) (0.035) (0.063) (0.046) (0.027) (0.018)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
-0.084 -0.062 0.184 -0.056 -0.075 -0.073
(0.214) (0.060) (0.121) (0.093) (0.054) (0.037)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.376 -0.007 -0.334 -0.117 0.054 0.030
(0.258) (0.075) (0.140) (0.095) (0.051) (0.038)
Urban (=1) 0.237 0.021 0.048 0.117 0.072 -0.002
(0.180) (0.064) (0.114) (0.068) (0.047) (0.030)
Java -0.342 -0.059 0.154 -0.208 -0.275 0.126
(0.598) (0.179) (0.408) (0.209) (0.139) (0.106)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variable estimates that are not statistically significant are not presented.
These control variables are: wife ageˆ2, wife’s years of education, and ratio of wife’s age to husband’s.
The estimations also include, although not presented, age fixed-effect and birth month
by province fixed effect.
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Table B6: Fixed-effect Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Religious Practice) on
Women’s Decision-making Power
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-routine
household
decisions
Time use
decisions
Fertility
decisions
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.009 0.021 -0.002 0.018 -0.030 -0.011
(0.070) (0.020) (0.043) (0.028) (0.016) (0.012)
Wife’s age 0.255 0.089 0.166 0.011 -0.023 0.012
(0.067) (0.022) (0.038) (0.028) (0.014) (0.011)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Religion is
Islam (=1)
0.686 0.017 0.544 -0.209 0.435 -0.127
(1.173) (0.309) (0.653) (0.387) (0.242) (0.221)
Wife’s years
of education
0.022 -0.000 -0.001 0.010 0.007 0.012
(0.038) (0.012) (0.023) (0.014) (0.009) (0.006)
Husband is
employed (=1)
-0.465 -0.283 0.107 -0.132 -0.172 -0.043
(0.400) (0.124) (0.195) (0.187) (0.083) (0.066)
Number of children
in household
-0.026 -0.014 0.016 -0.007 -0.028 -0.011
(0.073) (0.022) (0.042) (0.032) (0.014) (0.011)
Log per-capita
expenditure
-0.303 -0.053 -0.113 -0.080 0.007 -0.063
(0.111) (0.036) (0.067) (0.048) (0.028) (0.019)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
-0.177 -0.070 0.119 -0.043 -0.100 -0.082
(0.227) (0.066) (0.129) (0.096) (0.056) (0.040)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.440 -0.001 -0.344 -0.135 0.042 0.002
(0.268) (0.079) (0.146) (0.100) (0.052) (0.038)
Java -0.358 -0.057 0.132 -0.182 -0.282 0.105
(0.633) (0.192) (0.425) (0.222) (0.149) (0.107)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variable estimates that are not statistically significant are not presented.
These control variables are: ratio of wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education
to husband’s, urban, and household size.
The estimations also include, although not presented, age fixed-effect and birth month
by province fixed effect.
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Table B7: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Self-Assessment) on Women’s
Decision-making Power (IFLS 2007)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Time use
decisions
Fertility
decisions
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.205 -0.046 -0.050 -0.056 -0.066 0.028
(0.381) (0.102) (0.268) (0.105) (0.075) (0.066)
Wife’s age 0.116 0.009 0.058 0.020 0.024 -0.004
(0.045) (0.011) (0.029) (0.015) (0.009) (0.007)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Religion is Islam (=1) -0.053 -0.115 0.182 -0.027 -0.109 0.022
(0.281) (0.069) (0.191) (0.077) (0.040) (0.037)
Wife’s years of education -0.027 -0.006 -0.019 -0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.011) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
0.113 0.038 0.058 0.014 0.006 -0.001
(0.056) (0.014) (0.037) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008)
Husband is employed (=1) -0.470 -0.014 -0.160 -0.173 -0.093 -0.047
(0.246) (0.060) (0.164) (0.075) (0.051) (0.041)
Log per-capita
expenditure
0.051 0.031 -0.070 0.073 0.043 -0.026
(0.075) (0.019) (0.051) (0.025) (0.016) (0.013)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
0.224 0.007 0.165 0.083 0.006 -0.033
(0.122) (0.037) (0.086) (0.040) (0.028) (0.020)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.380 -0.042 -0.194 -0.132 0.006 -0.012
(0.127) (0.034) (0.089) (0.039) (0.029) (0.023)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.071 -0.037 0.059 0.010 0.053 -0.025
(0.131) (0.029) (0.103) (0.038) (0.025) (0.023)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.153 -0.095 -0.074 -0.039 0.049 0.000
(0.154) (0.036) (0.109) (0.042) (0.032) (0.024)
Java 0.400 0.005 0.273 0.026 0.036 0.064
(0.149) (0.034) (0.111) (0.034) (0.027) (0.022)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
Control variable estimates that are not statistically significant are not presented.
These control variables are: ratio of wife’s age to husband’s, household size, number of children
in household and urban.
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Table B8: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Religious Practice) on Women’s
Decision-making Power (IFLS 2007)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-routine
household
decisions
Time use
decisions
Fertility
decisions
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.863 -0.107 -0.441 -0.257 -0.013 -0.045
(0.356) (0.089) (0.227) (0.090) (0.054) (0.050)
Wife’s age 0.138 0.015 0.068 0.025 0.030 -0.008
(0.047) (0.012) (0.030) (0.015) (0.009) (0.006)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Religion is
Islam (=1)
-0.173 -0.124 0.098 -0.065 -0.084 -0.001
(0.225) (0.056) (0.150) (0.062) (0.030) (0.028)
Ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s
-0.588 -0.109 -0.520 -0.005 0.049 0.024
(0.388) (0.097) (0.258) (0.137) (0.076) (0.064)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
0.098 0.033 0.048 0.011 0.010 -0.004
(0.058) (0.014) (0.039) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008)
Husband is
employed (=1)
-0.334 0.013 -0.115 -0.133 -0.071 -0.043
(0.250) (0.060) (0.176) (0.066) (0.055) (0.045)
Log per-capita
expenditure
0.083 0.036 -0.050 0.082 0.041 -0.025
(0.078) (0.019) (0.054) (0.025) (0.016) (0.013)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
0.181 -0.001 0.163 0.058 0.001 -0.039
(0.132) (0.040) (0.091) (0.042) (0.029) (0.021)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.350 -0.041 -0.188 -0.117 0.019 -0.017
(0.130) (0.035) (0.092) (0.042) (0.027) (0.024)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.105 -0.033 0.090 0.015 0.045 -0.022
(0.140) (0.029) (0.108) (0.037) (0.026) (0.023)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.038 -0.080 -0.002 -0.013 0.042 0.008
(0.157) (0.034) (0.115) (0.044) (0.030) (0.024)
Java 0.562 0.028 0.363 0.075 0.024 0.078
(0.148) (0.033) (0.107) (0.036) (0.026) (0.021)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
Control variable estimates that are not statistically significant are not presented.
These control variables are: wife’s years of education, household size, number of children in
household and urban.
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Table B9: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Self-Assessment) on Women’s
Decision-making Power (IFLS 2014)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Time use
decisions
Fertility
decisions
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-1.821 -0.488 -1.030 -0.151 -0.115 -0.095
(0.513) (0.134) (0.279) (0.161) (0.088) (0.051)
Wife’s age 0.340 0.044 0.206 0.052 0.029 0.008
(0.071) (0.020) (0.037) (0.026) (0.014) (0.009)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.004 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Religion is
Islam (=1)
-0.302 -0.115 -0.039 -0.021 -0.148 -0.024
(0.362) (0.093) (0.189) (0.122) (0.055) (0.037)
Wife’s years
of education
-0.032 -0.020 -0.025 0.018 0.001 -0.005
(0.023) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002)
Ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s
-0.789 0.190 -0.776 -0.139 0.217 -0.169
(0.624) (0.191) (0.312) (0.238) (0.126) (0.083)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
0.058 0.058 0.009 0.006 -0.012 0.004
(0.093) (0.028) (0.040) (0.031) (0.016) (0.009)
Husband is
employed (=1)
-1.530 -0.556 -0.191 -0.462 -0.336 -0.056
(0.652) (0.162) (0.258) (0.259) (0.109) (0.066)
Household size -0.021 0.007 -0.027 -0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.027) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.005) (0.004)
Number of children
in household
0.138 0.029 0.052 0.020 -0.004 -0.001
(0.082) (0.022) (0.040) (0.033) (0.016) (0.011)
Log per-capita
expenditure
0.082 -0.042 -0.020 0.079 0.050 0.022
(0.131) (0.037) (0.062) (0.047) (0.024) (0.015)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
0.419 -0.057 0.305 0.206 -0.017 -0.013
(0.232) (0.063) (0.104) (0.098) (0.040) (0.024)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.750 -0.154 -0.305 -0.162 -0.062 -0.066
(0.242) (0.068) (0.122) (0.094) (0.040) (0.032)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.446 0.074 0.313 0.015 -0.002 0.053
(0.211) (0.057) (0.111) (0.081) (0.039) (0.027)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.349 -0.130 0.043 -0.221 -0.058 0.001
(0.250) (0.067) (0.129) (0.080) (0.040) (0.026)
Urban (=1) -0.219 -0.004 -0.191 0.044 -0.061 0.000
(0.181) (0.052) (0.091) (0.064) (0.028) (0.020)
Java 0.209 0.079 0.126 -0.000 -0.048 0.067
(0.202) (0.053) (0.103) (0.070) (0.033) (0.022)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
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Table B10: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Religious Practice) on
Women’s Decision-making Power (IFLS 2014)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-routine
household
decisions
Time use
decisions
Fertility
decisions
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-1.315 -0.346 -0.665 -0.200 -0.056 -0.087
(0.377) (0.100) (0.200) (0.125) (0.065) (0.043)
Wife’s age 0.257 0.019 0.159 0.039 0.028 0.005
(0.061) (0.018) (0.031) (0.026) (0.013) (0.009)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Religion
is Islam (=1)
0.378 0.064 0.337 0.049 -0.106 0.007
(0.383) (0.093) (0.202) (0.121) (0.046) (0.031)
Wife’s years
of education
0.024 -0.005 0.004 0.024 0.004 -0.003
(0.022) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002)
Ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s
-0.907 0.145 -0.844 -0.108 0.190 -0.178
(0.636) (0.194) (0.308) (0.247) (0.130) (0.086)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
0.044 0.056 -0.002 0.007 -0.015 0.005
(0.090) (0.028) (0.036) (0.032) (0.017) (0.009)
Husband is
employed (=1)
-1.231 -0.466 0.002 -0.431 -0.333 -0.052
(0.652) (0.164) (0.239) (0.271) (0.107) (0.066)
Household size -0.010 0.007 -0.022 0.001 0.005 0.002
(0.025) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.003)
Number of children
in household
0.206 0.051 0.086 0.028 -0.002 0.003
(0.075) (0.021) (0.037) (0.033) (0.016) (0.010)
Log per-capita
expenditure
0.186 -0.012 0.031 0.097 0.052 0.031
(0.129) (0.038) (0.061) (0.048) (0.025) (0.016)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
0.308 -0.068 0.235 0.195 -0.029 -0.012
(0.197) (0.054) (0.089) (0.095) (0.039) (0.024)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.707 -0.142 -0.283 -0.163 -0.067 -0.062
(0.234) (0.064) (0.118) (0.100) (0.041) (0.032)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.388 0.057 0.252 0.030 -0.003 0.056
(0.207) (0.053) (0.107) (0.084) (0.038) (0.026)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.253 -0.097 0.066 -0.169 -0.061 0.004
(0.265) (0.068) (0.136) (0.088) (0.042) (0.028)
Urban (=1) -0.046 0.043 -0.093 0.056 -0.049 0.012
(0.178) (0.049) (0.090) (0.062) (0.029) (0.020)
Java 0.392 0.134 0.226 0.024 -0.043 0.070
(0.193) (0.049) (0.099) (0.073) (0.035) (0.023)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
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Table B11: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Self-Assessment) on Indirect
Proxy of Women’s Autonomy (IFLS 2007)
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number
of arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares
of all
hh
assets
Wife’s
shares ofnon-
liquid
hh
assets
Currently
employed
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.010 0.023 0.830 -0.498 -1.094 0.010
(0.008) (0.015) (0.301) (0.281) (0.590) (0.009)
Wife’s age 0.050 0.035 0.842 0.055 1.045 0.046
(0.008) (0.011) (0.292) (0.286) (0.576) (0.008)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.011 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.000)
Religion is Islam (=1) 0.039 0.083 2.406 0.386 3.919 -0.138
(0.043) (0.064) (0.867) (0.980) (2.036) (0.032)
Wife’s years
of education
-0.004 0.041 0.342 -0.116 -0.248 0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.104) (0.074) (0.123) (0.002)
Ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s
0.003 -0.121 -4.315 3.064 11.188 0.020
(0.077) (0.110) (2.428) (2.637) (5.170) (0.067)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
0.008 -0.034 0.604 0.867 1.269 0.010
(0.007) (0.014) (0.398) (0.241) (0.493) (0.008)
Husband is employed (=1) 0.105 0.180 1.596 -0.196 5.633 -0.045
(0.043) (0.064) (1.648) (1.739) (2.820) (0.044)
Household size -0.014 -0.005 -0.096 -0.345 -0.114 -0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.118) (0.127) (0.220) (0.004)
Number of children
in household
0.076 0.009 0.003 -0.310 -0.376 -0.020
(0.009) (0.016) (0.302) (0.311) (0.556) (0.008)
Log per-capita
expenditure
-0.007 0.236 2.125 0.927 1.585 0.048
(0.015) (0.028) (0.529) (0.453) (0.870) (0.015)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
-0.004 0.074 2.115 -1.821 1.712 0.046
(0.024) (0.041) (0.954) (0.929) (1.846) (0.026)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.024 -0.005 0.351 -4.619 -10.817 0.033
(0.026) (0.046) (1.099) (0.876) (1.792) (0.024)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.016 0.088 3.177 -0.305 -2.416 0.015
(0.022) (0.067) (1.590) (0.650) (1.291) (0.027)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.019 -0.111 -1.578 -2.561 -8.296 0.043
(0.026) (0.054) (0.939) (0.759) (1.512) (0.027)
Urban (=1) -0.004 0.036 -1.397 -0.674 -0.564 -0.111
(0.020) (0.050) (1.127) (0.559) (1.099) (0.020)
Java 0.041 0.258 5.688 0.546 -1.764 -0.017
(0.020) (0.047) (1.032) (0.618) (1.324) (0.025)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table B12: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Religious Practice) on
Indirect Proxy of Women’s Autonomy (IFLS 2007)
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number
of arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares ofnon-
liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.001 0.023 0.494 -0.401 0.790 -0.006
(0.010) (0.020) (0.351) (0.304) (0.600) (0.012)
Wife’s age 0.049 0.031 0.792 -0.006 1.309 0.046
(0.008) (0.012) (0.307) (0.290) (0.602) (0.008)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.007 0.001 -0.015 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.000)
Religion is Islam (=1) 0.036 0.090 2.411 0.458 4.326 -0.140
(0.043) (0.064) (0.857) (1.012) (2.108) (0.033)
Wife’s years
of education
-0.004 0.042 0.338 -0.110 -0.269 0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.107) (0.077) (0.126) (0.002)
Ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s
0.000 -0.133 -4.620 3.392 13.349 0.003
(0.080) (0.107) (2.525) (2.747) (5.407) (0.068)
Ratio of wife’s years of
education to husband’s
0.007 -0.039 0.600 0.810 0.924 0.010
(0.008) (0.015) (0.432) (0.242) (0.499) (0.009)
Husband is employed (=1) 0.112 0.193 1.838 0.292 5.871 -0.048
(0.046) (0.066) (1.679) (1.731) (2.880) (0.046)
Household size -0.016 -0.009 -0.136 -0.402 -0.154 -0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.128) (0.129) (0.226) (0.004)
Number of children
in household
0.077 0.014 0.058 -0.371 -0.423 -0.017
(0.010) (0.016) (0.314) (0.317) (0.573) (0.009)
Log per-capita
expenditure
-0.005 0.240 2.329 0.835 1.169 0.046
(0.016) (0.029) (0.553) (0.461) (0.889) (0.015)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
0.003 0.116 2.375 -1.807 1.656 0.049
(0.026) (0.044) (1.028) (0.885) (1.750) (0.027)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.013 0.015 0.456 -4.632 -10.580 0.044
(0.026) (0.047) (1.149) (0.847) (1.813) (0.024)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.017 0.099 3.449 -0.390 -2.490 0.017
(0.023) (0.067) (1.632) (0.685) (1.352) (0.027)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.018 -0.089 -1.380 -2.847 -8.933 0.046
(0.027) (0.055) (0.995) (0.774) (1.564) (0.028)
Urban (=1) -0.001 0.029 -1.498 -0.604 -0.228 -0.109
(0.021) (0.051) (1.160) (0.577) (1.130) (0.020)
Java 0.041 0.262 5.863 0.198 -2.529 -0.016
(0.021) (0.048) (1.095) (0.662) (1.391) (0.026)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table B13: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Self-Assessment) on Indirect
Proxy of Women’s Autonomy (IFLS 2014)
Currently
use birth
control
Number of
arisangroups
joined
Wife’s
shares of
all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares ofnon-
liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.003 -0.014 -0.263 -0.970 0.013
(0.007) (0.019) (0.346) (0.704) (0.008)
Wife’s age 0.026 0.002 1.143 1.696 0.061
(0.007) (0.019) (0.341) (0.681) (0.007)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.000 0.000 -0.014 -0.019 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.010) (0.000)
Wife’s years
of education
-0.007 0.045 0.036 -0.067 0.007
(0.002) (0.006) (0.098) (0.180) (0.002)
Ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s
-0.185 -0.287 3.020 22.140 -0.010
(0.063) (0.157) (3.037) (5.875) (0.061)
Ratio of wife’s years of
education to husband’s
0.006 -0.051 0.980 1.165 0.001
(0.008) (0.019) (0.346) (0.644) (0.008)
Husband is
employed (=1)
-0.005 0.135 -5.010 -3.495 -0.010
(0.043) (0.131) (2.213) (4.353) (0.041)
Household size -0.007 0.005 -0.319 0.236 0.006
(0.003) (0.007) (0.147) (0.298) (0.003)
Number of children
in household
0.107 0.041 -0.733 -0.676 -0.040
(0.009) (0.020) (0.405) (0.737) (0.009)
Log per-capita
expenditure
-0.037 0.186 1.727 1.831 0.046
(0.013) (0.044) (0.626) (1.216) (0.012)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
-0.035 0.039 -1.320 6.166 0.002
(0.022) (0.065) (1.151) (2.577) (0.022)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.074 0.068 -9.217 -15.497 0.010
(0.022) (0.078) (1.130) (2.202) (0.024)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.027 0.108 -1.106 -6.791 0.031
(0.020) (0.069) (0.905) (1.892) (0.023)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.004 -0.023 -5.585 -14.609 0.027
(0.020) (0.070) (1.002) (1.967) (0.026)
Urban (=1) -0.036 -0.179 -0.377 -0.130 -0.053
(0.017) (0.056) (0.838) (1.664) (0.019)
Java 0.037 0.096 0.360 0.186 -0.014
(0.016) (0.065) (0.857) (1.770) (0.021)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table B14: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Religious Practice) on
Indirect Proxy of Women’s Autonomy (IFLS 2014)
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares ofnon-
liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.011 0.021 -0.136 0.605 0.005
(0.009) (0.028) (0.368) (0.734) (0.012)
Wife’s age 0.029 -0.003 1.082 1.814 0.058
(0.007) (0.019) (0.344) (0.697) (0.007)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.001 0.000 -0.013 -0.021 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.010) (0.000)
Wife’s years
of education
-0.007 0.045 0.089 -0.030 0.007
(0.002) (0.006) (0.103) (0.188) (0.002)
Ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s
-0.217 -0.230 2.922 23.318 -0.001
(0.065) (0.159) (3.084) (6.114) (0.062)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
0.006 -0.044 0.835 1.172 -0.001
(0.008) (0.019) (0.350) (0.635) (0.008)
Husband is
employed (=1)
-0.004 0.114 -5.324 -4.584 -0.004
(0.046) (0.136) (2.254) (4.566) (0.043)
Household size -0.007 0.005 -0.365 0.186 0.007
(0.003) (0.007) (0.148) (0.298) (0.003)
Number of children
in household
0.110 0.041 -0.592 -0.470 -0.040
(0.009) (0.021) (0.407) (0.748) (0.009)
Log per-capita
expenditure
-0.033 0.185 1.695 1.948 0.040
(0.014) (0.044) (0.636) (1.238) (0.013)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
-0.027 0.036 -0.754 6.510 -0.002
(0.023) (0.067) (1.162) (2.616) (0.023)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.064 0.074 -9.186 -14.849 0.008
(0.023) (0.079) (1.157) (2.238) (0.024)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.033 0.097 -0.988 -6.535 0.035
(0.021) (0.071) (0.953) (1.974) (0.023)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.005 -0.027 -5.512 -14.484 0.027
(0.021) (0.071) (1.025) (1.984) (0.026)
Urban (=1) -0.030 -0.175 -0.175 -0.099 -0.052
(0.017) (0.058) (0.863) (1.684) (0.019)
Java 0.034 0.086 0.589 0.514 -0.016
(0.017) (0.067) (0.892) (1.776) (0.021)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table B15: Fixed-effect Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Self-Assessment) on
Indirect Proxy of Women’s Autonomy
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares ofnon-
liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.015 0.033 0.424 0.080 -0.001
(0.008) (0.022) (0.360) (0.721) (0.008)
Wife’s age 0.034 0.173 -0.383 0.042 0.075
(0.009) (0.024) (0.411) (0.806) (0.009)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.007 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.011) (0.000)
Wife’s years
of education
0.004 0.001 0.645 0.373 0.003
(0.005) (0.012) (0.242) (0.451) (0.005)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
-0.012 -0.005 -0.909 -0.958 0.002
(0.013) (0.031) (0.504) (0.975) (0.012)
Household size -0.002 -0.014 -0.607 -0.070 0.010
(0.006) (0.013) (0.249) (0.609) (0.006)
Number of children
in household
0.101 0.056 0.205 -0.392 -0.053
(0.011) (0.026) (0.496) (0.926) (0.011)
Log per-capita
expenditure
-0.008 0.168 -0.521 -1.716 0.028
(0.017) (0.045) (0.793) (1.400) (0.016)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
0.028 0.054 -3.308 -5.299 0.067
(0.034) (0.080) (1.539) (3.276) (0.030)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.077 0.047 -3.646 2.929 0.016
(0.035) (0.083) (1.589) (3.853) (0.035)
Urban (=1) 0.078 -0.089 0.845 1.468 0.021
(0.028) (0.064) (1.307) (2.837) (0.027)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variable estimates that are not statistically significant are not presented.
These control variables are: religion is Islam, ratio of wife’s age to husband’s,
husband is employed, and Java.
The estimations also include, although not presented, age fixed-effect and birth month
by province fixed effect.
275
Table B16: Fixed-effect Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Religious Practice)
on Indirect Proxy of Women’s Autonomy
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares
of non-
liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.016 0.006 -0.857 1.057 0.001
(0.010) (0.030) (0.478) (0.854) (0.011)
Wife’s age 0.033 0.175 -0.362 0.676 0.075
(0.010) (0.026) (0.425) (0.849) (0.010)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.015 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.011) (0.000)
Wife’s years
of education
0.005 0.003 0.651 0.319 0.005
(0.005) (0.012) (0.250) (0.451) (0.005)
Ratio of wife’s years of
education to husband’s
-0.014 -0.010 -0.990 -0.246 -0.003
(0.013) (0.033) (0.563) (0.974) (0.012)
Husband is
employed (=1)
0.106 0.159 -2.153 -2.875 -0.001
(0.049) (0.139) (2.418) (5.441) (0.054)
Household size 0.004 -0.011 -0.690 -0.070 0.016
(0.006) (0.014) (0.275) (0.604) (0.006)
Number of children
in household
0.099 0.058 -0.042 -0.892 -0.055
(0.011) (0.027) (0.511) (0.968) (0.011)
Log per-capita
expenditure
0.001 0.165 -0.783 -2.314 0.029
(0.018) (0.048) (0.830) (1.479) (0.016)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
0.029 0.068 -3.567 -5.402 0.068
(0.036) (0.088) (1.624) (3.266) (0.032)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.085 0.038 -3.807 4.799 0.008
(0.036) (0.086) (1.632) (3.870) (0.035)
Urban (=1) 0.079 -0.094 0.926 1.628 0.021
(0.028) (0.062) (1.178) (2.688) (0.028)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variable estimates that are not statistically significant are not presented.
These control variables are: religion is Islam, ratio of wife’s age to husband’s, & Java.
The estimations also include, although not presented, age fixed-effect and birth month
by province fixed effect.
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Table B17: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Self-Assessment) on Indirect
Proxy of Women’s Autonomy (IFLS 2007)
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number
of arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares
of non-
liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.041 0.240 4.804 -1.387 -8.800 0.122
(0.061) (0.157) (3.370) (1.799) (3.557) (0.072)
Wife’s age 0.049 0.027 0.688 -0.001 1.194 0.046
(0.008) (0.013) (0.331) (0.283) (0.583) (0.008)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.007 0.001 -0.012 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.000)
Religion
is Islam (=1)
0.001 0.165 4.083 0.342 2.180 -0.083
(0.052) (0.093) (1.702) (1.163) (2.455) (0.042)
Wife’s years
of education
-0.004 0.041 0.324 -0.135 -0.222 0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.109) (0.076) (0.126) (0.002)
Ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s
0.014 -0.083 -3.689 2.565 11.807 0.036
(0.078) (0.117) (2.573) (2.688) (5.318) (0.072)
Ratio of wife’s years of
education to husband’s
0.007 -0.033 0.654 0.831 1.093 0.009
(0.008) (0.015) (0.417) (0.241) (0.509) (0.008)
Husband is
employed (=1)
0.107 0.169 1.503 -0.291 3.954 -0.048
(0.044) (0.069) (1.733) (1.642) (2.947) (0.047)
Household size -0.015 -0.003 -0.052 -0.371 -0.157 -0.001
(0.004) (0.007) (0.141) (0.138) (0.264) (0.004)
Number of children
in household
0.078 0.013 0.056 -0.362 -0.673 -0.023
(0.010) (0.018) (0.333) (0.320) (0.600) (0.009)
Log per-capita
expenditure
-0.005 0.228 2.037 1.046 2.240 0.041
(0.016) (0.030) (0.571) (0.475) (0.921) (0.016)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
-0.003 0.105 2.564 -1.647 1.116 0.053
(0.025) (0.045) (1.013) (0.954) (1.937) (0.028)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.030 0.003 0.290 -4.514 -10.279 0.036
(0.027) (0.049) (1.148) (0.899) (1.758) (0.025)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.015 0.071 3.046 -0.262 -1.800 -0.001
(0.024) (0.072) (1.714) (0.678) (1.403) (0.028)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.010 -0.118 -1.814 -2.439 -7.419 0.027
(0.028) (0.056) (1.015) (0.785) (1.579) (0.028)
Urban (=1) -0.011 0.048 -1.193 -0.628 -0.779 -0.093
(0.021) (0.053) (1.192) (0.560) (1.154) (0.022)
Java 0.055 0.226 4.900 0.835 -0.012 -0.040
(0.024) (0.058) (1.299) (0.711) (1.662) (0.028)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
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Table B18: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Religious Practice) on Indirect
Proxy of Women’s Autonomy (IFLS 2007)
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number
of arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.131 0.131 0.890 -1.682 -7.570 0.087
(0.052) (0.130) (2.462) (1.637) (3.394) (0.061)
Wife’s age 0.050 0.025 0.735 -0.056 1.682 0.045
(0.008) (0.013) (0.332) (0.285) (0.614) (0.008)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.007 0.002 -0.019 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.000)
Religion is
Islam (=1)
-0.013 0.108 2.522 0.469 4.393 -0.108
(0.051) (0.077) (1.090) (1.040) (1.984) (0.034)
Wife’s years
of education
-0.002 0.040 0.325 -0.107 -0.106 -0.000
(0.003) (0.006) (0.118) (0.084) (0.148) (0.003)
Ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s
-0.025 -0.084 -4.365 2.602 11.490 0.032
(0.081) (0.117) (2.793) (2.815) (5.556) (0.074)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
0.007 -0.039 0.602 0.768 0.692 0.009
(0.008) (0.015) (0.438) (0.242) (0.493) (0.009)
Husband is
employed (=1)
0.121 0.181 1.809 0.261 5.623 -0.054
(0.047) (0.069) (1.764) (1.609) (2.932) (0.047)
Household size -0.015 -0.009 -0.134 -0.437 -0.093 -0.004
(0.004) (0.007) (0.139) (0.136) (0.255) (0.004)
Number of children
in household
0.077 0.019 0.068 -0.416 -0.766 -0.018
(0.010) (0.018) (0.346) (0.324) (0.589) (0.009)
Log per-capita
expenditure
-0.001 0.243 2.471 0.911 1.565 0.044
(0.016) (0.030) (0.573) (0.471) (0.927) (0.016)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
-0.004 0.146 2.682 -1.608 1.367 0.060
(0.028) (0.045) (1.072) (0.894) (1.827) (0.028)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.015 0.022 0.371 -4.510 -9.861 0.048
(0.027) (0.048) (1.183) (0.868) (1.889) (0.024)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.015 0.098 3.674 -0.410 -2.076 0.009
(0.025) (0.070) (1.690) (0.696) (1.391) (0.027)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.000 -0.086 -1.304 -2.702 -7.801 0.030
(0.029) (0.056) (1.014) (0.803) (1.671) (0.029)
Urban (=1) -0.016 0.030 -1.620 -0.546 -0.556 -0.093
(0.022) (0.052) (1.172) (0.550) (1.128) (0.021)
Java 0.075 0.248 5.749 0.586 -0.784 -0.040
(0.025) (0.053) (1.176) (0.818) (1.738) (0.029)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
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Table B19: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Self-Assessment) on Indirect
Proxy of Women’s Autonomy (IFLS 2014)
Currently
use birth
control
Number of
arisangroups
joined
Wife’s
shares of
all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.119 0.366 -9.004 -16.446 0.054
(0.051) (0.172) (2.870) (4.738) (0.075)
Wife’s age 0.023 -0.025 1.445 2.609 0.056
(0.009) (0.024) (0.439) (0.846) (0.009)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.000 0.000 -0.016 -0.029 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.012) (0.000)
Religion is
Islam (=1)
0.129 0.340 -1.433 -0.203 -0.115
(0.044) (0.125) (1.716) (3.293) (0.060)
Wife’s years
of education
-0.003 0.052 -0.078 -0.241 0.008
(0.002) (0.007) (0.130) (0.218) (0.003)
Ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s
-0.149 -0.154 -0.164 14.116 -0.025
(0.076) (0.204) (3.951) (7.303) (0.071)
Ratio of wife’s years of
education to husband’s
0.010 -0.060 0.520 0.250 0.001
(0.008) (0.023) (0.365) (0.646) (0.008)
Husband is
employed (=1)
0.067 0.031 -5.255 -5.094 -0.014
(0.053) (0.186) (2.565) (5.968) (0.046)
Household size -0.009 -0.002 -0.412 0.157 0.004
(0.003) (0.009) (0.171) (0.344) (0.003)
Number of children
in household
0.097 0.061 -0.971 -1.486 -0.039
(0.009) (0.025) (0.457) (0.815) (0.010)
Log per-capita
expenditure
-0.018 0.227 1.217 2.346 0.033
(0.016) (0.053) (0.787) (1.487) (0.014)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
-0.033 0.030 -0.180 6.596 -0.018
(0.026) (0.083) (1.447) (3.106) (0.026)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.081 0.102 -8.649 -15.251 -0.012
(0.025) (0.093) (1.387) (2.689) (0.027)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.021 0.068 -0.546 -5.590 0.010
(0.023) (0.089) (1.123) (2.342) (0.028)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.016 -0.147 -5.037 -15.013 0.021
(0.025) (0.096) (1.262) (2.203) (0.032)
Urban (=1) -0.018 -0.127 -1.370 -0.909 -0.049
(0.020) (0.078) (1.051) (1.936) (0.023)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious
practice.
Control variable estimates that are not statistically significant are not presented (Java).
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Table B20: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity (Religious Practice) on Indirect
Proxy of Women’s Autonomy (IFLS 2014)
Currently
use birth
control
Number of
arisangroups
joined
Wife’s
shares of
all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares
of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
Religiosity
(religious practice)
0.055 -0.031 -6.566 -10.218 0.017
(0.039) (0.129) (2.256) (3.805) (0.063)
Wife’s age 0.033 -0.005 1.005 1.522 0.053
(0.008) (0.023) (0.388) (0.785) (0.008)
Wife ageˆ2 -0.001 0.000 -0.009 -0.014 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.011) (0.000)
Religion is
Islam (=1)
0.085 0.245 1.810 7.766 -0.131
(0.041) (0.109) (1.552) (2.873) (0.045)
Wife’s years
of education
-0.007 0.054 0.241 0.258 0.007
(0.003) (0.008) (0.132) (0.225) (0.002)
Ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s
-0.180 -0.224 -0.527 16.832 -0.027
(0.077) (0.195) (3.941) (7.273) (0.075)
Ratio of wife’s years
of education to husband’s
0.012 -0.052 0.392 0.473 -0.002
(0.008) (0.022) (0.339) (0.599) (0.008)
Household size -0.009 -0.001 -0.444 0.123 0.005
(0.003) (0.008) (0.156) (0.317) (0.003)
Number of children
in household
0.094 0.051 -0.456 -0.578 -0.040
(0.010) (0.024) (0.436) (0.828) (0.010)
Log per-capita
expenditure
-0.017 0.227 1.571 3.381 0.028
(0.016) (0.053) (0.733) (1.428) (0.015)
Live with
wife’s parents (=1)
-0.020 0.048 -0.034 5.871 -0.021
(0.026) (0.079) (1.313) (2.926) (0.026)
Live with
husband’s parents (=1)
-0.074 0.096 -8.180 -13.073 -0.014
(0.026) (0.091) (1.372) (2.568) (0.029)
Ambilocal
kinship norms (=1)
0.032 0.107 -0.835 -5.820 0.017
(0.023) (0.085) (1.152) (2.410) (0.028)
Patrilocal
kinship norms (=1)
-0.020 -0.058 -4.550 -13.325 0.024
(0.026) (0.089) (1.270) (2.560) (0.032)
Urban (=1) -0.023 -0.197 -0.373 0.283 -0.054
(0.020) (0.069) (1.028) (1.925) (0.022)
Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in
religious practice.
Control variable estimates that are not statistically significant are not presented.
These control variables are: husband is employed and Java.
280
Ta
bl
e
B
21
:
Fi
rs
tS
ta
ge
Es
tim
at
io
n
Re
su
lts
(IF
LS
20
07
)
A
ll
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
O
nl
y
fo
r
M
us
lim
s
Re
lig
ios
ity
(se
lf-
as
se
ss
m
en
t)
Re
lig
ios
ity
(re
lig
iou
sp
ra
ct
ice
)
Re
lig
ios
ity
(se
lf-
as
se
ss
m
en
t)
Re
lig
ios
ity
(re
lig
iou
sp
ra
ct
ice
)
Co
m
m
un
ity
re
lig
ios
ity
(se
lf-
as
se
ss
m
en
t)
0.3
94
**
*
0.1
39
**
*
0.3
58
**
*
0.1
29
*
(0
.07
0)
(0
.06
7)
(0
.07
7)
(0
.07
1)
Co
m
m
un
ity
re
lig
ios
ity
(re
lig
iou
sp
ra
ct
ice
))
0.0
27
0.3
46
**
0.0
75
0.3
18
**
*
(0
.04
7)
(0
.06
0)
(0
.05
1)
(0
.06
1)
M
or
et
ha
n
75
pe
rc
en
to
fv
ill
ag
ep
op
ul
at
ion
pa
rti
cip
at
ed
in
re
lig
iou
sa
ct
iv
iti
es
(=
1)
0.1
06
**
*
0.1
05
**
*
0.0
99
**
0.0
91
**
(0
.04
0)
(0
.03
9)
(0
.04
1)
(0
.04
1)
Ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
42
84
40
46
38
89
36
46
Ad
ju
ste
d
R
2
0.0
79
0.1
32
0.0
79
0.1
32
F-
sta
ts
16
.65
17
.25
17
.81
15
.08
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs,
clu
ste
re
d
at
vil
lag
el
ev
el,
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s

p
<
0:
10
,

p
<
0:
05
,

p
<
0:
0
1
281
Ta
bl
e
B
22
:
Fi
rs
tS
ta
ge
Es
tim
at
io
n
Re
su
lts
(IF
LS
20
14
)
A
ll
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
O
nl
y
fo
r
M
us
lim
s
Re
lig
ios
ity
(se
lf-
as
se
ss
m
en
t)
Re
lig
ios
ity
(re
lig
iou
sp
ra
ct
ice
)
Re
lig
ios
ity
(se
lf-
as
se
ss
m
en
t)
Re
lig
ios
ity
(re
lig
iou
sp
ra
ct
ice
)
Co
m
m
un
ity
re
lig
ios
ity
(se
lf-
as
se
ss
m
en
t)
0.3
75
**
*
0.1
25
0.3
24
**
*
0.1
61
*
(0
.07
2)
(0
.08
1)
(0
.08
5)
(0
.09
0)
Co
m
m
un
ity
re
lig
ios
ity
(p
ra
yi
ng
be
ha
vi
or
s/
pr
ay
in
g
fre
qu
en
cy
-o
nl
y
fo
rM
us
lim
s)
0.1
80
**
*
0.4
02
**
*
0.2
32
**
*
0.3
78
**
*
(0
.04
2)
(0
.06
3)
(0
.04
6)
(0
.06
2)
M
or
et
ha
n
75
pe
rc
en
to
fv
ill
ag
ep
op
ul
at
ion
pa
rti
cip
at
ed
in
re
lig
iou
sa
ct
iv
iti
es
(=
1)
0.0
18
0.0
87
8*
*
-0
.00
9
0.0
61
(0
.04
1)
(0
.04
0)
(0
.04
3)
(0
.04
0)
Ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
40
42
38
74
36
55
34
86
Ad
ju
ste
d
R
2
0.0
90
0.1
57
0.0
75
0.1
62
F-
sta
ts
19
.79
22
.87
19
.47
23
.00
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs,
clu
ste
re
d
at
vil
lag
el
ev
el,
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s

p
<
0
:1
0
,

p
<
0
:0
5
,

p
<
0:
0
1
282
Table B23: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-making
Power
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Time use
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.023 0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.016 0.007
(0.046) (0.012) (0.030) (0.016) (0.009) (0.006)
Observations 5270 4977 5270 5270 5270 4337
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.008 0.023 0.017 0.025 0.008
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.095 -0.014 -0.009 -0.053 -0.023 0.005
(0.051) (0.011) (0.037) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 5013 4746 5013 5013 5013 4124
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.008 0.022 0.018 0.027 0.008
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.191 -0.040 -0.095 -0.041 -0.008 -0.010
(0.058) (0.016) (0.026) (0.023) (0.012) (0.008)
Observations 6393 6005 6393 6393 6393 5800
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.022 0.035 0.042 0.039 0.014
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.052 -0.032 -0.017 0.040 -0.022 -0.026
(0.063) (0.016) (0.031) (0.026) (0.012) (0.008)
Observations 6127 5763 6127 6127 6127 5556
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.022 0.033 0.042 0.041 0.017
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam, ratio
of wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live
with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship
norms, urban, and Java
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Table B25: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-making
Power
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.212 -0.059 -0.034 -0.041 -0.076 0.005
(0.320) (0.079) (0.227) (0.090) (0.058) (0.056)
Observations 5116 4834 5116 5116 5116 4212
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.000 0.025 0.015 0.015 0.008
First stage F-stat 26.38 21.73 26.38 26.38 26.38 20.67
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.013 0.241 0.024 0.017 0.970 0.289
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.821 -0.115 -0.395 -0.218 -0.040 -0.063
(0.301) (0.066) (0.200) (0.073) (0.042) (0.042)
Observations 4868 4612 4868 4868 4868 4006
Adjusted R2 -0.020 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 0.027 -0.013
First stage F-stat 30.02 29.70 30.02 30.02 30.02 28.48
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.156 0.698 0.120 0.229 0.636 0.419
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-1.671 -0.480 -0.902 -0.152 -0.114 -0.081
(0.441) (0.112) (0.237) (0.141) (0.077) (0.043)
Observations 5139 4880 5139 5139 5139 4662
Adjusted R2 -0.072 -0.130 -0.123 0.035 0.024 -0.004
First stage F-stat 19.14 18.57 19.14 19.14 19.14 18.08
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.850 0.703 0.966 0.468 0.422 0.199
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-1.124 -0.315 -0.507 -0.168 -0.076 -0.093
(0.303) (0.076) (0.162) (0.103) (0.055) (0.033)
Observations 4950 4711 4950 4950 4950 4488
Adjusted R2 -0.002 -0.030 -0.013 0.028 0.036 0.004
First stage F-stat 25.57 24.30 25.57 25.57 25.57 20.81
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.284 0.364 0.056 0.715 0.206 0.610
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam, ratio of
wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure,
live with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship
norms, urban, and Java
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Table B26: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Indirect Proxy of Women’s
Autonomy
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number of
arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares of
all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.010 0.026 0.875 -0.391 -0.664 0.011
(0.008) (0.015) (0.285) (0.264) (0.538) (0.009)
Observations 4414 5271 5271 5219 3855 5271
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.158 0.081 0.033 0.056 0.087
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.001 0.047 0.872 -0.002 1.034 -0.001
(0.010) (0.018) (0.312) (0.283) (0.514) (0.010)
Observations 4167 5014 5014 4969 3717 5014
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.161 0.082 0.036 0.060 0.086
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.003 -0.005 N/A -0.347 -0.803 0.011
(0.007) (0.017) (0.324) (0.644) (0.007)
Observations 5233 3296 6369 4666 6393
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.074 0.062 0.079 0.076
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.011 0.039 N/A -0.256 -0.008 0.002
(0.009) (0.023) (0.324) (0.608) (0.010)
Observations 4990 3185 6105 4527 6127
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.073 0.063 0.081 0.071
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam, ratio of
wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live with
wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship norms,
urban, and Java
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Table B27: Fixed-effect Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Indirect Proxy of
Women’s Autonomy
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.015 0.025 0.181 -0.031 0.002
(0.008) (0.019) (0.310) (0.582) (0.006)
Observations 10408 9798 12337 9401 12395
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.326 0.012 0.009 0.063
F-stat 18.818 74.859 4.021 2.148 20.755
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.016 0.018 -0.544 0.896 0.005
(0.010) (0.025) (0.405) (0.642) (0.008)
Observations 9938 9387 11844 9118 11896
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.325 0.015 0.010 0.063
F-stat 18.875 70.328 4.137 2.207 18.759
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam,
ratio of wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s,
husband is employed, household size number of children in household, nominal
log per-capita expenditure, live with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents,
ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table B28: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Indirect Proxy of Women’s
Autonomy
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number
of arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.040 0.251 5.149 -1.451 -6.334 0.092
(0.061) (0.138) (3.009) (1.495) (2.680) (0.064)
Observations 4282 5117 5117 5068 3745 5117
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.112 0.039 0.030 0.021 0.067
First stage F-stat 16.67 26.41 26.41 26.95 18.07 26.41
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.012 0.607 0.605 0.947 0.740 0.162
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.131 0.173 2.130 -0.953 -3.153 0.051
(0.052) (0.108) (2.079) (1.281) (2.563) (0.052)
Observations 4044 4869 4869 4827 3609 4869
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.150 0.078 0.034 0.042 0.079
First stage F-stat 17.16 29.99 29.99 30.60 36.07 29.99
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.207 0.804 0.370 0.798 0.166 0.100
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.119 0.304 N/A -7.445 -13.692 0.058
(0.051) (0.144) (2.330) (4.086) (0.063)
Observations 4038 2697 5124 3923 5139
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.012 -0.023 -0.027 0.061
First stage F-stat 19.87 23.93 32.54 31.62 31.88
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.104 0.189 0.171 0.788 0.122
Religiosity
(religious practice)
0.055 -0.016 N/A -4.726 -7.424 0.001
(0.039) (0.106) (1.800) (2.961) (0.051)
Observations 3870 2616 4937 3819 4950
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.080 0.038 0.050 0.064
First stage F-stat 22.91 23.52 42.24 13.91 42.24
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.028 0.055 0.050 0.088 0.100
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam, ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed, household
size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live with wife’s parents,
live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table B29: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-making
Power (only for Muslims)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.013 0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.021 0.008
(0.049) (0.013) (0.031) (0.016) (0.009) (0.006)
Observations 4748 4472 4748 4748 4748 3915
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.006 0.018 0.017 0.025 0.007
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.079 -0.016 0.011 -0.051 -0.027 0.005
(0.052) (0.011) (0.039) (0.017) (0.011) (0.009)
Observations 4484 4234 4484 4484 4484 3696
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.006 0.016 0.017 0.027 0.007
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.184 -0.044 -0.088 -0.036 -0.005 -0.013
(0.060) (0.017) (0.027) (0.024) (0.012) (0.008)
Observations 5789 5437 5789 5789 5789 5285
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.021 0.031 0.039 0.039 0.014
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.099 -0.046 -0.034 0.034 -0.028 -0.031
(0.068) (0.017) (0.033) (0.028) (0.013) (0.009)
Observations 5520 5192 5520 5520 5520 5039
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.021 0.029 0.040 0.042 0.017
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam, ratio
of wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is
employed, household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita
expenditure, live with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms,
patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table B30: Fixed-effect Estimation of Religiosity on Women’s
Decision-making Power (only for Muslims)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Time use
decisions
Fertility
decisions
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.075 -0.022 -0.024 -0.007 -0.020 -0.003
(0.055) (0.016) (0.031) (0.022) (0.012) (0.008)
Observations 11223 10770 11223 11223 11223 9901
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.146 0.104 0.060 0.033 0.022
F-stat 38.394 42.289 27.585 18.439 9.331 5.580
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.018 0.005 0.027 -0.011 -0.026 -0.009
(0.069) (0.019) (0.038) (0.028) (0.015) (0.011)
Observations 10715 10295 10715 10715 10715 9457
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.145 0.106 0.059 0.032 0.021
F-stat 37.273 40.222 26.941 16.085 9.463 4.911
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, ratio of wife’s age
to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure,
live with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, urban, and Java
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Table B31: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-making
Power (only for Muslims)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.272 -0.066 -0.086 -0.050 -0.070 0.010
(0.337) (0.085) (0.244) (0.095) (0.063) (0.058)
Observations 4617 4352 4617 4617 4617 3803
Adjusted R2 0.022 -0.004 0.017 0.014 0.018 0.007
First stage F-stat 17.81 13.71 17.81 17.81 17.81 15.13
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.211 0.639 0.197 0.227 0.453 0.211
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.678 -0.088 -0.329 -0.186 -0.014 -0.066
(0.282) (0.061) (0.201) (0.071) (0.043) (0.041)
Observations 4363 4124 4363 4363 4363 3592
Adjusted R2 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 0.001 0.027 -0.015
First stage F-stat 26.82 26.75 16.34 16.34 16.34 12.56
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.211 0.639 0.060 0.019 0.743 0.141
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-1.546 -0.475 -0.799 -0.128 -0.086 -0.106
(0.446) (0.118) (0.242) (0.141) (0.077) (0.044)
Observations 4640 4406 4640 4640 4640 4234
Adjusted R2 -0.057 -0.126 -0.096 0.032 0.032 -0.018
First stage F-stat 24.80 20.02 24.798 24.80 24.80 20.89
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.022 0.293 0.055 0.020 0.743 0.141
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-1.207 -0.339 -0.541 -0.173 -0.085 -0.093
(0.309) (0.077) (0.165) (0.106) (0.058) (0.035)
Observations 4449 4235 4449 4449 4449 4059
Adjusted R2 -0.009 -0.036 -0.024 0.024 0.037 0.006
First stage F-stat 24.95 24.70 26.82 26.82 26.82 26.01
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.588 0.419 0.197 0.227 0.453 0.211
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, ratio of wife’s age
to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed, household
size, number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live with wife’s parents,
live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table B32: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Indirect Proxy of Women’s
Autonomy (only for Muslims)
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number
of arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.008 0.029 0.982 -0.262 -0.560 0.011
(0.008) (0.015) (0.304) (0.259) (0.579) (0.009)
Observations 4005 4749 4749 4701 3483 4749
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.152 0.075 0.033 0.047 0.078
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.006 0.053 0.957 0.235 1.556 -0.001
(0.010) (0.020) (0.354) (0.299) (0.549) (0.010)
Observations 3752 4485 4485 4445 3341 4485
Adjusted R2 0.064 0.154 0.074 0.037 0.053 0.077
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.001 -0.007 N/A -0.196 -0.511 0.010
(0.007) (0.018) (0.339) (0.683) (0.007)
Observations 4749 3061 5770 4232 5789
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.076 0.058 0.072 0.070
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.013 0.041 N/A -0.354 -0.183 -0.005
(0.010) (0.024) (0.349) (0.648) (0.009)
Observations 4504 2949 5503 4091 5520
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.075 0.060 0.074 0.065
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, ratio of wife’s age
to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure,
live with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms,
patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table B33: Fixed-effect Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Indirect Proxy of
Women’s Autonomy (only for Muslims)
Currently use
birth control
Number of
arisan groups
joined
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares
of non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.014 0.013 0.384 0.206 0.001
(0.008) (0.019) (0.328) (0.601) (0.007)
Observations 9461 8940 11170 8552 11224
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.328 0.012 0.006 0.067
F-stat 19.234 69.717 3.718 1.578 21.938
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.010 0.028 -0.436 0.817 0.007
(0.011) (0.023) (0.432) (0.684) (0.009)
Observations 8984 8521 10669 8263 10716
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.328 0.015 0.007 0.067
F-stat 18.829 64.744 3.767 1.611 19.837
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, ratio of wife’s age
to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure,
live with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, urban, and Java
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Table B34: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Indirect Proxy of Women’s
Autonomy (only for Muslims)
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number
of arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.098 0.287 5.181 -1.365 -5.295 0.069
(0.062) (0.150) (3.221) (1.639) (2.981) (0.069)
Observations 3890 4618 4618 4572 3393 4618
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.093 0.037 0.029 0.020 0.069
First stage F-stat 16.19 24.83 24.83 25.65 17.33 24.83
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.037 0.886 0.564 0.823 0.836 0.154
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.162 0.163 1.656 -1.046 -3.257 0.044
(0.055) (0.113) (2.188) (1.364) (2.594) (0.055)
Observations 3647 4364 4364 4325 3253 4364
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.149 0.075 0.033 0.027 0.072
First stage F-stat 15.07 26.80 26.80 27.29 33.18 26.80
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.381 0.686 0.347 0.918 0.484 0.116
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.045 0.346 N/A -6.405 -12.091 0.048
(0.047) (0.145) (2.417) (4.331) (0.065)
Observations 3651 2500 4627 3549 4640
Adjusted R2 0.065 -0.009 -0.010 -0.018 0.059
First stage F-stat 19.51 21.62 28.86 27.57 28.28
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.680 0.092 0.181 0.651 0.071
Religiosity
(religious practice)
0.034 0.050 N/A -4.765 -8.071 -0.013
(0.041) (0.104) (1.917) (3.154) (0.048)
Observations 3482 2418 4438 3444 4449
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.083 0.034 0.035 0.058
First stage F-stat 23.04 27.69 42.66 40.93 42.61
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.629 0.023 0.160 0.433 0.068
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, ratio of wife’s age
to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed, household
size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live with wife’s parents,
live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table B35: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-making
Power (Weighed)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.022 0.003 -0.015 -0.001 -0.018 0.011
(0.047) (0.012) (0.029) (0.016) (0.010) (0.006)
Observations 4417 4141 4417 4417 4417 3788
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.007 0.032 0.014 0.025 0.009
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.068 -0.008 0.006 -0.052 -0.025 0.012
(0.053) (0.012) (0.039) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009)
Observations 4170 3919 4170 4170 4170 3582
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.006 0.029 0.015 0.027 0.009
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.188 -0.046 -0.100 -0.040 0.002 -0.008
(0.057) (0.016) (0.027) (0.024) (0.013) (0.008)
Observations 5239 4881 5239 5239 5239 4872
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.027 0.047 0.027 0.027 0.011
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.103 -0.045 -0.047 0.031 -0.023 -0.024
(0.067) (0.019) (0.034) (0.026) (0.013) (0.009)
Observations 4996 4659 4996 4996 4996 4646
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.027 0.045 0.027 0.030 0.013
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam,
ratio of wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband
is employed, household size, number of children in household, nominal log per-capita
expenditure, live with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms,
patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table B37: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-making
Power (Weighed)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.192 -0.026 -0.040 -0.071 -0.065 0.027
(0.373) (0.099) (0.262) (0.103) (0.075) (0.067)
Observations 4284 4018 4284 4284 4284 3673
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.004 0.033 0.006 0.019 0.008
First stage F-stat 16.65 13.19 16.65 16.55 16.65 13.45
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.026 0.511 0.024 0.040 0.779 0.569
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.834 -0.088 -0.426 -0.261 -0.012 -0.045
(0.348) (0.089) (0.218) (0.089) (0.054) (0.050)
Observations 4046 3805 4046 4046 4046 3474
Adjusted R2 -0.024 -0.005 -0.007 -0.026 0.028 -0.004
First stage F-stat 25.57 24.30 25.57 25.57 25.57 25.81
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.050 0.031 0.004 0.784 0.328 0.900
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-1.832 -0.482 -1.058 -0.137 -0.115 -0.096
(0.508) (0.136) (0.274) (0.157) (0.089) (0.051)
Observations 4042 3811 4042 4042 4042 3781
Adjusted R2 -0.121 -0.140 -0.187 0.020 0.006 -0.020
First stage F-stat 19.79 18.73 19.79 19.79 19.79 20.05
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.850 0.718 0.998 0.568 0.412 0.208
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-1.333 -0.343 -0.706 -0.180 -0.056 -0.086
(0.372) (0.101) (0.196) (0.123) (0.066) (0.043)
Observations 3874 3660 3874 3874 3874 3623
Adjusted R2 -0.019 -0.032 -0.030 0.012 0.026 0.001
First stage F-stat 22.86 23.76 22.86 22.86 22.86 21.96
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.300 0.350 0.070 0.799 0.203 0.592
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam, ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed, household
size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live with wife’s parents,
live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table B38: OLS Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-making
Power (only for Muslims & Weighed)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.018 0.005 -0.011 0.001 -0.023 0.011
(0.051) (0.013) (0.031) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007)
Observations 4005 3746 4005 4005 4005 3441
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.004 0.029 0.014 0.025 0.008
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.040 -0.006 0.026 -0.046 -0.027 0.016
(0.052) (0.013) (0.041) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010)
Observations 3752 3518 3752 3752 3752 3229
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.003 0.026 0.014 0.027 0.008
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.169 -0.045 -0.089 -0.031 0.004 -0.009
(0.059) (0.017) (0.028) (0.025) (0.014) (0.008)
Observations 4755 4429 4755 4755 4755 4452
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.026 0.043 0.026 0.025 0.010
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.171 -0.064 -0.076 0.022 -0.028 -0.029
(0.074) (0.020) (0.037) (0.029) (0.015) (0.010)
Observations 4510 4205 4510 4510 4510 4224
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.027 0.042 0.026 0.028 0.013
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure,
live with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms,
patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table B40: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-making
Power (only for Muslims & Weighed)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.183 -0.023 -0.063 -0.070 -0.040 0.035
(0.385) (0.106) (0.276) (0.104) (0.079) (0.068)
Observations 3889 3640 3889 3889 3889 3338
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.002 0.029 0.006 0.025 0.006
First stage F-stat 16.17 12.58 16.17 16.17 16.17 13.60
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.053 0.612 0.060 0.063 0.306 0.446
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.600 -0.052 -0.331 -0.198 0.029 -0.039
(0.336) (0.088) (0.235) (0.085) (0.060) (0.050)
Observations 3646 3422 3646 3646 3646 3134
Adjusted R2 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.007 0.022 -0.004
First stage F-stat 15.08 14.73 15.08 15.08 15.08 16.58
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.208 0.850 0.221 0.276 0.379 0.330
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-1.642 -0.464 -0.935 -0.091 -0.068 -0.124
(0.497) (0.138) (0.269) (0.155) (0.085) (0.051)
Observations 3655 3445 3655 3655 3655 3443
Adjusted R2 -0.091 -0.130 -0.144 0.021 0.016 -0.042
First stage F-stat 19.47 18.38 19.47 19.47 19.47 19.87
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.838 0.772 0.976 0.474 0.861 0.884
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-1.388 -0.366 -0.738 -0.160 -0.056 -0.093
(0.393) (0.107) (0.203) (0.131) (0.072) (0.046)
Observations 3486 3293 3486 3486 3486 3284
Adjusted R2 -0.018 -0.034 -0.037 0.014 0.024 0.000
First stage F-stat 23.00 23.55 23.00 23.00 23.00 22.05
~2 P-val
(Overidentification test) 0.840 0.746 0.402 0.637 0.725 0.820
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variables are: community-level self-assessed religiosity, community-level
religious practice, and more than 75 percent village population participation in religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, ratio of
wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size, number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure, live with
wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms,
patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table B41: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-making
Power (using only one IV)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-routine
household
decisions
Time use
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-2.837 -0.337 -1.617 -0.748 -0.005 -0.136
(1.563) (0.311) (0.905) (0.402) (0.157) (0.162)
Observations 4416 4140 4416 4416 4416 3787
Adjusted R2 -1.025 -0.240 -0.695 -0.670 0.025 -0.117
First stage F-stat 8.38 8.89 8.38 8.38 8.38 7.66
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-1.132 -0.131 -0.620 -0.313 -0.004 -0.072
(0.383) (0.098) (0.250) (0.096) (0.059) (0.053)
Observations 4169 3918 4169 4169 4169 3581
Adjusted R2 -0.073 -0.014 -0.053 -0.039 0.027 -0.019
First stage F-stat 41.68 39.67 41.68 41.68 41.68 45.52
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-1.922 -0.515 -0.705 -0.382 -0.058 -0.277
(0.789) (0.216) (0.397) (0.268) (0.120) (0.088)
Observations 4742 4451 4742 4742 4742 4423
Adjusted R2 -0.140 -0.160 -0.057 -0.019 0.019 -0.276
First stage F-stat 23.59 22.36 23.59 23.59 23.59 25.41
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-1.079 -0.281 -0.407 -0.228 -0.025 -0.156
(0.414) (0.110) (0.218) (0.148) (0.069) (0.051)
Observations 4525 4253 4525 4525 4525 4221
Adjusted R2 0.008 -0.007 0.013 0.009 0.026 -0.033
First stage F-stat 50.93 51.91 50.93 50.93 50.93 50.85
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variable is: community-level religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam, ratio of
wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size, number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure,
live with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal
kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table B42: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Indirect Proxy (using only
one IV)
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number
of arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.414 0.337 0.447 -3.506 -15.368 0.114
(0.189) (0.343) (6.866) (4.826) (11.515) (0.163)
Observations 4412 4417 4417 4366 3038 4417
Adjusted R2 -0.539 0.046 0.077 0.003 -0.179 0.045
First stage F-stat 8.41 8.40 8.40 9.50 7.75 8.40
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.165 0.100 -0.480 -1.339 -6.344 0.039
(0.058) (0.132) (2.644) (1.827) (3.733) (0.062)
Observations 4165 4170 4170 4126 2909 4170
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.144 0.076 0.034 0.012 0.076
First stage F-stat 41.31 41.68 41.68 43.04 48.22 41.68
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.036 -0.166 N/A -7.274 -14.810 0.102
(0.080) (0.267) (4.075) (6.311) (0.111)
Observations 4737 2461 4722 3298 4742
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.043 -0.026 -0.046 0.045
First stage F-stat 23.55 18.74 24.03 23.79 23.59
Religiosity
(religious practice)
0.022 -0.103 N/A -4.235 -7.650 0.037
(0.045) (0.143) (2.262) (3.736) (0.062)
Observations 4520 2371 4507 3191 4525
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.053 0.040 0.045 0.068
First stage F-stat 50.96 35.75 50.86 49.72 50.93
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variable is: community-level religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, religion is Islam,
ratio of wife’s age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is
employed, household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita
expenditure, live with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms,
patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table B43: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Decision-making
Power (using only one IV and Muslims population)
Aggregate
measure
Child-
related
decisions
Routine
household
decisions
Non-
routine
household
decisions
Timeuse
decisions
Fertility
decisions
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-1.552 -0.146 -0.974 -0.402 0.066 -0.085
(0.847) (0.201) (0.565) (0.213) (0.127) (0.114)
Observations 3994 3736 3994 3994 3994 3431
Adjusted R2 -0.287 -0.046 -0.246 -0.183 0.000 -0.046
First stage F-stat 13.42 14.32 13.42 13.42 13.42 13.14
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.848 -0.076 -0.501 -0.236 0.037 -0.070
(0.372) (0.096) (0.267) (0.092) (0.065) (0.053)
Observations 3743 3510 3743 3743 3743 3220
Adjusted R2 -0.029 -0.002 -0.034 -0.012 0.019 -0.018
First stage F-stat 37.50 32.75 37.50 37.50 37.50 40.48
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-1.634 -0.502 -0.603 -0.264 -0.037 -0.234
(0.685) (0.190) (0.349) (0.237) (0.110) (0.078)
Observations 4280 4016 4280 4280 4280 4019
Adjusted R2 -0.090 -0.152 -0.036 0.004 0.019 -0.191
First stage F-stat 28.15 27.62 63.81 28.15 28.15 29.23
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-1.104 -0.334 -0.416 -0.198 -0.011 -0.150
(0.437) (0.117) (0.230) (0.159) (0.077) (0.053)
Observations 4063 3818 4063 4063 4063 3817
Adjusted R2 0.012 -0.016 0.011 0.014 0.024 -0.024
First stage F-stat 52.48 51.93 52.48 52.48 52.48 51.13
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variable is: community-level religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, ratio of wife’s age
to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size, number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure,
live with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms,
patrilocal kinship norms, urban, and Java
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Table B44: IV Estimation of the Impact of Religiosity on Women’s Indirect Proxy
(using only one IV and Muslims population)
Currently
use birth
control
Number
of arisangroups
joined
Number
of arisan
meetings
attended
last year
Wife’s
shares
of all
household
assets
Wife’s
shares of
non-liquid
household
assets
Currently
employed
IFLS 2007
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
-0.355 0.236 -0.962 -3.589 -13.396 0.045
(0.143) (0.273) (5.647) (3.977) (8.404) (0.131)
Observations 3993 3995 3995 3949 2768 3995
Adjusted R2 -0.381 0.097 0.064 -0.002 -0.130 0.067
First stage F-stat 13.43 13.45 13.45 15.22 13.98 13.45
Religiosity
(religious practice)
-0.192 0.092 -1.152 -1.375 -7.316 0.027
(0.062) (0.144) (2.916) (2.015) (3.934) (0.068)
Observations 3742 3744 3744 3705 2636 3744
Adjusted R2 -0.007 0.141 0.066 0.034 -0.012 0.068
First stage F-stat 37.51 37.50 37.50 38.96 43.85 37.50
IFLS 2014
Religiosity
(self-assessment)
0.040 -0.110 N/A -5.929 -13.479 0.059
(0.071) (0.223) (3.616) (5.489) (0.090)
Observations 4275 2277 4262 2983 4280
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.063 -0.006 -0.038 0.058
First stage F-stat 52.52 43.65 52.55 53.04 52.48
Religiosity
(religious practice)
0.027 -0.078 N/A -4.144 -8.497 0.021
(0.049) (0.153) (2.471) (4.058) (0.063)
Observations 4058 2186 4047 2876 4063
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.063 0.038 0.034 0.058
First stage F-stat 25.871 8.131 12.156 15.995 14.389
Standard errors, clustered at community level, in parentheses;
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The instrumental variable is: community-level religious practice.
Control variables: wife’s age, wife’s age2, wife’s years of education, ratio of wife’s
age to husband’s, ratio of wife’s years of education to husband’s, husband is employed,
household size number of children in household, nominal log per-capita expenditure,
live with wife’s parents, live with husband’s parents, ambilocal kinship norms, patrilocal
kinship norms, urban, and Java
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